The Mind-Body Problem

[gekokujo]

Originally Posted by coolmantaho

materialism or physicalism, whichever preferred.

my preferred theory does not fall under physicalism; for physicalists, mind does not arise from brain – in fact, mind does not exist at all, since everything a person does is but a deterministic response to what is sensed in the environment; therefore, for physicalists, it is not mind but rather behavior that arises from the brain, the organ of control.

nevertheless, my chosen theory is still grounded in the general materialistic model: matter and energy are all that exist, all that can exist, and all that can give rise to existence; thus, mind, a material object, arises from brain, a material object.

furthermore, matter and energy are the same. an electrical discharge is no less material than a rock. a mind possesses an objective existence same as light or radio waves.

since my preferred theory prescribes that mind arises from a material cause (the brain) and is itself a material object, and because this theory does not contradict materialism which prescribes that the material is all that exists and all that can arise or, more precisely, emerge into existence, this theory has been aptly labeled Emergentism.

Ischaramoochie: although your objections are straightforward as always, it appears you’ve elaborated HBB’s

Originally Posted by HBB

Does that mean a non-material something can arise from a material something?

to which i respond: no, a non-material cannot arise from a material since a non-material cannot arise, period. can anyone offer a non-material being or object that possesses a property that is not merely an elaboration of something in the material world?

pain, anger and other emotions are physical events since each is an involuntary response generated by the body in reaction to physical stimuli, is detectable by our sense organs, and causes measurably-increased levels of specific brain chemicals; true, anger or sexual arousal can be triggered without the presence of an external stimulus but a mental image of, say, Anna Kournikova assembled by the brain’s visual center from impressions stored in memory remains a form of physical stimulation, albeit generated by an internal mechanism of the brain: memory, dreams and the process of visualization have no less an objective existence than the external objects they reference, though their actual subject matter may not share that property, i.e. imaginary or fictional creatures, places, and circumstances.

on the other hand, “abstract concepts” do not exist, therefore cannot arise but are merely implied. the concept of pain and anger is implied by the experience of the involuntary responses pain and anger. mathematics is “experienced”, first of all, through the unconscious processes which underlie our motor skills: children born with damage to a specific part of the brain have found it impossible to learn the ability to count, in that they also lack the ability to recognize their own fingers or distinguish bet. the left and right sides of their bodies (stimulus applied to the left hand felt in the right) - and so lack an objective frame of reference by which knowledge being imparted to them can be anchored; thus, even though numbers and words can be physically pointed-to in books or computer screens, that is insufficient to induce learning since the mind must also be able to check what the senses apprehend against a sufficient store of previously “checked” or verified knowledge.

the phenomenon of learning, then, is actually an argument for the materiality of the brain since learning requires an objective reference: nothing can imply nothing.

one can even learn “new” things without even adding new information, the mind of a detective recapitulates previous experiences to arrive at a reasoned guess despite the specifics of the present case being hidden; what does not follow is that an objective source necessarily “beget” something with an objective identity: 1+1=2 regardless of any mind but the same cannot be said of reasoned guesses (including mine) nor subjective concepts like morality and justice.

[coolmantaho]

i'll share that fifth proposition after a few more discussions anybody is free to guess though...

the problem that i see however, with even searching for a fifth proposition, if it does exist at all, is that it may serve so abtruse in nature and form that most will probably even consider it mere fanciful thinking to which no amount of contemplation will settle, somewhat akin to pondering what other cognitive abilities humans will gain in the far future, aside from reason, intuition, emotion, etc.

as for my analogy to the mind-body problem, i present a model of ordered society. a mass of human beings together in residence (though this, in itself is interconnected to the mind-body problem), who continue to maintain a harmonious connection with one another (i will emphasize that they make regular contact with one another... in which they would not constitute people merely thrown together in a specific locality and coerced to remain there). what exactly runs a human society, we might ask--- the people who exist in it, or the ideas that they exchange, that they succumb to everyday in the form of theoretical models, religions, or even just plain societal norms? perhaps some will argue that without the people, a society would not persist. of course this is a viable option, since the definition of a society itself consists of a population of people. but without ideas, how would the members of the said ORDERED society maintain their state? concepts of 'family', of 'peace', of 'justice', and 'social harmony' (these are all ideas) would not even exist, hence the society would be unable to function, to even persist. and yet to ascribe the running of the society alone to ideas would be an abhorrent fallacy, since ideas themselves cannot exist without the human element.

it is clear then, that both play their part. and yet the exact relationship between the idea-constituent of the society, and the human-constituent corresponding, is but fuzzy at most. as in the mind-body problem the idea-constituent does not gain a physical form whatsoever, not even in the sub-atomic level, and the human-constituent does manifest directly in physical reality. and yet the idea-constituent is able to influence the human-constituent to perhaps even stifling amounts, as well as the converse.

the ultimate question to be gained here is the question, 'which comes first?' and yet let us note again that a society cannot exist without both components, the material and immaterial. maybe one might say that it was individual person that first formulated the necessary ideas to allow social cohesion, but then we must recall the analogy is the society, not the person. mind = ideas, body = members of society. by the time the society is actually PRESENT (or 'born'), both elements already exist, if in basic form. and without either, it would be expunged.

more on this later.

anyway, another element which i consider must also be taken account into this most interesting problem is that the mind is dynamic both in function, and in evolution. correct me if i'm wrong, but it seems that the latter part (the mind is dynamic in its evolution) has been undoubtedly taken for granted in former posts. the mind-state that humans possess now, has been different from the time of the first hominids, and will change drastically furthermore into the future (for the better, hopefully).

i think there are several trends that i believe are palpable (if we are to consider evolutionary anthropology):
1). A 'being' must have a brain (even if this brain is but primitive), to have a mind.
2). the complexity of the brain is proportional to the complexity of the mind
3). the complexity of the mind is commensurate to the ability of the 'being' discussed to commune with that which is abtruse, immaterial.

based on these two, it seems that it is the brain which seems to 'create' the mind, and thus it would seem to support a materialist view.

consider this however--- that it is an increased complexity of mind, that which propels the brain to evolve further, and thus become more complex. with an ability of an organism to comprehend the symbolic, that which is immaterial--- take language for example--- the task of comprehension of these can be ultimately taxing to the mind. over time, the symbols that a mind will derive from the immaterial will grow more and more complex.

consider the building of communication as an instance, communication begins as but simple physical gestures (check out mating rituals among animals) but this eventually grows to form intricate symbols ever more elaborate, whether in speech or writing (try checking out the chinese written language, for size). because of the growth of complexity in communication, this compels the mind to evolve its powers of comprehension, to make the job of deciphering the signs easier, to make the task more efficient. this necessitates the brain to become more sophisticated, in order that the mind becomes more sophisticated. and when the mind develops new heights of complexity, so does the immaterial allegories it ascribes also become more intricate. if the 'beings' under discussion are under the environmental compulsion to develop symbolic skills (ex. develop hunter communication to maximize hunting), then the process would possibly occur with even more intensity, and speed.

ergo:
4). a complexity of the mind serves as the impetus for further evolution of the brain--- generally in the direction of further complexity.

the better brain precedes a better mind, precedes a better brain. if we follow this back towards the very beginning, we'll end up again with that classic question: which came first--- the chicken or the egg? except in this instance it applies to the mind and body(brain). because of this, we will have to trace the evolution of the brain unto the simplest organisms, and ultimately, the very beginning of life. and yet, where does life begin?--- another quintessential philosophical question.

herein lies another great mystery.

i think i'm rambling here. and i might have made some errors somewhere... check for it.

[coolmantaho]

gekokujo... give me a day to mull over your reply... unfortunately, my brain works too slowly for my taste. perhaps you could elaborate a bit (just a bit) on what you intended by the mind being a 'material object', and if it is a material object, how it does manifest in objective reality...

[gekokujo]

^ok, but first

Originally Posted by gekokujo

the phenomenon of learning, then, is actually an argument for the materiality of the brain since learning requires an objective reference: nothing can imply nothing.

that should read "mind", mind!

[Quentin]

or maybe mind is but an abstraction for a sentient property? nyeee

[Jaywalker]

Originally Posted by Ischaramoochie

1. The human body is a material thing.
2. The human mind is a spiritual thing.
3. Mind and Body interact.
4. Spirit and Matter do not interact.

first I don’t know what was meant by “spirit”. If “spirit” is the assumption that consciousness can exist independent of the brain, then are we saying that the mind is different from consciousness because if not, preposition 3 and 4 are direct opposites of one sentence. It’s like saying A is not B and C is A but C is synonymous with B. They’re not only contradictory in logic but also “directly” contradictory in sentence structure.

I’m having issues with Ischaramoochie’s assumption that there can be non-material interactions between material entities. Most of the examples of non-material interactions between material entities given above involve human consciousness (which was also assumed nonmaterial -a circular argument therefore)
Subjectivity doesn’t necessarily entail non-determinacy or non-materiality. If two individuals get different emotions upon seeing an image that’s just because of their different personalities-which are byproducts of their experiences and natural temperament –which are byproducts of other things (Chaos theory remember) and when you go down to the basic elements. It’s still very material in nature

Originally Posted by Ischaramoochie

that electrochemical processes could be altered with the reception of new information would not really serve as a defense of the physicalist theory since information itself is non-physical

On the surface information does seem immaterial but The information that our senses receive can be broken down into physical elements. The image our eyes receive are just variations in light patterns. Sounds are just pressure disturbances in the air. So it’s not like information is passed from one point to another through non-physical means..
Unless someone’s going to include the quantum brain theory into the discussion then direct physical interaction among material entities is the only plausible explanation.

Intangibility and materiality are not totally incompatible concepts. Like the example I gave before a 3 dimensional image of an object in a computer screen has properties that don’t seem tangible but the image is composed of material units. What is intangible is the illusion it creates but it actually exists as a material entity in real space only in a different form.

[Jaywalker]

edited ...double post

[gekokujo]

cool: sorry, didn’t notice your question before, just a bit then: it’s established that specific ‘thinking’ tasks are accompanied by increased activity in specific regions of the brain. it’s established that when these same regions of the brain are damaged, the same ‘thinking’ tasks are hampered to a degree consistent with the damage incurred. my position is that this relation along with other similar relations are facts that make it extremely unlikely for the mind to not arise from the brain and extremely unlikely for the mind to arise from somewhere other than the brain.

thus i introduce another term after emergence and that term is supervenience. i’d also like to make my category of emergentism more specific by saying that i prefer to ally myself to the monist emergentists, since i am asserting that the material is the one substance whose existence is justified. yup.

[Jaywalker]

sorry about the double post ....I'm pretty sure I edited the second one though

[coolmantaho]

geko,

you view sounds terribly valid, in that it reduces all that is possible to exist in the universe to be simply material (as you said, matter and energy). i can't say that before, i haven't subscribed to a pseudo-materialist view. but as of the moment, i'm currently seeking if a model that introduces both elements of the material and that which is 'immaterial' (not necessarily spirit, in my view, but a sort of metaphysical reality which is somehow intertwined with what we realize to be 'objective'). for personal reasons, one of which would be i want to formulate my own idiosyncratic theory...

as of now however, since you have taken the assumption that all is material, and only can be material, this is difficult to dispute, since it reduces the main objections to the non-reference of something immaterial to simply some neurological phenomenon in the brain. and yet, in order to do that, the materialist view must also make a prior assumption: that what our sense-impressions, first, are believable, and true. if we posit the converse, however--- that these sense-impressions are not true--- then we may end up with conclusion that those sense-impressions are all that exist for us, and hence end up with a view that only those that is possible is that which is mental in origin, that only the pseudo-spiritual exists and everything outside our mind, our perception of 'self', is part of it... for all we may know, the only concrete thing that truly persists may be that conception of 'self'... and this ultimately leads into solipsicism (did i spell that right?).

it must be noted however, that both theories of the mind-body relation that i've mentioned thus far, are beyond doubt logically derived, and if one merely refers to their doctrine, all is solved. to settle it--- mind, body thingamajig--- we must either subscribe to one extreme or the other, that everything is actually pure 'mind' (phenomenalism) or pure 'body' (materialism). both views are nearly incontestable, in their own right.

the problem that i currently face myself, is why selecting either extreme can result in a system that is coherent and cogent, while introducing both elements, the material body, and the 'spiritual' mind, produces the paradox we view now. not only by means of the four presuppositions presented above, but what causes us to postulate them. maybe at their root, lies a general misinterpretation of what is 'spirit', 'material'.

just rambling.

as of now, i have not yet discovered any possible counter-arguments for your model 'emergentism'. maybe the reason behind it is that is metascientific: it is anchored by the discoveries of the physical sciences (of which we all know their extreme successes), and builds upon them. this characteristic of the materialist view is further espoused by neuroscience, which has also come into the picture. but specifically because it is metascientifical, its survival also hangs fully on what triumphs and failures the future of science will bring. if by some slim probability, science can account for EVERY psychological/parapsychological phenomenon by means of the physical sciences, then its supremacy will be indisputable. but if there will still remain at least ONE mental faculty which cannot be expatiated by such, then its validity will still be prone to doubt.

on a side-note, about the brain's visual systems, i've read quite some kooky (if still completely unproven) theories about how the brain may produce them. one involves the brain having specialized neuron-axes (axes corresponding to the axes of a coordinate planes) which corresponds all visual information we recieve into mathematical entity-values which 'make-up', so to speak, what we see.

about the learning thing however, this can also entail another possibility aside from learning being a pure objective phenomenon. it might also be possible to consider that immaterial aspects can possibly manifest in something material without necessarily interacting with it. nothing in the four postulates says something against this. though this will implacably lead again into the same problem.

as for the rest of your post:

on the other hand, “abstract concepts” do not exist, therefore cannot arise but are merely implied. the concept of pain and anger is implied by the experience of the involuntary responses pain and anger. mathematics is “experienced”, first of all, through the unconscious processes which underlie our motor skills

one can even learn “new” things without even adding new information, the mind of a detective recapitulates previous experiences to arrive at a reasoned guess despite the specifics of the present case being hidden; what does not follow is that an objective source necessarily “beget” something with an objective identity: 1+1=2 regardless of any mind but the same cannot be said of reasoned guesses (including mine) nor subjective concepts like morality and justice.

sorry bro... medyo nalabuan ako dito. i find difficulty in understanding what you intend by 'abstract concepts do not exist but are implied.' i tried following this by my understanding, and eventually ended up at what seemed to be a self-refutation of your very model: if abstract concepts do not 'exist' as such, then how can materialism hang on objective, scientific concepts which themselves are abstract?

just found it rather... fuzzy... those two quotes.

[freakster2k1]

reject all four; none of them fits my experience-- it is important for philosophy to fit one's experience and not let our experience fit in a philosophy.

[coolmantaho]

correction:

i tried following this by my understanding, and eventually ended up at what seemed to be a self-refutation of your very model: if abstract concepts do not 'exist' as such, then how can materialism hang on objective, scientific concepts which themselves are abstract?

make that: then how can materialism hang on scientific concepts which correspond to the objective but themselves are abstract, and hence non-existent?

[Ischaramoochie]

the fifth proposition is:

5. Each of the four previous propositions is true only to a certain extent.

...a penrose rectangle:

[gekokujo]

^mooch man: that's the 'impossible' made material - how about the 'immaterial'?

[gekokujo]

Originally Posted by coolmantaho

then how can materialism hang on scientific concepts which correspond to the objective but themselves are abstract, and hence non-existent?

because it’s the other way around, scientific concepts “hang” on what we are able to determine about the world: it’s the experience of the body’s responses pain and anger which imply the concepts pain and anger, it’s the experience of the physical phenomena of falling bodies which implies the law of gravity, it’s the experience that bodies in space don’t simply ‘fall’ as much as observers perceive their successively (re-)appearing in a string of points and interpret this as motion/directionality that dis-implies the absoluteness of classical physics and implies the relativity of space-time – and that may not be the end of the story: we are beholden to the world, not our concepts of it (are you implying Kant?)…

…which means that the materialist position is not simply “logically-derived”, rather it is logically-implied by what we have determined about the world at this point…

on “expatiating” each and every: to be true to itself, even if science were to account for 100 out of 100 tricky problems listed, it must still assume that questions no. 101 to infinity remain unanswered - just that nobody’s asked them yet…

…and even then scientists are still obliged to ask a final question: “does anyone have a better answer?”

“neural axes”: hey, that makes sense! esp. with regards to memory, it’d be more efficient to map key coordinates on Anna Kournikova’s face and body (“impressions”) and reassemble them on a generic sprite model labeled “goddess” should the need arise. might be worth exploring how that’s related to the subjectivity question.

it might also be possible to consider that immaterial aspects can possibly manifest in something material without necessarily interacting with it.

what’s an immaterial aspect? and wouldn’t manifesting into or becoming something else be a form of interacting with that something else?

[Ischaramoochie]

Originally Posted by gekokujo

^mooch man: that's the 'impossible' made material - how about the 'immaterial'?

that is only partly true. what is made material is something which looks like the penrose rectangle, but the penrose rectangle itself remains impossible. here's a picture of the object after a change in perspective:

the real penrose rectangle is a non-physical product of the mind, which cannot exist in a material form.

[gekokujo]

...which references a physical object in the world called a rectangle.

and that "something" keeps the impossibility of its concept intact, hence nothing is challenged really.

[gekokujo]

how about something impossible to conceive?

[Ischaramoochie]

Originally Posted by Jaywalker

Assuming that the mind is produced through non-deterministic/non-physical processes in the brain is problematic in that it would introduce very iffy concepts that would be very hard to defend using empirically acceptable methods. Non physical interactions between physical entities if simplified to their basic operations should still be physical in nature.

I think a good analogy would be a 3d image of a mug in a computer monitor. The 3d image isn’t actually a physical mug but the basic units that compose the image is physical in nature. Though it is not physically what it appears to be, it exists in physical space and therefore a physical entity. Not a physical mug but a physical representation of a mug. I think the same can be said about consciousness. The seeming intangibility of such concepts doesn’t necessarily imply their non-physicality

there's something amiss about the analogy of a physical mug and the physical means of representing it. first of all, the material used to represent the mug is undoubtedly physical, but the representation itself does not rest in the physicality of the materials used. had that been the case, then converting the complicated arrangement of colors of the bitmap into a palette should not change the nature of the representation. since this is clearly not the case, representation lies not in the physical means by which a thing is represented.

by this, we come to a discussion on semantics and semiotics. what really is a representation, and what relation does it have to that which it represents? as far as a sign or symbol is concerned, the relation between it and the thing represented lies in the consciousness which perceives it, depending on a preconceived relationship between the two. there is no difference between two persons' perception of a chinese character, although it's representation could be very different, especially if one knows how to read chinese and the other does not.

but before we go on to such a discussion, we need to know whether there really is an objective basis for perception. we find consolation in the fact that others appear to share the same opinion when we call an object "red." what is doubtful however is whether what is generally called red appears the same for all people. consider the scenario of placing one of your hands in cold water and the other in hot water: undoubtedly one would feel hotness on one hand, and coldness on the other. however, placing both hands in warm water just after the previous experiment would lead one to believe that the water is both hot and cold! clearly this is an impossibility if we are to assume perception as objective.

lastly, how are we to account for the apparently physical space where dreams take place? if we assume the first person in the dream to be our conscious selves, then where are our "selves?" should we say that the character which we believe to be us in our dreams is simply an illusion?

[Ischaramoochie]

Originally Posted by gekokujo

...which references a physical object in the world called a rectangle.

and that "something" keeps the impossibility of its concept intact, hence nothing is challenged really.

not really - a rectangle is not a physical object, but merely a description of its form. had a rectangle really existed as a physical object, then it should be dependent on a specific material for it to be called as such.

something impossible to conceive, such as the event of an insurmountable force encountering an immovable rock only serves to strengthen the argument for the immateriality of the mind. since mind is capable of recognizing such things as infinity, insurmountability, and immovability in spite of these properties being only logical negations of observable physical properties, then it means that the mind is not constrained by physical limits. this demonstrates the mind's ability to transcend physical cognitive limitations and arrive at ideas all its own without reference to the senses.