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PHOTOS: 40th PBA Season Opening Ceremony

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PROMO: Big Hero 6

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PHOTOS: Kia Victorious in Battle of Newcomers

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PHOTOS: Aguilar, Ginebra Bully Talk N Text

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REVIEW: The Trial

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Results 1 to 20 of 20
  1. #1
    glorifiedprogramer
    Join Date
    Sep 2000
    Location
    Rizal

    Lightbulb Does anybody have a copy of the U.P. thesis papers of Trillanes??

    The artilcle on the paper of Trillanes as described in today's Inquirer looks intriguing.

    Every evidence are exact to the dates, times and places except for the persons involved in the alleged corruption.

    Now, does anybody have a copy of either/both of the said Trillanes thesis papers?

    This will make an interesting and enlightening read.

  2. #2
    It's being serialized in Malaya. PDI also has a copy. Perhaps you can check with them (or ask them to serialize it, too). You could also ask the UP dept. that gives the Public Administration degree.

  3. #3

    Cool

    jeez, do you have to remind us that that guy once studied in UP? hindi ko matanggap hanggang ngayon.

  4. #4

  5. #5
    Almost Famous
    Join Date
    Apr 2001
    Location
    Agusan_Del_Sur
    i have the full 37 pages.

    *************

    CONCLUSIONS

    Based on the data gathered, the following are the conclusions:
    1. There is corruption in the Philippine Navy procurement system. However, the levels of corruption of the different units of the PN varied and are dependent on the corruptive or non-corruptive behavior of their respective Commanders.
    2. There are several forms of corruption being practiced. These are; lagay, negotiated canvass, rigged bidding, "ghost delivery", overpricing, tong, substitution and under delivery.
    3. The main reason why corruption is being resorted to is to expedite the processing of documents. Also, the corruptive behavior is not initiated by the dealer nor the procurement official instead, the practice had become a routine that both parties readily and mutually agree on the terms.
    4. All offices involved in the procurement system had corruption incidences. However, some offices were perceived to be more corrupt than the others. Ironically, the COA, which is supposed to be the watchdog of the government against corruption, got a 100% response in corruption perception.
    5. There is a prevailing fixed rate of lagay. However, this is dependent on the amount of transaction except for the COA, where the consistent response yielded the amount of lagay at 1-2% of the amount of the transaction.
    6. The data gathered validated the hypothesis inferred by the theoretical framework where the boundary exchange processes between the procurement officals and accredited dealers, which work within the milieu of the procurement process, would result to bureaucratic corruption. However, this is not applicable to offices, which have no discretionary powers, as in the case of the Deputy Commander's office and to offices, which are already part of the largesse as in the case of the BAC.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    There are only two practical recommendations that can be formulated as a result of this study. First, is for the PN to strictly adhere to the merit system of promotion and selection of officers to be designated as commanders of its different units. The primary criteria for qualification should be an officer who possesses moral integrity, technical competence and vision to effectively formulate reforms and, more importantly, he should also have the political will to implement these reforms.
    The other recommendation is to limit the boundary exchange processes to the front line levels only so as to totally insulate the other offices. Thus, these offices can perform their review and inspection functions with a more independent and dispassionate perspective.

    AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

    This research has opened a floodgate for future investigative researches. One is an operations research on the auditing processes of the COA. It is very frustrating to know that the very agency tasked to weed out corruption is unanimously found to be the most corrupt office. Another future study could be a policy research to formulate policies to address this endemic problem of bureaucratic corruption
    Last edited by PnoloP; Aug 1, 2003 at 09:17 AM.

  6. #6
    Symbian personified
    Join Date
    Mar 2001
    Location
    Quezon City

    The TRILLANES thesis

    INTRODUCTION
    On 26 May 2001, Abu Sayyaf bandits kidnapped 20 persons from Dos
    Palmas, an up-scale resort in Palawan. The next day, a joint task
    force was formed to conduct pursuit operations (PDI, 27 May 2001). On
    28 May, a reconnaissance plane spotted the kidnappers' group aboard
    three boats approaching the Mapun Island Group (MIG)(PDI, 28 May
    2001). Immediately, four navy patrol crafts were dispatched to
    conduct a naval blockade on the island. Then finally on 31 May, Abu
    Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya claims that they have slipped through the
    naval blockade and are now in Sulu and Basilan (PDI, 31 May 2001).
    Presidential Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao quickly forgave the Navy
    for its ineffectiveness when he said: "the gunmen's boats had top
    speeds of 40 knots, way beyond the capability of the Philippine Navy.
    Using that type of craft they would have eaten up the wide expanse of
    Sulu Sea between Palawan and Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi (Mapun) in five
    hours" (PDI, 28 May 2001). Tiglao further stressed that "the biggest
    problem really is the Philippine Navy has few patrol boats. There are
    plans to increase the number of these patrol boats" (PDI, 28 May
    2001). These statements coming from the presidential spokesperson
    clearly signified three things: First, is the cluelessness of the
    PGMA Administration as regards the true situation on the area because
    of its total reliance on non-incriminating information given by the
    AFP leadership; Second, is its ignorance on the capabilities of its
    navy; Last, is the PGMA Administration's penchant for tolerating
    grossly incompetent acts of the AFP, in this case the Navy, due to
    her political indebtedness for being primarily responsible for
    installing her as President of the Republic.
    The kidnappers actually used three motor launches (lancha) that run a
    measly 12 knots as seen by the Air Force reconnaissance plane and
    reported to the Western Command. This probably explains why the
    kidnappers took two days (and not 5 hours as Tiglao said) to travel
    from Dos Palmas to MIG. Besides, the kumpit (fast motor boats used by
    smugglers in the South), while it is true that it can run up to 40
    knots (without load), it is never used for prolonged sorties as it
    easily runs out of fuel. Its reported fuel consumption is approx 500
    liters/hr at speed of 40 knots. For it to traverse Dos Palmas to
    Mapun, they would need space for at least 10 drums of fuel aside from
    the space that the kidnappers and hostages would occupy. For a sleek
    boat, which measures no more than 60 feet, this is impossible unless
    they had a convoy of at least 5 kumpits, which is totally unheard of
    and costs around P125, 000,000.00.
    The four navy patrol crafts would have successfully blockaded MIG
    (area approx 30 sq n.mi) had they been deployed correctly. Each craft
    has a navigational/surface search radar that has an effective
    scanning radius of 6 nautical miles (n.mi.). This means that if
    properly positioned, the four patrol crafts' radar sweeps should have
    overlapped at least at the middle, thus covering the whole MIG upto 3
    n.mi. off the coastlines. However, as it happened the Task Group
    Commander in charge of the blockade, relying heavily on intelligence
    reports, positioned all four crafts 1n.mi off Tandatao Pt of Mapun
    mainland at 500-yard intervals thus minimizing their surface search
    capabilities. The Naval Special Warfare Group team that landed in the
    area supposedly to rescue the hostages found out that indeed one of
    the boats used was anchored near Tandatao Pt, but the kidnappers'
    group were either in Pamelikan Is or Binlut Is, the northern islands
    of MIG and both were way beyond radar range from where the crafts
    were positioned. Thus, enabling the group to slip off to Basilan.
    The escape of the Abu Sayyaf through the naval blockade was one
    tactical blunder that caused great humiliation and enormous cost to
    the country. To be simply ignored and forgiven by the President
    (through Tiglao's statement) was a display of weakness as a Commander-
    In-Chief of the AFP. But I am inclined to believe that the President
    was not as stupid and weak as this gesture had showed. Thus, it is
    rather safe to conclude that it was her political indebtedness and
    fear of the AFP that prevented her from imposing sanctions that could
    have antagonized it. Otherwise, she would also suffer the same fate
    as former President Estrada through another "withdrawal of support"
    by the AFP. These unfortunate political concessions, first
    demonstrated in the case of RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP during the PN
    leadership crisis that occurred in February 2001(to be discussed
    later in this paper), while it would favor certain officers, could
    further deteriorate the Navy, and the AFP.
    While it would seem that the incident cited above has dwelt more on
    incompetence and ineffectiveness, this paper would show that this is
    just one manifestation of the ill effects of corruption in the Navy.
    More specifically, how corruption made this incident even possible to
    happen.
    Through the years, the Navy top brass have always raised the issues
    of obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the fleet to
    cover for the Navy's ineffectiveness. But is this really the case?
    Or, is it simply caused by an institutionalized corruption that
    exists in all levels and in all areas of the organization? If so,
    then what is the cost? How could this problem be solved? These are
    the questions that this paper intends to answer.
    In going about the discussion, a brief look at the history of the
    Navy will be necessary to appreciate its importance and relevance to
    the country. Other basic facts about the organization would also have
    to be laid down to provide the necessary backdrop to the main subject
    of the paper.
    THE PHILIPPINE NAVY
    THE PAST
    The Insurgent Navy
    The Philippine Navy traces its roots way back to the Philippine
    Revolution against Spain with the hand-over by the Americans of a
    captured Spanish steam pinnace to Gen Emilio Aguinaldo on 20 May
    1898. The vessel was named Magdalo and emerged as the first
    watercraft of the navy. Soon, several other merchant ships donated by
    patriots were added to form a nascent fleet. The Insurgent Navy was
    instrumental to the revolutionary cause through its conduct of basic
    naval operations such as troop deployments and arms shipments. The
    first successful amphibious assault against a Spanish garrison was
    even spearheaded by the Magdalo on Bacoor Bay on 26 May 1898. Its
    effectiveness went on throughout the Fil-Am War. However, after the
    capture of Pres. Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901, the insurgent navy
    disintegrated. (Zulueta 1998, 20)
    The Off-Shore Patrol
    The Navy was reborn with the creation of the Off-Shore Patrol (OSP)
    on 14 April 1938. A few patrol crafts and three high-speed torpedo
    boats, also known as Q-boats, were the pioneers of this force. They
    were intended to form part of a nucleus of 55 Q-boats that would
    repel enemy amphibious landings as Gen Douglas McArthur had
    envisioned. But before the acquisition of more Q-boats, war had
    broken out. As a consequence, the OSP was relegated to other roles
    such as; troop insertions, intelligence operations and ferry
    missions. Though they had a few skirmishes with Japanese Navy ships
    and warplanes, after the fall of Bataan on 08 April 1942, all ships
    of the OSP had to be scuttled. (Giagonia 1997, 147)
    The Post-War Navy
    After World War II, the country had a surplus of war materiel given
    by the US. Among which were 83 ships of various types. Thus the OSP
    was reorganized and upgraded into the Philippine Naval Patrol, to
    become a major command of the AFP. On 23 December 1950, through E.O.
    389, the Philippine Naval Patrol was renamed as the Philippine Navy.
    (Giagonia 1997, 245)
    For the next four decades, the Navy experienced a confluence of
    events and performed various roles in furtherance of national
    security interests and national development. The first role was to
    conduct counter insurgency operations against the Hukbalahap then the
    ferry missions during the Korean War both in the early 1950's.
    Followed by the anti-smuggling and anti piracy operations in Sulu
    where the Navy was credited for destroying the network of illegal
    operations of the most notorious band of pirates and outlaws,
    including the dreaded Kamlon. The 1960's were highlighted by
    activities such as the ferry missions during the Vietnam War and by
    the bilateral and multi-lateral naval exercises that further
    strengthened the Navy's maritime defense posture in the region. The
    anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations in the south were sustained
    during this era (Giagonia 1997, 247-272). Throughout the 1970's up to
    the early 1980's, the Navy reverted to its counter-insurgency mode
    this time against two fronts, the Muslim secessionists and the
    communists (Zulueta 1998, 44). During the 1986 EDSA Revolt, eighty
    five percent of the Navy joined the rebels led by then Minister of
    Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and then AFP Vice Chief of Staff and PC
    Chief Fidel V Ramos. ( Giagonia 1997, 310)
    "By the time things were simmering down to a semblance of peace quiet
    in the early 1990's, the American naval and air forces, stung by the
    Philippine Senate's rejection of a treaty that would have prolonged
    their stay in the Philippines, were leaving in a huff. Suddenly, the
    Philippines saw its "surrogate" navy and air force heading for the
    gates of Subic and Clark, leaving the resident highly anxious about
    its national defense." (Zulueta 1998, 46)
    Commo Jose Francisco, former FOIC, on commenting about the American
    withdrawal, aptly stated "All throughout the years the Americans were
    here, we had the military assistance agreement with them and
    logistical support from them, and all that the government had to do
    was pay our salaries. What happened was that we had an indigestion.
    We knew it would not last, but when it did end, we were at a loss"
    (Zulueta 1998, 46). Rightly so, among the benefits the Navy had when
    the US bases were still around were: the US Military Assistance
    Program (USMAP), the hand-me-down program of the US; Foreign Military
    Sales (FMS), part of the bases rental fees are channeled back to the
    AFP for the purchase of surplus US military hardware or ship repair
    packages; use of floating drydock and other facilities; foreign
    training programs and technical consultations; and the security
    blanket for external threats. (The latter could arguably be
    considered a benefit since it could also be that because of this
    dependence, the Philippine Navy never got to prepare to become an
    independent and credible navy by the time the Americans left.)
    THE PRESENT
    Mission
    The Navy today has for its mission "to conduct prompt and sustained
    naval operations in support of the AFP's mission".
    Functions
    1. Provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the
    Philippines and to protect the people from external threats.
    2. Conduct naval operations in support of air and ground
    operations.
    3. Conduct maritime law enforcement within the territorial
    waters and EEZ.
    4. Promote safety of life at sea and environment protection.
    5. Assist in national development efforts.
    Resources
    Personnel 1,687 Officers, 10,561 EP
    Marines 387 Officers, 7,142 EP
    Budget P6,014,191,000.00 (Source:GAA 2000)
    Assets (Total / Operating)
    Patrol Ships 14 / 3
    Patrol Boats 35 / 10
    Transport Ships 9 / 4
    Auxiliary Ships 8 / 2
    Patrol Craft 32 / 17
    Service Craft 19 / 9
    Aircraft:
    Fixed wing 9 / 4
    Rotary 5 / 2
    Operational Readiness:
    Ships 38.5%
    Aircraft 42.8%
    Capabilities
    Limited Surface Warfare
    Naval Gunfire Support
    Amphibious Warfare
    Sealift Operations
    Domestic sea control
    Search and Rescue
    Present Role in Society
    The traditional role of any navy is to obtain "sea control" when
    necessary. Sea control is the ability of a fleet to control certain
    maritime areas (Mahan 1885) for whatever purpose it may serve. It
    involves deployment of naval forces to engage, destroy or repel enemy
    naval forces and carries with it the right to forbid passage through
    capture or destruction (Agudelo 1994, 25). While the Navy can obtain
    sea control within our territorial waters, it cannot do so beyond it.
    This is due to the fact that our antiquated and technology-deficient
    fleet could not match-up to any of our neighbors' navies (de los
    Reyes 1996). Thus, the Navy today could not perform its primary
    mandated task to provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of
    the Philippines and protect the people from all external threats.
    With this, the role of the Navy has been relegated to conducting
    internal security operations and maritime law enforcement. But the
    Philippines, with its recognition as an archipelagic state, where
    all "the islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic
    geographical, economic and political entity", these roles seemed as
    paramount to the survival of the state as naval defense. (Zulueta
    1998, 14)
    Internal Security Operations (ISO) involve naval gunfire support,
    amphibious and sealift operations. These are defined in an operations
    plan and are conducted often in conjunction with air and ground
    forces. For the past decades, the Navy had been very active in this
    role in support of the counter-insurgency operations.
    On the other hand, Maritime Law Enforcement (MARLEN) is actually the
    primary role of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), which was separated
    from the Navy and transferred to the DOTC in 1998. However, due to
    the PCG's lack of surface assets and also due to the wide expanse of
    the Philippine waters that include the EEZ, the Navy was deputized by
    various government agencies to enforce their specific laws. MARLEN
    involves the conduct of active and passive patrols to achieve naval
    presence in areas were illegal activities are perceived to be
    rampant.
    While it is a known fact that several Navy ships are of World War II
    vintage, most of the boats/crafts that conduct MARLEN operations are
    new and acquired only in the mid-90's. They are highly effective in
    coastal waters. Most are armed with 25 mm cannons and have maximum
    speeds of 30 knots.
    FORMS AND LOCI OF CORRUPTION
    CORRUPTION DEFINED
    Corruption is "defined as a dysfunctional and pathological act that
    negates the accomplishment of its constitutional mandate of promoting
    public interest" (Sosmena 1999, 6). "It is the misuse of a public
    office for personal gain". (Klitgaard 1995)
    Corruption may be categorized in two ways: individualized or systemic
    (Carino 1985, 15). Individual corruption is where a person performs a
    secret moneymaking act in relation to his duties as public official
    or government employee. While systemic corruption is committed in an
    agency where "corruption has become so regularized and
    institutionalized that organizational supports back wrong-doing and
    actually penalizes those who live up to the old norms" (Caiden 1977,
    306). It is "demonstrated when bureaucrats and clients can describe
    the same illegal process, including such details as bribery rates per
    service and the way these are shared among the members of the
    syndicate throughout the agency. Those with 'initiative' and 'daring'
    share the largesse with their colleagues with less opportunities,
    thus engulfing everyone in an administrative culture that tolerates,
    even idolizes, the fruits of corruption". (Carino 1985, 15)
    LOCI OF CORRUPTION
    The loci of corruption in the Navy are found in two distinct areas:
    in operational activities, which are ship-based and in administrative
    and support activities, which are shore-based. Ship-based activities
    include individual Navy ship activities and Naval Task Forces (NTF)
    directly involved in ship operations. Shore-based activities,
    meanwhile, include operations or functions of the various
    staff/support units such as personnel, intelligence, logistics,
    finance, training, etc.. Under these are the various forms of
    corruption, which are not necessarily peculiar to each.
    Ship-based Corruption
    Direct bribery "Any public officer who shall agree to perform an
    act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his
    duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
    received by such officer, personally or through mediation of
    another..." (Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code 1987)
    Case illustration # 1
    On or about 1600H of 07 June 1995, while patrol ship PS1 was anchored
    off Sacol Island, Zamboanga and conducting a naval blockade against
    Abu Sayyaf Group reportedly hiding on the said island, a medium-sized
    lancha was sighted suspiciously steaming near their ship. Upon
    sensing its possible hostile intentions, the crew of PS1 signaled it
    to come alongside. The lancha was inspected and it yielded P11
    million worth of smuggled goods. At the same time, 2 Navy patrol
    crafts were also sighted approaching the lancha but were observed to
    have reversed their course when it unintentionally went near PS1.
    During interrogation aboard PS1, the master patron confessed that
    they were hired to transport the goods from Sandakan, Malaysia to a
    designated place near the coast of Zamboanga City. They were further
    instructed to rendezvous with Navy patrol crafts that will escort
    them to the drop-off point.
    The lancha and its crew were then apprehended and its goods were
    confiscated.
    This special "escort" arrangement is common to the small patrol
    crafts assigned in Naval Forces South. The personnel assigned in
    these crafts are particularly vulnerable to bribes since they are the
    workhorses of the fleet that conduct MARLEN patrols. The bribe
    package includes a monthly rice and cash incentives for the crew plus
    repair expenses for the craft. A utility boy is also provided who
    also doubles as courier in behalf of the smuggler.
    Case illustration # 2
    On Aug 1999, a patrol gunboat (PG1) along with three other patrol
    crafts received a directive from NTF61 to conduct naval
    blockade/MARLEN patrols at designated areas in Sulu Sea, several
    n.miles off Jolo Is. Also contained in the directive was an
    intelligence report stating that there will be an attempt that
    evening to smuggle in assorted firearms and explosives to the island.
    PG1 and the other crafts then proceeded as ordered and vigilantly
    kept watch over their designated areas where the Muslim extremists
    were supposed to pass as stated in the directive. The following
    morning, the PN boats returned to port empty handed. A few days
    later, the NTF61 operations officer invited fellow officers to a
    drinking spree. There he openly bragged that he just got a payoff
    amounting to P100,000.00 from a known big-time smuggler. The payoff
    was for letting the smugglers pass through a few nights ago without
    being apprehended by ensuring that their sea lanes were cleared of
    Navy patrol boats. This he did by directing all patrol boats to
    proceed to their designated areas far away from these sea lanes.
    It is common knowledge for intelligence operatives that only small-
    time smugglers would dare to dash their way through the waters of the
    South. Their merchandise are often blue seal cigarettes, ukay-ukay or
    small quantities of lumber. However, most of them are armed with
    machine guns and sometimes have armed escorts. On the other hand, big-
    time smugglers, pirates and bandits (including the Abu Sayyaf) will
    never venture out into the Philippine waters unless they are
    given "clearance" by the Navy, Customs and PNP personnel (the Navy
    mole in these transactions is usually the operations officer of the
    NTF). They would not risk losing their valuable merchandise, which
    include arms, explosives, drugs and other contrabands, to a crusading
    Navy captain patrolling the high seas. Another given fact is that the
    bulk of the arms supply of the MILF are sea-borne. MILF Commanders
    use big-time smugglers as fronts to conduct their transshipment
    operations. This form is also common in Quezon province where illegal
    logging is rampant and in the Northern coasts of Luzon where all
    forms of smuggling are being conducted.
    Extortion a crime "committed by means of intimidation of persons,
    that is, by extorting money from a person. In cases where a law
    enforcer has apprehended a person committing a crime and the officer
    demands money from the culprit as the price for not arresting or
    prosecuting him, even if the latter is willing to give money, there
    is nevertheless some element of intimidation because of the threat of
    impending arrest or prosecution. (Aquino 1987, 427)
    Case illustration # 3
    On or about 1900H of 14 May 1999, the Commanding Officer (CO) of a
    patrol gunboat (PG2) assigned in Davao, received an intelligence
    report stating that a known smuggler would attempt to smuggle
    contrabands that evening to the southern coast of Davao. Immediately,
    PG2 was off to sea to conduct patrols to intercept the unknown craft.
    A few hours later, PG2 picked-up a radar contact a few miles off
    their position. As the patrol gunboat approached, the crew noticed
    that boat was unlighted yet it was running at a steady speed, an
    obvious indication of a smuggling activity. PG2 then overtook the
    suspected smuggling boat and conducted inspection. The boat yielded
    contrabands worth at least P2 million.
    After the inspection, the patron was invited inside PG2 for
    interrogation. Present during the investigation were the CO,
    Executive Officer (EXO), Chief Master At Arms (CMAA) and the patron
    of the boat. Upon being seated in the wardroom, the CO said to the
    patron "Didiretsohin na kita, magbigay ka ng P100,000.00 at
    pakakawalan kita." The patron haggled for a while but eventually
    agreed. He then went back to his boat and after a few minutes,
    returned to PG2. The patron gave a bag to the CO, who then counted
    the money inside. Satisfied with the transaction, the CO ordered the
    boat to be released. The CO then went inside his room with the bag in
    hand.
    This is a classic example of individual corruption as defined by Dr
    Carino. Often done by the extreme scalawags of the Navy, which are
    not few.
    Fraud Against Government (Pilferage) "Any person subject to
    military law who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willfully
    misappropriates, applies to his own use or benefit, or wrongfully or
    knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms, equipment,
    ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property of
    the government furnished or intended for the military services
    thereof." (Article of War Nr 95 1938)
    Case Illustration # 4
    On March 1995, the CO of a patrol gunboat PG3 received a directive
    from the Naval Task Force 71(NTF71) to conduct MARLEN patrol around
    the waters off Saranggani. The CO then reprovisioned and refueled to
    full tank capacity for the protracted mission. After refueling, PG3
    left port. However, when they were already out at sea, instead of
    conducting MARLEN patrols as directed, the CO instructed the crew to
    moor their patrol boat to a payaw or fish marker. After securing
    their patrol boat to the payaw, The CO then gave orders to have the
    main engines shut off. During this time, the CO was periodically
    reporting to NTF71 that his craft was continuously patrolling the
    designated area. After four days of being moored to the payaw, PG3
    went back to port. The CO then reported the negative result of his
    patrol to the NTF71 Commander and then made a phone call to a
    contact. Early morning the next day, a motor launch went alongside
    PG3. After a few hours, the motor launch left but not after siphoning
    10,000 liters of fuel saved by PG3 during the operation and paying
    the CO P60,000.00 as payment at P6/liter.
    Case illustration # 5
    On October 1999, the CO of patrol ship PS2, went to the Petron Bulk
    Plant in Cagayan de Oro to make a "special" arrangement regarding the
    delivery of fuel to his ship. He wanted Petron to give him P60,000.00
    in cash instead of delivering the 10,000 liters of fuel his ship had
    requested. That way he added that the Petron station would even earn
    some more from the transaction. He assured Petron that the ship would
    receive the "ghost" delivery accordingly. The CO thought that since
    he over-declared his ship's fuel consumption, he had a fuel savings
    of 10,000 liter and this would cover for the 'ghost' delivery.
    Intelligence operatives got wind of the transaction and an
    investigation soon followed. When the verdict was out and the
    information was confirmed, the unscrupulous CO was "punished" by the
    Headquarters by assigning him to another ship of the same category.
    Almost 2 out 4 Navy vessels engage or have engaged in these types of
    malpractice. These occur in all geographical areas of operation, even
    in Manila Bay. Some CO's try to justify this act by claiming that the
    money generated goes to ship operations or for morale and welfare
    activities. But for most, it is simply to sustain their lifestyle.
    Worse, some CO's sell the fuel to the very same smugglers they are
    supposed to apprehend.
    Shore-based Corruption
    Malversation "Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of
    his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
    appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
    consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
    person to take such public funds, wholly or partially, or shall
    otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
    funds or property..."(Art 217 Revised Penal Code 1987)
    Case illustration # 6
    In 1999, patrol gunboat PG4 underwent major repairs that had a budget
    cost of P50 million. While the vessel was drydocked in Navotas, the
    Executive Officer found out that the steel plates placed on the hull
    were below the specifications stated in the work order. He then
    reviewed the other areas of the work package and discovered that most
    of the spare parts being installed during the overhauling of the main
    engines were used ones coming from another gunboat of the same class
    that has been mothballed. Thus, when he computed the actual cost
    incurred by the contractor, the total repair package should have been
    only P5 million. The EXO then went to the Headquarters to complain
    about the repair irregularities and the grossly overpriced contract,
    he was surprised to find out that the repair had already been
    accepted by the Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee six
    months before. Which means that the contractor had been paid even
    while the repair was still unfinished. Six months later, PG4
    completely bogged down right after a send-off ceremony for
    deployment. It is now programmed for another major repair.
    Case illustration # 7
    On 22 December 1999 during the Command Christmas Party, the Commander
    of the Philippine Fleet distributed P450.00 each to all the personnel
    in his Command (For a total number of personnel at above 4,000, this
    would compute to roughly P2 million). Then on January 2000, the
    Patrol Force (a major unit of Philippine Fleet) prepared documents
    for the "ghost" repair of an already operational patrol gunboat
    amounting to P3 million apparently as payment for the cash advanced
    by a favored dealer during the said Christmas party.
    Case illustrations # 6 and 7 will show why only 38% of the total
    naval assets are operational. For the Navy top brass to say that the
    Navy has few patrol boats is because of their own undoing. Had these
    funds for repair (almost P350 million in the present budget) been
    used properly all these years, there would have been more ships to
    patrol our waters. A patrol boat with a speed of 20 knots is capable
    of patrolling an area of almost 3,000 sq n.mi. in one hour. Several
    boats positioned properly, could project a Naval presence in the vast
    Philippine waters that could effectively deter outlaws.
    Case illustration # 8
    The Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Personnel, O-N1,
    among other functions, is the staff in charge of personnel
    accounting. It listed the total number of active military personnel
    (officers and EP) at 19,714. This total excludes those assigned in
    GHQ. On the other hand, the Philippine Navy Finance Center (PNFC) is
    the unit in charge of providing the pay and allowances of personnel.
    In the PNFC list, the total number of personnel (excluding those
    assigned in GHQ since their salaries are handled by the AFP Finance
    Center) is 20,496 or 782 more than O-N1's total. Simply put the Navy
    is paying 782 personnel whose whereabouts are unknown.
    These "ghost" personnel came from those who have left the service
    either through attrition, AWOL, retirement, death, etc., and have not
    been dropped deliberately from the payroll.
    Case illustration # 9
    All officers assigned in the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy
    (HPN) get an average of P3,000.00 each monthly as "incentive pay". To
    afford this, the HPN prepare documents for "ghost deliveries" also
    known as "conversion". At 193 officers, this would amount to almost
    P600,000.00 a month.
    This is done in almost all major units that have the authority to
    procure. Other variations of this are over-pricing, under delivery
    and substitution. This is easily done because of the collusion
    between dealers and all those involved in the procurement process.
    The COA Auditors give a blind eye to these irregularities because
    they receive commissions equivalent to 1-2 percent of the total
    amount in the purchase orders. A PCIJ report further states
    that "After 1991, negotiated deals became the norm, with the AFP
    going straight to the President for whatever big purchase it wants to
    make. Nearly all these deals turned disadvantageous- if not downright
    disastrous- to troops in the end...officers say that corruption has
    become so pervasive in the AFP that the crooks in their midst have
    evolved a vocabulary of their own. For instance, one colonel
    said, 'cost of money' means 'the amount a proponent pays to
    facilitators for making his dreams come true'. 'Cleared money',
    meanwhile, is 'money (procurement budget) that has been converted (to
    other uses), which one could spend anywhere.' Put another way, it
    is 'laundered money', he said. Contractors for their part said that
    the evolving consensus among them is that some service commands are
    more corrupt than others. Their integrity meter puts the Army on top,
    followed by General Headquarters, and then the Navy. The Air Force
    ranks last, they said, for allegedly being the most corrupt."
    Overpricing "in the Navy is about 100 to 200 percent."(Mangahas 2001)
    EFFECTS ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
    The direct effects of corruption in the Navy on national development
    are staggering. It affects the economy through the systemic rape of
    the funds entrusted to it. These include losses from the ghost
    payroll, ghost repairs, ghost deliveries/conversion, pilferage of
    fuel, overpriced purchases, etc.
    Indirectly, the effects are much, much worse. "Smugglers, poachers
    and pirates rob the economy of billions in lost revenue and taxes,
    ultimately sapping the strength of local industries and commerce and
    often times inflicting serious damage on the natural
    environment."(Tangco and Sarmenta 1998, 177)
    Then "Senator Orlando Mercado, who chairs the Senate Committee on
    national defense and security, estimates that around 600,000.00
    metric tons of fish worth an astounding P50 billion are lost annually
    due to poaching by foreign fishing vessels." (Tangco and Sarmenta
    1998, 177)
    Even more alarming is its indirect effect on national security. The
    government had been spending billions trying to contain Muslim
    secessionists and bandits on the ground. Not to mention the thousands
    of lives lost. When they could have been greatly diminished by a
    sustained naval presence. The existence of the MILF is hinged on its
    unimpeded supply lines from sympathetic countries that pass through
    sea lanes wittingly provided by the Navy primarily because of
    corruption.
    As for the Abu Sayyaf, while it may be true that they have fast
    kumpits, these boats are still detectable by radar and would not last
    long in a hot pursuit. Besides, they are not known to go island
    hopping if they knew that there were Navy boats patrolling the seas
    that were not in their pockets.
    PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
    The prospects for the future of the Navy have been defined by two
    recent events: The success story that happened at the Naval Education
    and Training Command (NETC) in 2000 and the PN leadership crisis on
    February 2001 which involved RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP and the
    Philippine Marines.
    The NETC is the training arm of the Navy. It is responsible for the
    conduct of basic, advanced and specialization courses for officers
    and enlisted personnel. Since NETC is technically a school, bulk of
    its purchases are for uniforms and accessories, school/office
    supplies and training materials. With an annual budget of P169
    million (P121M for salaries and P48 M for supplies) (NETC OPB for CY -
    2000), the NETC had become the object of larceny by previous
    Commanders, which resulted in the deterioration of the whole training
    system of the Navy.
    On December 1999, Commodore Ruben G Domingo AFP assumed as Commander
    of NETC. Knowing the dark history of his unit and the tasks at hand,
    he immediately set into motion a reform program centered into
    the "cleansing" of the procurement system. And the result was
    astounding. In one year, the NETC, not only accomplished its mission
    of conducting all programmed courses, it had also accumulated P5
    million worth of savings. These savings were then used to improve
    other training facilities and equipment. The complete eradication of
    corruption was achieved. He did this, first, by removing suspected
    scalawags from staff positions then replacing them with officers whom
    he perceived to be still unstained by the grime of corruption. Then,
    Commo Domingo simply instructed everyone to do things "by the book".
    Particularly, the religious implementation of canvassing and bidding
    procedures of procurement set forth by existing laws and guidelines.
    No "conversion" or "substitution" was allowed. As a safety net, he
    involved the Intelligence division to monitor the process and set up
    entrapment operations whenever necessary.
    Surprisingly, Commo Domingo's reform program did not resemble
    the "radical redesigning" concept of Reengineering (Hammer and Champy
    1993), the "entrepreneurial government" spirit espoused by the
    Reinventing Government concept (Osborne and Gaebler 1990) nor was it
    a form of "Neo-Taylorism" (Reyes 1998, 189). Its only main components
    were his technical competence, moral integrity and political will as
    a Commander. Specifically, the technical competence to formulate
    reforms and the moral integrity and political will to enforce them.
    On December 2000, when RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP assumed as Flag-
    Officer-In-Command (FOIC) of the Philippine Navy everybody in the
    Navy expected radical changes. RAdm Wong, who had a reputation of
    being incorruptible, had envisioned a totally corrupt-free Navy. Upon
    assumption, he went on a "crusading mode" by "going to several places
    trying to clean up the Navy" (Golez 2001). On February 2001, the Navy
    (and the AFP) was rocked by a leadership crisis when the Philippine
    Marines demanded the relief of the RAdm Wong (Pazzibugan 2001). The
    crisis was triggered by the berating of the Marines by RAdm Wong for
    alleged irregularities in the procurement of P3.8 million worth of
    Kevlar Helmets (Pablo 2001). In the events that followed, President
    Arroyo left the crisis to be resolved by then Chief of Staff Gen
    Angelo Reyes (Pablo 2001), who offered Wong the command of the newly
    formed Northern Command as a concession to the Marines. RAdm Wong,
    realizing that this was a demotion, opted to resign (Pazzibugan
    2001). Later on Pres Arroyo was "asked if she was satisfied with the
    way Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes had handled the
    conflict between Wong and the Marine Corps, The President said Reyes
    had done the right thing." (Pablo 2001). RAdm Wong was eventually
    replaced by RAdm Hingco, whose policy was to disregard all reforms
    initiated by his predecessor and to maintain status quo.
    For a President and Commander-in-Chief, whose government was supposed
    to be founded on such slogans as "New Politics", moral regeneration
    and good governance, to say that what Gen Reyes did was "the right
    thing" was truly demoralizing to say the least. This was the first
    indication of the type of leadership the AFP would expect from its
    Commander-in-Chief. RAdm Wong should have been fully backed by his
    Chief of Staff and his Commander-in-Chief as he was on the right and
    principled side. More importantly, he was "the" advocate of good
    governance and, certainly, someone who has both the moral ascendancy
    and political will to effect change in the Navy. Unfortunately,
    according to the "New Politics" philosophy of Pres. Arroyo, this is
    not so.
    The two events narrated symbolize both hope and despair. Hope in that
    there is still a chance for the Navy to get out of the hole its
    officers and former officers had created. And despair at the thought
    that this chance is reliant on a politics-administration dichotomy
    (Wilson 1887), which was best described by Dr Danilo R Reyes in one
    of his lectures as a "pretender" paradigm.
    CONCLUSION
    The corruption problem in the Philippine Navy is grave. The direct
    and indirect damages to our economy, national security and peace and
    order in terms of costs and lives lost have been devastating. Thus,
    impeding our national development efforts. Even as the MILF, Abu
    Sayyaf, smugglers, pirates, and poachers continue to spread havoc as
    each day passes that they are not apprehended.
    The obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the Navy's fleet
    are not the reasons for its ineffectiveness but they are the results
    of years of malversation of funds. Ill-equipped as it is, the Navy is
    still very capable of ISO and MARLEN operations if only there are
    CO's and officers who have enough moral decency to be faithful to
    their mandated tasks. More so, if the people in the headquarters
    would properly appropriate funds then this capability would be
    further enhanced.
    The corruption had become systemic and had eaten through the very
    core of the organization and had infected, practically, all levels of
    the bureaucracy and all areas of operations.
    The future of the Navy is clouded by mixed insights. On one hand, the
    success of the NETC model was a ray of light amidst the darkness of
    moral decadence. It proved that total eradication of corruption in a
    major unit in the Navy is possible. The next step is magnifying this
    accomplishment to a higher plane, the Philippine Navy Command itself.
    More importantly, it showed how it could be done simply through the
    Commander's political will with moral integrity and technical
    competence as primary requisites.
    However, this will only be possible if the next crusading Flag-
    Officer-In-Command will be fully supported by a Commander-in-Chief
    who possesses strong leadership qualities and who will not allow
    political concessions and political indebtedness to be the bases of
    his/her decision-making as regards AFP matters. This way the whole
    AFP Officer Corps will not get the impression that they are being
    treated as an organization of untouchables who can easily get away
    with anything.
    REFERENCES
    Agudelo, Jose T., 1994 Naval Requirements of an Archipelagic State.
    Philippine Military Digest Vol 1 Nr 1. (January-March)
    Caiden, Gerald and Naomi, 1977 Administrative Corruption. As quoted
    in Carino, Ledivina V. 1985. International Review of Administrative
    Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public Administrations No.1 1985.
    Carino, Ledivina V., 1985 The Politicization of the Philippine
    Bureaucracy: Corruption or Commitment?, International Review of
    Administrative Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public
    Administrations No.1 1985.
    Giagonia, Regino, 1997 The Philippine Navy (1898-1996) 2nd Edition.
    Manila: Philippine Navy
    Golez, Roilo, 2001 As quoted by Pazzibugan, Dona. 2001. Golez:
    Military row inevitable given Wong's 'crusading mode'. Philippine
    Daily Inquirer. Feb 28
    Hammer, Michael and Champy, James, 1993 As printed in Arie Halachmi
    1995 Re-engineering and public management: some issues and
    considerations. London, England: Sage Publications Ltd
    Klitgaard, 1995 As quoted in Sosmena, Gaudioso 1999 Concept of
    Bureaucratic Sedition. Vol II No.6. NDCP Occasional paper
    Mahan, Alfred T., 1885 As reprinted in John B Hattendorf 1991, ed.
    Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the writings of Rear Admiral
    Alfred Thayer Mahan. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press
    Mangahas, Malou C., 2001 Kickbacks and Negotiated Deals Mar AFP
    Procurement System (Corruption-free modernization?). A PCIJ Report
    downloaded from PCIJ website at www.pcij.org
    Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler, 1992 Reinventing Government: How the
    Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector from School
    House to Statehouse, City Hall to Pentagon. Reading MA: Addison-
    Wesley
    Pazzibugan, Dona, 2001 Golez: Military row inevitable given
    Wong's 'crusading mode'. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 28
    Pablo, Carlito and Nocum, Armando, 2001 AFP turmoil worsens.
    Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 27
    2001 Wong links Biazon to mess. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 28
    Reyes, Danilo R., 1998 Public Sector Reengineering: Practice,
    Problems and Prospects. Philippine Journal of Public Administration
    Vol. XLII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July - October)
    Sosmena, Gaudioso, 1999 Concept of Bureaucratic Sedition. Vol II
    No.6. NDCP Occasional paper
    Tangco, Ruben and Sarmenta, Sev, 1998 The Continuing Quest for
    Relevance in Ruben v. Tangco ,ed. Tides of Change: The Philippine
    Navy Looks Back A Hundred Years And Peers Into The Next Century.
    Manila: Philippine Navy through Infinit-I Communication Services
    Wilson, Woodrow, 1887 as reprinted in Dwight Waldo 1953, ed. Ideas
    and Issues in Public Administration. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
    Inc.. Chap 4, pp. 64-75.
    Zulueta, Joselito, 1999 Archipelagic Riddle. In Ruben v. Tangco ,ed.
    Tides of Change: The Philippine Navy Looks Back A Hundred Years And
    Peers Into The Next Century. Manila: Philippine Navy through Infinit-
    I Communication Services
    1938 Articles of War as printed in A Manual for Courts-Martial Armed
    Forces of the Philippines. 1987 Edition
    1987 Ramon C Aquino, ed. The Revised Penal Code Vol I & II. 1987
    Edition. Manila: Central Book Supply, Inc
    1996 Capt Ariston de los Reyes PN, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
    Plans and Programs as quoted in Manila Standard Aug 20 during a
    hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance.
    2000 Gen Appropriations Act. Downloaded from DBM website at
    www.dbm.gov.ph
    2001 Joint Army, Navy, Air Force task force tracking kidnappers.
    Philippine Daily Inquirer. May 27
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    Philippine Daily Inquirer. May 28
    2001 No proof of hostages in Sulu, Basilan: military spokesperson.
    Philippine Daily Inquirer. May 31


    Corruption in the navy procurement system
    INTRODUCTION
    On February 2001, the Philippine Navy (and the AFP) was rocked by a
    leadership crisis when the Philippine Marines (PMAR) demanded the
    relief of the Flag-Officer-In-Command, Rear Admiral Wong (Pazzibugan
    2001). The crisis was triggered by the berating of the Marines by
    RAdm Wong for alleged irregularities in the procurement of P3.8
    million worth of Kevlar Helmets (Pablo 2001). In the events that
    followed, the Marines prevailed and RAdm Wong was stripped of his
    command and was "promoted" to an ambassadorial post. The crisis,
    while it was eventually resolved peacefully, exposed a previously
    unseen face of the Navy, and that is the face of CORRUPTION.
    BACKGROUND: THE PHILIPPINE NAVY
    The Philippine Navy (PN) is one of three branches of service of the
    Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Its mission is "to conduct
    prompt and sustained naval operations in support of the AFP's
    mission". Among its functions are; to provide naval defense to ensure
    the sovereignty of the Philippines and to protect the people from
    external threats; to conduct naval operations in support of air and
    ground operations; to conduct maritime law enforcement within the
    territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone; to promote safety of
    life at sea and environment protection; and to assist in national
    development efforts (NOQC Naval Orientation Reference Handguide,
    1997).
    The following are the other relevant information about the Philippine
    Navy:
    Personnel 1,687 Officers, 10,561 EP
    Marines 387 Officers, 7,142 EP
    Budget P6.88B (Source:GAA 2000)
    AUTHORITY
    The authority of the Philippine Navy and all government agencies to
    procure is "in accordance with the guidelines prescribed under the
    Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Executive Order No. 302'
    (entitled 'Providing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for
    the Procurement of Goods/Supplies by the National Government') "dated
    February 19,1996" (this was amended by E.O. 262) "and with due regard
    to the provisions of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual".
    (Manual on Procurement 1999). For the AFP, this was operationalized
    by the Department of National Defense Department Order Nr 47 dated 30
    April 1996 entitled "Delegation of Authority on Local Procurements"
    and further regulated by J-4 Logistics Directive Nr PC-97-03 dated 01
    August 1997.
    PROCUREMENT PROCESS
    RESEARCH PROBLEMS
    This research seeks to resolve the following problems:
    1. Does corruption exist within the procurement system of the
    Philippine Navy? If so, what are the different forms of corruption
    being practiced? And, where within the PN bureaucracy do these
    corrupt practices occur?
    2. Is there a relationship between offices exposed to boundary
    exchange and corruption propensity?

    CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
    This research covers two parts. The first part is a descriptive
    analysis of the existence and extent of corruption, the forms of
    corruption being practiced, as well as the other variables stated.
    The second part would follow the theoretical framework shown below:
    >From this framework, this research hypothesizes that the boundary
    exchange processes between PN procurement officials and accredited
    dealers, which work within the milieu of the procurement system
    process would result to bureaucratic corruption.
    CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS
    1. BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION is "defined as a dysfunctional and
    pathological act that negates the accomplishment of its
    constitutional mandate of promoting public interest" (Sosmena 1999,
    6).
    2. CORRUPTION "It is the misuse of a public office for
    personal gain" (Klitgaard 1995). Corruption may be categorized in two
    ways: individualized or systemic (Carino 1985, 15). Individual
    corruption is where a person performs a secret moneymaking act in
    relation to his duties as public official or government employee.
    While systemic corruption is committed in an agency where "corruption
    has become so regularized and institutionalized that organizational
    supports back wrong-doing and actually penalizes those who live up to
    the old norms" (Caiden 1977, 306). It is "demonstrated when
    bureaucrats and clients can describe the same illegal process,
    including such details as bribery rates per service and the way these
    are shared among the members of the syndicate throughout the agency.
    Those with 'initiative' and 'daring' share the largesse with their
    colleagues with less opportunities, thus engulfing everyone in an
    administrative culture that tolerates, even idolizes, the fruits of
    corruption". (Carino 1985, 15)
    3. BOUNDARY EXCHANGE "a value-free interaction" or exchange of
    boundaries between the client and the public official (as defined by
    Dr Prosperina Tapales during an interview conducted on 21 March
    2002).
    4. PROCUREMENT OFFICIAL for the purpose of this research, all
    PN officers, enlisted personnel, civilian employees involved in the
    PN procurement system would be labeled as procurement officials. They
    would also include the officials and personnel of the local
    Commission on Audit office.
    5. FORMS OF CORRUPTION:
    6. A. Lagay also known as SOP, commission, porsyento, for the
    boys, etc. This is "grease money" given to the procurement official
    by the dealer to facilitate the processing of documents or as a
    return favor for a project given.
    7. B. Tong extortion or money demanded by the procurement
    official to a dealer to facilitate the processing of documents.
    8. C. Negotiated canvass or nego an arrangement made by the
    dealer and the procurement official to manipulate a canvass method of
    procurement to ensure that the purchase order would be "won" by the
    said dealer. This is done by giving all the canvass papers of a
    certain project to the favored dealer. Thus, effectively depriving
    other interested dealers.
    9. D. Rigged bidding or bidding-biddingan an arrangement made
    by the dealer and the procurement official/s to manipulate a public
    bidding method of procurement to ensure that the purchase order would
    be "won" by the said dealer. This is done by the collusion between
    all the attending bidders, which include the favored dealer, and the
    Bids and Awards Committee.
    10. E. Ghost delivery or conversion the process in which
    government funds allocated through budget releases are "converted"
    into cash. This is done by preparing procurement documents taken from
    either a negotiated canvass or a rigged bidding, then, instead of
    delivering the items stated in the purchase order, the dealer would
    deliver the cash equivalent of the goods in the purchase order, less
    certain percentages for the dealer's profit.
    11. F. Over-pricing to cover for the additional expenses
    incurred by the lagay, the dealers and procurement official mutually
    agree on setting the price, which are way above the authorized
    limits.
    12. G. Under delivery again to cover for the additional
    expenses incurred by the lagay, the dealers and procurement official
    mutually agree that the quantity of the delivery will be lower than
    the one specified in the purchase order.
    13. H. Substitution to circumvent certain prohibitions of the
    law, specifically the General Appropriations Act, where certain gov't
    agencies have no capital outlay and, therefore, cannot buy equipment,
    the dealer and the procurement official mutually agree to deliver
    items other than those stated in the purchase order.
    OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
    1. Perception of corruption on the PN procurement system this
    would be measured by asking the respondents the question, "Sa pananaw
    ninyo, mayroon bang corruption sa procurement system ng PN sa
    kasalukuyan?"
    2. Perception of corruption on the procurement system of major
    units of the PN this would be measured by the statement "Base sa
    inyong pananaw, sukatin ninyo ang level ng corruption ng mga
    sumusunod na unit ng PN." To quantify the different levels, a fixed
    ratio scale was formulated wherein a standardized value was assigned
    to a corresponding level of corruption. A value of 0 was assigned for
    the level, walang corruption; 1 for the level, madalang ang
    corruption; 2 for the level, di-gaano laganap ang corruption; 3 for
    the level, laganap ang corruption; 4 for the level, talamak ang
    corruption.
    3. Perception of corruption on the different offices involved in
    the procurement system is measured by the question "Sa pananaw
    ninyo, alin sa mga sumusunod na opisina na kasapi sa procurement
    system ay mayroong nagaganap na corruption?"
    4. Perception on the eradication of corruption in the PN
    procurement system is measured by the question "Kayo ba ay pabor na
    alisin ang corruption sa procurement system ng PN?"

    REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
    While there are volumes of literature on corruption, there are very
    rare writings that directly dealt with corruption on the procurement
    system of a military organization or any government agency for that
    matter. One such writing is the article for the Philippine Center for
    Investigative Journalism by Malou C. Mangahas entitled "Kickbacks and
    Negotiated Deals Mar AFP Procurement System". While the said article
    made some startling revelations, it did so under the pretext
    of "journalistic freedom", where the data gathered came as
    unstructured information fed by people from both inside and outside
    of the organization (AFP) and, therefore, lacks the criteria of
    validity and reliability to support its findings as in a technical
    research.
    SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
    The Martial Law years have created a fearful reputation for the AFP
    organizations. Because of this, no group has ever dared to conduct
    any formal research on corruption on the procurement system of a
    military organization. Thus, the significance of this research
    couldn't possibly be overstated.
    This research would provide a vivid picture of what used to be a
    restricted domain of the AFP. It could also be seen as a microcosmic
    representation of the procurement systems of various government
    agencies.
    METHODOLOGY
    RESEARCH DESIGN
    The survey design was used since it is the most applicable for the
    quantitative-descriptive and quantitative-explanatory approaches of
    this research.
    UNITS OF ANALYSIS
    The following are the units of analysis:
    1. The Philippine Navy. It is represented by its five major
    units based in the Manila-Cavite area namely; Headquarters Philippine
    Navy, Headquarters Support Group (HPN,HSG); Headquarters Philippine
    Fleet (HPHILFLT); Headquarters Philippine Marines (HPMAR); Naval
    Logistic Center (NLC) and the Naval Sea Systems Command (NASSCOM).
    These units were chosen because of their huge individual budgets and,
    therefore, are the main procuring agencies of the PN.
    2. a. HPN,HSG The support unit of the main headquarters of the
    PN.
    3. b. HPHILFLT One of two operating arms of the PN. This unit
    has the administrative control over all floating and air assets.
    4. c. HPMAR The other operating arm of the PN. It has
    administrative control over all Philippine Marine (PMAR) brigades and
    other PMAR units.
    5. d. NLC The main procuring agency of the PN. It is
    responsible for supplying the bulk of the logistical requirements of
    the whole PN.
    6. e. NASSCOM The main service support group of the PN. It is
    also responsible for the repair of ships and other major equipment.
    7. All offices involved in the procurement process.
    8. Accredited dealers of the PN.
    RESPONDENTS
    The respondents chosen are the accredited dealers of the PN because
    they are considered to be insiders in the procurement system and they
    would be easier subjects to extract confidential information from,
    than the officers involved in the procurement system.
    TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION
    A primary technique of data collection (questionnaires) was used for
    this research. As for the sampling strategy, a simple random sampling
    from a sample frame of all the accredited dealers of the PN was
    initially planned. However, it was found that there was no updated
    list available and the said non-current list contained inactive or
    inexistent dealers, which made probability sampling inapplicable.
    Hence, purposive sampling methods were resorted to.
    STATISTICAL TOOLS
    Chi-square Statistic was used to establish the relationship between
    two nominal variables namely; boundary exchange and corruption. The
    application of said statistical tool was facilitated by the use of
    Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).
    LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
    Due to the sensitivity of the research subject, which could expose or
    incriminate a military organization like the Philippine Navy, the
    respondents may not have fully detached themselves from the physical
    or professional risks involved, despite the assurances of the
    researcher. Thus, the objectivity of some of their answers may have
    been affected by the fear of reprisal.
    FINDINGS
    DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
    The survey design was used since it is the most applicable for the
    quantitative-descriptive and quantitative-explanatory approaches of
    this research.
    PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS
    Of the 30 accredited dealers chosen as respondents, only 1 (3.3%) is
    a male while 29 (96.7%) are females (Table 1). This could be
    explained by the conjecture that since the PN is a male-dominated
    workplace, having females as dealers may help in facilitating
    business transactions.
    PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION ON THE PHILIPPINE NAVY PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
    The frequency distribution on the perception of corruption on the PN
    procurement system yielded an absolute affirmative answer that
    corruption does exist.
    PERCEPTION OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION ON THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM OF
    THE MAJOR UNITS OF THE PN
    HPHILFLT scored the lowest at 1.43 and would fall under the level of
    madalang ang corruption. This is due mainly to the integrity and
    moral resolve of its incumbent commander, RAdm Ruben G Domingo. Most
    of the respondents even qualified their answers in a way that if it
    weren't for the lagay at COA, HPHILFLT would have been corruption-
    free. HPN,HSG came in a distant second with a score of 2.30, followed
    by the HPMAR at 2.39. Both of these units fall under the level of di-
    gaano laganap ang corruption. The most corrupt PN units as far as the
    dealers were concerned were NASSCOM (2.87) and NLC (2.95), whose
    scores fall under the level of laganap ang corruption. According to
    them, the high levels of corruption of these units were caused by
    their commanders' blatant negative bureaucratic behavior.
    FORMS OF CORRUPTION
    The most common form of corruption being practiced is the lagay,
    which recorded a 100% frequency. This was followed by the "negotiated
    canvass" at 86.7% and "rigged bidding" at 76.7%. The least practiced
    is the "under delivery" at 36.7%.
    REASONS WHY CORRUPTION IS BEING RESORTED TO
    The main reason why corruption is being resorted to by the dealer is,
    in order "to expedite the processing of documents" (96.7%). A
    significant number of respondents (63.33%) also said that another
    reason is "to be able to get a project or transaction". While only
    36.7% of the respondents answered that utang na loob was the reason.
    WHO INITIATES CORRUPTION?
    On the question of "who initiates corruption?", a significant nuber
    (83.3%) claimed that the corrupt practices were mutually agreed upon
    by both parties with neither one initiating directly. Instead, these
    under-the-table ransactions have become a routine activity that it
    had evolved to an SOP or standard operating procedure.
    PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION PER OFFICE
    Surprisingly, the offices, which emerged as the top three from the
    frequency distribution, are civilian offices; the Commission on Audit
    (100%); the Accounting Office (66.7%); and the Supply Accountable
    Office (66.7%). While the finding for the COA is indisputable, a big
    factor in the findings for other two offices could be that the
    dealers are more willing to volunteer information against civilian
    employees than against military officers.
    Among the military offices, the procurement office figured the
    highest in terms of corruption perception at 60%. It is followed by
    the logistics office and the Commander's office both at 56.7%. The
    Bids & Awards Committee (16.7%), Deputy Commander's office (20%) and
    Chief of Staff office (20%) are the three lowest in terms of
    corruption perception.
    IS THERE A FIXED RATE OF "LAGAY" PER OFFICE
    According to all 30 respondents, there is a fixed rate of lagay per
    office. However, this finding is deceiving because, while it is
    applicable to the COA where there is consistency in the fixed
    indicated by the respondents at 1-2% of the total amount of the
    purchase order, the entries for the other offices had a wide range of
    variance. This could be explained by the tendency of the dealers to
    get confused in assigning fixed values for every office. They further
    qualified that these are dependent on the total amount of the
    transaction. At any rate, the finding for the COA is very significant
    and indisputable at the same time.
    IS IT PROFITABLE TO DEAL WITH THE PN?
    28 out of 30 respondents (93.3%) felt that despite the existence of
    corruption, transacting business is still profitable. This could give
    us an idea of the high profit margins being padded by the dealers on
    the goods and services delivered to the end-users just to cover for
    the expenses incurred by the corrupt practices.
    PERCEPTION ON THE ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION IN THE PN PROCUREMENT
    SYSTEM
    Amazingly, a slight majority of the respondents (53.3%) were not in
    favor of the eradication of corruption, while 46.7% felt otherwise.
    One possible explanation for this is that the dealers who did not
    favor the eradication of corruption are apprehensive that a level
    playing field may not assure them of getting transactions and, thus,
    not favor them as mush as the status quo. Specifically, a level
    playing field would negate whatever "business" connections they have
    with those with discretionary powers.
    INFERENTIAL STATISTICS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION PROPENSITY AND
    BOUDARY EXCHANGE
    Chi-square statistic was used to establish if there is a relationship
    between boundary exchange and corruption propensity for every office
    involved in the procurement system. Of the 12 offices subjected to
    the research, only the Deputy Commander's office and Bids & Awards
    Committee obtained a significance level higher than the 0.05
    threshold set to conclusively establish a relationship. Hence, for
    these two offices, there were not evidence to conclude that there is
    a relationship. But for each of the other offices, the relationship
    between boundary exchange and corruption propensity was found to be
    conclusive.
    COMMANDER'S OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 19.615 1 .000
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the office of the Commander,
    corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
    the 17 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
    office of the Commander, all of them had boundary exchange processes
    with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-
    square test value of 19.615 and significance level of 0.000.
    DEPUTY COMMANDER'S OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 3.750 1 .053
    ANALYSIS:
    The chi-square test value of 3.75 and significance level of 0.053
    would indicate to us that, at the office of the Deputy Commander,
    there are not enough data to conclude that corruption propensity and
    boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 6 respondents who had
    perceived that there is corruption at the said office, 4 (66.66%) had
    boundary exchange processes, while 2 (33.33%) did not.
    CHIEF OF STAFF OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 5.868 1 .015
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the office of the Chief of Staff,
    corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
    the 6 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
    office of the Chief of Staff, 5 (83.3%) of them had boundary exchange
    processes with the said office while only 1 (16.66%). Statistically,
    this is validated by the chi-square test value of 5.868 and
    significance level of 0.015.
    LOGISTICS OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 11.940 1 .001
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Logistic Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 17
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Logistic
    Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
    office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value
    of 11.940 and significance level of 0.001.
    COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 8.684 1 .003
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Comptroller Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 10
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Comptroller
    Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
    office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value
    of 8.684 and significance level of 0.003.
    PROCUREMENT OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 5.000 1 .025
    Continuity Correction 2.608 1 .106
    Likelihood Ratio 6.009 1 .014
    Fisher's Exact Test .054 .054
    Linear-by-Linear Association 4.833 1 .028
    N of Valid Cases 30
    a Computed only for a 2x2 table
    b 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
    expected count is 1.20.
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Procurement Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 18
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Procurement
    Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
    office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value
    of 5.000 and significance level of 0.025.
    SUPPLY ACCOUNTABLE OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 6.667 1 .010
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Supply Accountable Office,
    corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
    the 20 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
    Supply Accountable Office, all of them had boundary exchange
    processes with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by
    the chi-square test value of 19.615 and significance level of 0.000.
    COMMISION ON AUDIT
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value
    Pearson Chi-Square .
    N of Valid Cases 30
    a No statistics are computed because Commission on Audit is a
    constant.
    ANALYSIS:
    The SPSS could not compute statistically the chi-square value and
    significance level of the given data because the variable of
    corruption perception at the Commission on Audit was misread as a
    constant since all the respondents perceived the COA to be corrupt.
    Nonetheless, by looking at the Cross Tabulation count, of the 30
    respondents who perceived COA to be corrupt, 28 (93.33%) had boundary
    exchange processes at the said office. Hence, corruption propensity
    and boundary exchange are directly related.
    FINANCE OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 6.563 1 .010
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Finance Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 14
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Finance
    Office of the Commander, all of them had boundary exchange processes
    with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-
    square test value of 6.563 and significance level of 0.010.
    TECHNICAL INSPECTION COMMITTEE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 6.982 1 .008
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Technical Inspection Committee,
    corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
    the 13 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
    Technical Inspection Committee, all of them had boundary exchange
    processes with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by
    the chi-square test value of 6.982 and significance level of 0.008.
    BIDS & AWARDS COMMITTEE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 3.409 1 .065
    ANALYSIS:
    The chi-square test value of 3.409 and significance level of 0.065
    would indicate to us that, at the Bids and Awards Committee, there
    are not enough data to conclude that corruption propensity and
    boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 5 respondents who
    perceived that there is corruption at the office of the Commander, 3
    (60%) of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office
    while 2 (40%) did not.
    ACCOUNTING OFFICE
    Chi-Square Tests
    Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-
    sided)
    Pearson Chi-Square 4.286 1 .038
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Accounting Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 20
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Accounting
    Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
    office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value
    of 4.286 and significance level of 0.038.
    CONCLUSIONS
    Based on the data gathered, the following are the conclusions:
    1. There is corruption in the Philippine Navy procurement
    system. However, the levels of corruption of the different units of
    the PN varied and are dependent on the corruptive or non-corruptive
    behavior of their respective Commanders.
    2. There are several forms of corruption being practiced. These
    are; lagay, negotiated canvass, rigged bidding, "ghost delivery",
    overpricing, tong, substitution and under delivery.
    3. The main reason why corruption is being resorted to is to
    expedite the processing of documents. Also, the corruptive behavior
    is not initiated by the dealer nor the procurement official instead,
    the practice had become a routine that both parties readily and
    mutually agree on the terms.
    4. All offices involved in the procurement system had corruption
    incidences. However, some offices were perceived to be more corrupt
    than the others. Ironically, the COA, which is supposed to be the
    watchdog of the government against corruption, got a 100% response in
    corruption perception.
    5. There is a prevailing fixed rate of lagay. However, this is
    dependent on the amount of transaction except for the COA, where the
    consistent response yielded the amount of lagay at 1-2% of the amount
    of the transaction.
    6. The data gathered validated the hypothesis inferred by the
    theoretical framework where the boundary exchange processes between
    the procurement officals and accredited dealers, which work within
    the milieu of the procurement process, would result to bureaucratic
    corruption. However, this is not applicable to offices, which have no
    discretionary powers, as in the case of the Deputy Commander's office
    and to offices, which are already part of the largesse as in the case
    of the BAC.

    RECOMMENDATIONS
    There are only two practical recommendations that can be formulated
    as a result of this study. First, is for the PN to strictly adhere to
    the merit system of promotion and selection of officers to be
    designated as commanders of its different units. The primary criteria
    for qualification should be an officer who possesses moral integrity,
    technical competence and vision to effectively formulate reforms and,
    more importantly, he should also have the political will to implement
    these reforms.
    The other recommendation is to limit the boundary exchange processes
    to the front line levels only so as to totally insulate the other
    offices. Thus, these offices can perform their review and inspection
    functions with a more independent and dispassionate perspective.
    AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
    This research has opened a floodgate for future investigative
    researches. One is an operations research on the auditing processes
    of the COA. It is very frustrating to know that the very agency
    tasked to weed out corruption is unanimously found to be the most
    corrupt office. Another future study could be a policy research to
    formulate policies to address this endemic problem of bureaucratic
    corruption.
    REFERENCES
    Caiden, Gerald and Naomi, 1977 Administrative Corruption. As quoted
    in Carino, Ledivina V. 1985. International Review of Administrative
    Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public Administrations No.1 1985.
    Carino, Ledivina V., 1985 The Politicization of the Philippine
    Bureaucracy: Corruption or Commitment?, International Review of
    Administrative Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public
    Administrations No.1 1985.
    Klitgaard, 1995 As quoted in Sosmena, Gaudioso 1999 Concept of
    Bureaucratic Sedition. Vol II No.6. NDCP Occasional paper
    Mangahas, Malou C., 2001 Kickbacks and Negotiated Deals Mar AFP
    Procurement System (Corruption-free modernization?). A PCIJ Report
    downloaded from PCIJ website at www. PCIJ. org
    Pazzibugan, Dona, 2001 Golez: Military row inevitable given
    Wong's 'crusading mode'. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 28
    Pablo, Carlito and Nocum, Armando, 2001 AFP turmoil worsens.
    Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 27
    2001 Wong links Biazon to mess. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 28
    Sosmena, Gaudioso, 1999 Concept of Bureaucratic Sedition. Vol II
    No.6. NDCP Occasional paper
    1996 Department of National Defense Department Order Nr 47 dated 30
    April
    1997 2NFSU Manual on Procurement, Zambales
    1997 AFP J-4 Logistics Directive Nr PC-97-03 dated 01 August
    1998 NOQC Naval Orientation Reference Handguide, Zambales, Naval
    School Center
    1999 Manual on Procurement. COA-PTTAF. Quezon City; Adriana Printing
    Co Inc.
    2000 Gen Appropriations Act. Downloaded from DBM website at www.
    DBM.gov.ph

  7. #7
    Banned by Admin
    Join Date
    Jan 2001
    Location
    Staten Is.
    This Trillanes thesis assumes lots of things and tries to use scientific methods that might not be applicable at all.

    1) How many dealers do the offices in the Phil. Navy regularly deal with?
    If there are thousand dealers then the 30 respondents would not be a very valid sample.
    Why is the total number of dealers not included?
    What is the volume of transactions per year for all dealers and for the 30 dealers used as respondents?

    The PRESENT merely listed the Navy's resources, why not more facts about the dealers from where the pool of respondents were taken.

    2) Not that there is anything wrong with using 96.7% female as respondents but, if even the professionals at ABC-CBS gave POGI points to the mutineer, couldn't that POGI points affected the 96.7% females in the study. too?
    If there are thousands of dealers, is that ratio of men to women consistent with the total number of dealers the Navy is working with or could it be that because " they (mostly women) would be easier subjects to extract confidential information from, than the officers involved in the procurement system."
    The bias in the study is very evident here. "Easier subjects" is no excuse! The author could have included respndents who abstained from giving information, not just those who "perceived" or "not perceived" corruption.

    An implicit factor may also separate the data into different distributions of the same "family" (say, several different normal distributions). Each subsample would follow a distribution from the family, but the combined data would not fit a distribution from the family.

    For example, measurements for females may follow a normal distribution, and measurements for males may also follow a normal distribution, but the measurements for the entire population of both males and females may not follow a normal distribution. Depending on the relative proportions of sampled data from each underlying normal distribution, and on the means and variances of each distribution, the composite mixture distribution may appear to be skewed, or to have nonnormal kurtosis, or both. Separating the data into different subsamples based on the value of the implicit factor may reveal that, conditional on the value of the implicit factor (e.g., gender), the data are sampled from a normal distribution, even if it is a different distribution for each value of the implicit factor.

    Of course, an implicit factor may also separate the data into different distributions that do not all come from the same family. And if one of more of the subsamples has a small sample size, the test on the subsample may fail to detect a difference from the hypothesized distribution due to a lack of power


    And how was the "extraction" of information from the 1 male and 29 females done? (I am beggining to doubt the sexuality of the 1 male in the study.) The content of the questionnaire used should have been presented here also.

    Other "troubling" or "problematic" statements in the thesis:

    ...."Hence, purposive sampling methods were resorted to. .." operative word - purposive. Selection of respondents were made at the author's discretion. Thus data are not independent of bias.

    ...Thus, the objectivity of some of their answers may have
    been affected by the fear of reprisal....


    street-talk: they could be lying!

    These alone violates basic rules of statistics and jeopardizes any conclusion that might be arrived at.



    3) "respondents who perceived that there is corruption..." that statement is repeated in all analysis in the study and yet the author doesn't realize that the word "perception" is just that perception. Reality has to have a value like PhP or $ amount. Scietific methods do not make perception a reality, not without any objective evidence.

    4) In the introduction "..The escape of the Abu Sayyaf through the naval blockade was one tactical blunder that caused great humiliation and enormous cost to the country..." This seems to be the precipitating factor for the thesis. And the whole introduction is riddled by the authors own perception of the whole strategy, and of the government and GMA's reaction to it.
    Is it because the author has his own strategy that was not adopted. Or, is the author's "perception" of the Abu Sayaff incident a mere afterthought second-guessing?

    To be simply ignored and forgiven by the President
    (through Tiglao's statement) was a display of weakness as a Commander- In-Chief of the AFP. But I am inclined to believe that the President was not as stupid and weak as this gesture had showed. Thus, it is rather safe to conclude that it was her political indebtedness and fear of the AFP that prevented her from imposing sanctions that could have antagonized it.


    This weakens the authors position and possibly is the most telling bias. Ignored and forgiven by the President was a display of weakness... why didn't he run that thru a Chi-Square test, too?

    Thus, it is rather safe to conclude that it was her political indebtedness and fear of the AFP that prevented her from imposing sanctions that could have antagonized it.
    Safe to conclude? What facts have the author marshalled here that he can make a safe conclusion? He is such an expert in scietifically proving perceptions, can he not do so on his own perceptions?

    5) The first RECOMMENDATION [b....]for the PN to strictly adhere to the merit system of promotion and selection of officers to be
    designated as commanders of its different units. The primary criteria for qualification should be an officer who possesses moral integrity, technical competence and vision to effectively formulate reforms and, more importantly, he should also have the political will to implement these reforms.... [/b]
    HAS NO BASIS from the ANALYSIS at all or from the entire thesis! IN fact, even without the study, it goes without saying that all employee selection and promotion in public or private offices must be made thru merit system!

    The other recommendation is to limit the boundary exchange processes to the front line levels only so as to totally insulate the other offices. Thus, these offices can perform their review and inspection functions with a more independent and dispassionate perspective....

    TOTALLY INSULATE? What is that? Does the author realize that totally insulating one department from another can result in TOTAL PARALYSIS os some departments if not thew entire organization!

    With these things I conclude that the whole crap is a waste of time! Chi-square THIS!



    Of the 30 accredited dealers chosen as respondents, only 1 (3.3%) is
    a male while 29 (96.7%) are females (Table 1).

    COMMANDER'S OFFICE
    ANALYSIS...
    ".....The data indicate to us that, at the office of the Commander,
    corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
    the 17 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
    office of the Commander, all of them had boundary exchange processes
    with the said office...."

    DEPUTY COMMANDER'S OFFICE
    ANALYSIS:
    "..
    would indicate to us that, at the office of the Deputy Commander,
    there are not enough data to conclude that corruption propensity and
    boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 6 respondents who had
    perceived that there is corruption at the said office, 4 (66.66%) had
    boundary exchange processes, while 2 (33.33%) did not.
    CHIEF OF STAFF OFFICE
    ...
    ANALYSIS: ...
    The data indicate to us that, at the office of the Chief of Staff,
    corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 6 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the office of the Chief of Staff, 5 (83.3%) of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office while only 1 (16.66%). Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 5.868 and significance level of 0.015.
    LOGISTICS OFFICE
    ...
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Logistic Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 17
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Logistic Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 11.940 and significance level of 0.001.
    COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE
    ...
    ANALYSIS:
    The data indicate to us that, at the Comptroller Office, corruption
    propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 10
    respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Comptroller Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 8.684 and significance level of 0.003.
    PROCUREMENT OFFICE
    ...
    ANALYSIS:
    Of the 18 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Procurement Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 5.000 and significance level of 0.025.

    etc.....
    blah,,,,blah,,,blah....yadiya..diya...diya..diya...
    Last edited by boardbuster; Aug 3, 2003 at 01:48 PM.

  8. #8
    Banned by Admin
    Join Date
    Jan 2001
    Location
    Staten Is.
    Originally posted by PnoloP
    i have the full 37 pages.

    *************

    CONCLUSIONS

    Based on the data gathered, the following are the conclusions:
    1. There is corruption in the Philippine Navy procurement system. However, the levels of corruption of the different units of the PN varied and are dependent on the corruptive or non-corruptive behavior of their respective Commanders.
    2. There are several forms of corruption being practiced. These are; lagay, negotiated canvass, rigged bidding, "ghost delivery", overpricing, tong, substitution and under delivery.
    3. The main reason why corruption is being resorted to is to expedite the processing of documents. Also, the corruptive behavior is not initiated by the dealer nor the procurement official instead, the practice had become a routine that both parties readily and mutually agree on the terms.
    4. All offices involved in the procurement system had corruption incidences. However, some offices were perceived to be more corrupt than the others. Ironically, the COA, which is supposed to be the watchdog of the government against corruption, got a 100% response in corruption perception.
    5. There is a prevailing fixed rate of lagay. However, this is dependent on the amount of transaction except for the COA, where the consistent response yielded the amount of lagay at 1-2% of the amount of the transaction.
    6. The data gathered validated the hypothesis inferred by the theoretical framework where the boundary exchange processes between the procurement officals and accredited dealers, which work within the milieu of the procurement process, would result to bureaucratic corruption. However, this is not applicable to offices, which have no discretionary powers, as in the case of the Deputy Commander's office and to offices, which are already part of the largesse as in the case of the BAC.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    There are only two practical recommendations that can be formulated as a result of this study. First, is for the PN to strictly adhere to the merit system of promotion and selection of officers to be designated as commanders of its different units. The primary criteria for qualification should be an officer who possesses moral integrity, technical competence and vision to effectively formulate reforms and, more importantly, he should also have the political will to implement these reforms.
    The other recommendation is to limit the boundary exchange processes to the front line levels only so as to totally insulate the other offices. Thus, these offices can perform their review and inspection functions with a more independent and dispassionate perspective.

    AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

    This research has opened a floodgate for future investigative researches. One is an operations research on the auditing processes of the COA. It is very frustrating to know that the very agency tasked to weed out corruption is unanimously found to be the most corrupt office. Another future study could be a policy research to formulate policies to address this endemic problem of bureaucratic corruption
    The conclusions are not valid since they were based on subjective
    perception of statistically "illegal" sample.


    The recommendations are therefore not valid, too. The author did not "prove", quantify or qualify that there is something wrong with the hiring and promotion. He has no statistics on that! Not any solid evidence. Besides, hiring practices were never questioned in the body of the thesis, so why have a recommmendation like that. And how can he be certain that something is wrong with the hiring and promotion. When employees were hired they must have good credentials, it is the sytems that could have corrupted them. So changes must be made in the system. A recommendation on proper checks and balances would have been more valid. Also proper documentation of every transactions. With originals in a secured place.

    The author tried to justify his "method" by saying...
    ..TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION
    A primary technique of data collection (questionnaires) was used for this research. As for the sampling strategy, a simple random sampling from a sample frame of all the accredited dealers of the PN was initially planned. However, it was found that there was no updated list available and the said non-current list contained inactive or inexistent dealers, which made probability sampling inapplicable. Hence, purposive sampling methods were resorted to.


    The author "found no updated lists available!"
    Why didn't he recommend better management of transaction data?
    Why didn't the recommend better accountability at all levels? why didn't he recommend an annual audit by a non-government auditiing firm?
    Why didn't he recommend open bidding to all interested public firms of government or PN purchases and contrat jobs? This way overpricing can be avoided. Only meritorious low bids will be considered. And if authorities go for the higher bid, they should explain it to Congress! Why did't look into that?
    Why? Because he is not thinking clearly! His big ego, prevented him from doing so. He considered himself uncorruptible and better strategist! And he latched on corruption, because that is so easy to say, even without valid proof. What he have borders on hearsay!


    And this is what the UP dept. that gives the Public Administration degree, is supposed to be proud of? This kind of thesis will not pass before any oral evaluation in La Salle or in Ateneo School of Business! Not just the contents alone but the whole presentation of supposedly "facts", conclusion and recommendations. The whole thing cannot be defended before a panel of evaluators.
    Last edited by boardbuster; Aug 3, 2003 at 07:53 PM.

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  10. #9
    Originally posted by boardbuster
    The conclusions are not valid since they were based on subjective
    perception of statistically "illegal" sample.


    The recommendations are therefore not valid, too. The author did not "prove", quantify or qualify that there is something wrong with the hiring and promotion. He has no statistics on that! Not any solid evidence. Besides, hiring practices were never questioned in the body of the thesis, so why have a recommmendation like that. And how can he be certain that something is wrong with the hiring and promotion. When employees were hired they must have good credentials, it is the sytems that could have corrupted them. So changes must be made in the system. A recommendation on proper checks and balances would have been more valid. Also proper documentation of every transactions. With originals in a secured place.

    The author tried to justify his "method" by saying...
    ..TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION
    A primary technique of data collection (questionnaires) was used for this research. As for the sampling strategy, a simple random sampling from a sample frame of all the accredited dealers of the PN was initially planned. However, it was found that there was no updated list available and the said non-current list contained inactive or inexistent dealers, which made probability sampling inapplicable. Hence, purposive sampling methods were resorted to.


    The author "found no updated lists available!"
    Why didn't he recommend better management of transaction data?
    Why didn't the recommend better accountability at all levels? why didn't he recommend an annual audit by a non-government auditiing firm?
    Why didn't he recommend open bidding to all interested public firms of government or PN purchases and contrat jobs? This way overpricing can be avoided. Only meritorious low bids will be considered. And if authorities go for the higher bid, they should explain it to Congress! Why did't look into that?
    Why? Because he is not thinking clearly! His big ego, prevented him from doing so. He considered himself uncorruptible and better strategist! And he latched on corruption, because that is so easy to say, even without valid proof. What he have borders on hearsay!


    And this is what the UP dept. that gives the Public Administration degree, is supposed to be proud of? This kind of thesis will not pass before any oral evaluation in La Salle or in Ateneo School of Business! Not just the contents alone but the whole presentation of supposedly "facts", conclusion and recommendations. The whole thing cannot be defended before a panel of evaluators.
    While it is true that the source of information is lacking versus the indicated potential, the fact is that there were sources for the information in the study. The thesis probably would not pass LaSalle or Ateneo panels, the fact is it did at UP. The thing that the author said was that corruption existed at the Philippine Navy, and he cited very specific instances with mathematical data that would hold up even if additional sources could be found. Unfortunately, only 30 could be accounted for. But technically, you need only one data point to say that corruption exists. He had the guts to say the system is corrupt ... and everyone saying so what? is equally just as bad.

  11. #10
    Originally posted by boardbuster
    The conclusions are not valid since they were based on subjective
    perception of statistically "illegal" sample.


    The recommendations are therefore not valid, too. The author did not "prove", quantify or qualify that there is something wrong with the hiring and promotion. He has no statistics on that! Not any solid evidence. Besides, hiring practices were never questioned in the body of the thesis, so why have a recommmendation like that. And how can he be certain that something is wrong with the hiring and promotion. When employees were hired they must have good credentials, it is the sytems that could have corrupted them. So changes must be made in the system. A recommendation on proper checks and balances would have been more valid. Also proper documentation of every transactions. With originals in a secured place.

    The author tried to justify his "method" by saying...
    ..TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION
    A primary technique of data collection (questionnaires) was used for this research. As for the sampling strategy, a simple random sampling from a sample frame of all the accredited dealers of the PN was initially planned. However, it was found that there was no updated list available and the said non-current list contained inactive or inexistent dealers, which made probability sampling inapplicable. Hence, purposive sampling methods were resorted to.


    The author "found no updated lists available!"
    Why didn't he recommend better management of transaction data?
    Why didn't the recommend better accountability at all levels? why didn't he recommend an annual audit by a non-government auditiing firm?
    Why didn't he recommend open bidding to all interested public firms of government or PN purchases and contrat jobs? This way overpricing can be avoided. Only meritorious low bids will be considered. And if authorities go for the higher bid, they should explain it to Congress! Why did't look into that?
    Why? Because he is not thinking clearly! His big ego, prevented him from doing so. He considered himself uncorruptible and better strategist! And he latched on corruption, because that is so easy to say, even without valid proof. What he have borders on hearsay!


    And this is what the UP dept. that gives the Public Administration degree, is supposed to be proud of? This kind of thesis will not pass before any oral evaluation in La Salle or in Ateneo School of Business! Not just the contents alone but the whole presentation of supposedly "facts", conclusion and recommendations. The whole thing cannot be defended before a panel of evaluators.

    Dear Mouse,

    I agree with the observation of this pexer. The recommendation is far out.

    Besides, there is no specific recommendation for each of the findings and conclusions.

    While the candidate stated that the corruption is not initiated by the procurement official and the dealers because they are already embedded in the system, he failed to give recommendation for the other two variable factors contributing to the corrupt practices.

    The study is a perception of corruption in one particular unit of the military and some people would like me to believe that this pushed the writer to lead the mutiny. It seems it is a case of broken nail for a human being and the suggested treatment is to remove the head.


    The CAT

  12. #11
    glorifiedprogramer
    Join Date
    Sep 2000
    Location
    Rizal
    Can anyone confirm if we are argueing over the first version or the second? Correct me if my facts are wrong.

    From what I heard the first version was admittedly more emotional than factual. Taken as a first draft, this is the 30+ pages.

    There is however a more academically sounding thesis which, as I take from the interviews, impressed his professors. I'm not to belittle the U.P. professors' opinions, but let as talk over the thesis the way Malaya (newspaper) suggests it.

    The first thesis was very emotional and displays an unadulterated expression of "disconfidence" and hopelessness and anger.

    The second version was more academic, with more facts than opinions and much less emotion.

  13. #12
    Originally posted by palin
    Can anyone confirm if we are argueing over the first version or the second? Correct me if my facts are wrong.

    From what I heard the first version was admittedly more emotional than factual. Taken as a first draft, this is the 30+ pages.

    There is however a more academically sounding thesis which, as I take from the interviews, impressed his professors. I'm not to belittle the U.P. professors' opinions, but let as talk over the thesis the way Malaya (newspaper) suggests it.

    The first thesis was very emotional and displays an unadulterated expression of "disconfidence" and hopelessness and anger.

    The second version was more academic, with more facts than opinions and much less emotion.
    Two versions? I thought there were two theses (or if you prefer, thesises), not two versions.

  14. #13

    Cool *****!

    i could make something like that in two weeks! sabi ko na, eh. the public ad program is just for dimwitted gov't employees too dumb to make rank. they try to get a 'nominal degree' from UP to up their chances. real masteral courses like economics, liberal arts, even MBA are too rigorous for them.

  15. #14
    Banned by Admin
    Join Date
    Dec 2002
    Location
    Metro_Manila
    Someone from PA told me Trillanes HAS NOT GRADUATED from the MPA program, he hasn't even got to writing his thesis. The above study is a simple research paper her made in his first year.

  16. #15
    The media has been playing up Trillanes and his group as "intellectuals", but to say that the NRP, a hodpepdge of motherhood statements, as their Bible? Sheesh.

    Goons with guns, who just realized how stupid they were because Filipinos didn't care to support another "gulo". I mean c'mon, were they really expecting people power? How about migrate to another country imbes na mangulo dito?

    Goodbye. Rot in jail heroes.

  17. #16
    Originally posted by boardbuster

    And this is what the UP dept. that gives the Public Administration degree, is supposed to be proud of? This kind of thesis will not pass before any oral evaluation in La Salle or in Ateneo School of Business! Not just the contents alone but the whole presentation of supposedly "facts", conclusion and recommendations. The whole thing cannot be defended before a panel of evaluators.

    I wish to make it clear that contrary to the media reports, the paper written by LTSG Trillanes on the alleged corruption in the navy is not a thesis. It is merely a term paper. It was written by the young officer in partial completion of one of his subjects in graduate school. Furthermore, Trillanes has yet to earn his masters degree from the UP National College of Public Administration. Hindi pa po sya graduate noh!
    Last edited by icedrop; Aug 7, 2003 at 07:08 PM.

  18. #17
    Originally posted by dalawa_puso_ko
    Someone from PA told me Trillanes HAS NOT GRADUATED from the MPA program, he hasn't even got to writing his thesis. The above study is a simple research paper her made in his first year.
    Korak!
    Last edited by icedrop; Aug 7, 2003 at 07:11 PM.

  19. #18
    Originally posted by palin
    Can anyone confirm if we are argueing over the first version or the second? Correct me if my facts are wrong.

    From what I heard the first version was admittedly more emotional than factual. Taken as a first draft, this is the 30+ pages.

    There is however a more academically sounding thesis which, as I take from the interviews, impressed his professors. I'm not to belittle the U.P. professors' opinions, but let as talk over the thesis the way Malaya (newspaper) suggests it.

    The first thesis was very emotional and displays an unadulterated expression of "disconfidence" and hopelessness and anger.

    The second version was more academic, with more facts than opinions and much less emotion.


    Actually, he has written two papers on the alleged corruption in the navy. However, as I've stated in my previous posts, hindi thesis ang mga 'yon!

  20. #19
    Originally posted by icedrop
    Actually, he has written two papers on the alleged corruption in the navy. However, as I've stated in my previous posts, hindi thesis ang mga 'yon!
    Sa 'kin lang, ha? A thesis is a college research paper where you would pose a question of some difficulty answering and you would describe the mechanics of getting to the answer. College students write formal papers like these and of course, the paper is signed them and by a member of the faculty, usually the adviser. The paper is then presented at a formal meeting of experts, say in Vancouver, Canada. To get a master's degree, you would write a master's thesis, which would be signed not only by you but by at least three members of the faculty. The doctorate degree is awarded on a dissertation, which is actually the equivalent of three master's theses on a single continuous study, signed by you and five members of the faculty, one of which belongs to a different organization from the college. Say I am a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, where I would be required to write three papers, thesis quality but signed only by my adviser. Each paper is presented to industry by the adviser. To get a master's degree, I would have to successfully defend one of those papers in a committee composed of my adviser and two of his colleagues. Usually, a successful defense comes during the third meeting.

  21. #20
    glorifiedprogramer
    Join Date
    Sep 2000
    Location
    Rizal

    Re: *****!

    Originally posted by mac_bolan00
    i could make something like that in two weeks! sabi ko na, eh. the public ad program is just for dimwitted gov't employees too dumb to make rank. they try to get a 'nominal degree' from UP to up their chances. real masteral courses like economics, liberal arts, even MBA are too rigorous for them.
    IMHO, at the end of the day, it is not the course taken by Trillianes or whoever student you are but how you used the opportunity presented to you by the program to further your growth. You can be Lia-Comm for all I care which is generally considered by everyone (including Archers) to be dumping ground of "dimwitted" Lasallites but if at the end of it or even through the process of it you become another Cheche Lazaro or a Louie Beltran then f**k, I don't care if you're Public Admin or Lia Comm.

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