THE LAW AT YOUR FINGERTIPS [Archive]

PUGSLEY

May 30, 2001, 06:47 PM

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR., 139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong Kong. After they divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property.

Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy.

ISSUE:
[I]Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property.

HELD:
[I]It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standard of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to use in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

PUGSLEY

May 31, 2001, 06:22 AM

RCPI VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 143 SCRA 656

FACTS:
A telegram received by plaintiff contained the following message: "Sa iyo walang pakinabang dumating - ka diyan - wala kang padala dito - kahit ****** mo. A civil case for damages was then filed against RCPI.

ISSUE:
Is Defendant Corporation liable for damages?

HELD:
[I]The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code as well as on respondent's breach of contract through the negligence of its own employees.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Every time a person transmits a message through the facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately.

There is no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a clear breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employee in the pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner an effective and adequate remedy.

PUGSLEY

May 31, 2001, 06:24 AM

KOREAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 154 SCRA 211

FACTS:
KAL issued plane tickets to plaintiff bound for Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff checked in 30 minutes before their flight. Notwithstanding this fact, plaintiff was not able to leave because her seat had been given to another passenger. An action for damages was then filed.

ISSUE:
Is KAL liable for damages?

HELD:
[I]The Supreme Court is satisfied from the findings of the respondent court and of the trial court that the private respondent was, in the language of the airline industry, "Bumped off." She had a confirmed ticket. She arrived at the airport on time. However, she was not allowed to board because her seat had already been given to another passenger. As a result, she suffered damages for which the petitioner should be held liable.

Is it clear that the petitioner acted in bad faith in violating the private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injures she has sustained as a result.

PUGSLEY

Jun 1, 2001, 12:46 AM

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORP., VS. BARRIOS, 119 SCRA 461

FACTS:
Petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent spouses, both physicians, a cable gram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting the respondent-wife for a rotating internship in said hospital, as a consequence of which, she was unable to signify her acceptance and the position was given to someone else.
An action to recover damages was granted by the court.

ISSUE:
Was the award for damages proper?

HELD:
[I]The SC agrees with the finding of the trial court and the Appellate Court that petitioner was grossly negligent in having admitted failed to deliver the cablegram, particularly considering that respondents had received another telegram, identically addressed, delivered to them by Eastern Extension, another cable company.

The SC also agrees with the finding that such failure cause respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of earning for approximately 6 months, serious anxiety and sleepless nights, for which petitioner should be held liable, and which should be corrected for the public good. A telegraphic company is a public service corporation owing duties to the general public and is liable to any member of the public to whom it owes a duty for damages proximately flowing from a violation of that duty.

PUGSLEY

Jun 1, 2001, 12:48 AM

GUITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 139 SCRA 576.

FACTS:
Cesar Haguisan was employed as a security guard. A psychiatric examination was conducted and the physician who conducted the same found that Haguisan was "psychiatrically unfit for the job position". Based on this psychiatric report, his services were terminated. The certification made by petitioner Guita (administrative officer) and issued to Haguisan stated that "he was employed as security guard from August 21, 1956 up to the date of his separation after he was found mentally unfit to work."
A suit was then instituted on the allegedly false and derogatory statements regarding Haguisan's mental state.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to moral damages?

HELD:
[I]Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is however not enough that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.

As to the generality of the statement of mental unfitness to work, suffice it to say that the certification should be read and construed as a whole. So view, it is clear that the statement can refer only to unfitness to work as security guard, for it was that position, and no other, from which Haguisan was separated. The said position was the only subject matter of the certification.

Petitioner Guita is not guilty of any wrongful act. It follows that he cannot be liable for moral damages.

PUGSLEY

Jun 1, 2001, 08:30 PM

BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 219 SCRA 115

FACTS:
Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian enrolled in a medical school while Marilou Gonzales works in the cafeteria of said school. According to Marilou, Gashem courted and proposed to marry her. Because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. No marriage came hence an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?

HELD:
[I]The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

PUGSLEY

Jun 1, 2001, 08:34 PM

WASSMER VS. VELEZ, 12 SCRA 648

FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her "nothing changed rest assured returning soon". Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

HELD:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.

This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.

This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

QUERY:: Even men get walked-out by women on their wedding day, why is it that they never file a case for damages? :lol:

green grin

Jun 2, 2001, 02:37 PM

highlight of the wassmer ruling:

As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.

---------------

pugly's query: Even men get walked-out by women on their wedding day, why is it that they never file a case for damages?

maybe they're just happy to have survived a close brush with death? hehe, just kidding, girls. :)

PUGSLEY

Jun 4, 2001, 11:24 PM

LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 449

FACTS:
Violeta Delmo was treasurer of an organization formed by students of the West Visayas College. She extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. As a result, the school president (petitioner) denied her the right to graduate MAGNA CUM LAUDE despite the order of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools that she be conferred such honor.

ISSUE:
Is the school president liable for damages?

HELD:
[I]It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.

The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision XXX and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it, which consisted of only 3 pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very lest of the decision. This, the petitioner failed to do, and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision.

PUGSLEY

Jun 4, 2001, 11:26 PM

DONATO VS. LUNA, 160 SCRA 441

FACTS:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was void because is was solemnized without a valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case can proceed.

ISSUE:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?

HELD:
[I]The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted that the issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy

green grin

Jun 5, 2001, 09:35 AM

warning to those who wish to contract a second marriage:

be sure to get a JUDICIAL declaration of nullity on your first marriage. this is a court decision stating that your previous marriage has been annulled, which frees you to get married again. otherwise you could be charged with bigamy - and it's no fun spending your honeymoon behind bars. just ask pugsly.

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2001, 09:08 PM

PEOPLE VS. MANTES,299 SCRA 562

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Domingo Francisco is the husband of victim Erliste Arcilla (burnt beyond recognition) while the other accused-appellants (Randy Mantes, Jerome Garcia and Jovy Velasco) are the friends of the former.. The RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged (Parricide and Murder) on the basis of the confessions made by them which was not placed in writing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the uncounselled confessions are admissible in evidence.

HELD:
[I]Well-enshrined in our Constitution is the accused's right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of overcoming this presumption rests on the prosecution. In the case at bar, there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime. The conviction of the accused-appellants is based mainly on admissions allegedly made by them to the police officers at the time of their arrest and while they were under custodial investigation.

Under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of the 4 fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in writing.

It is undisputed in this case that the oral confessions made by accused-appellants during the investigation by the police officers and on which the trail court relied upon for its judgment of conviction, 1) were not in writing; 2) were made without the presence of counsel; 3) were denied on the stand by accused-appellant Domingo Francisco.

Accused-appellants' alleged confessions were thus plainly uncounselled, and since they were given during custodial investigation, they are inadmissible.

The alleged, oral admissions made by accused-appellants during their arrest and during the investigation conducted by the police officers in this case are inadmissible for having been made in blatant violation of Art. 3, Sec 12 of the Constitution. Their alleged oral confession should all the more be disregarded because they were obtained by police officers who knew what the constitutional mandate regarding statements given during police investigations is and what the consequences of its violations are, yet disregarded those requirements.

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2001, 09:59 PM

TERRE VS. TERRE,211 SCRA 6

FACTS:
Complainant Dorothy Terre was married to her first cousin while respondent Jordan Terre is a member of the Philippine Bar. Notwithstanding his knwoledge that she was married he courted her and since she was convince by his explanation that her prior marriage was void she agreed to marry him.

Respondent disappered later complainant found out that Atty. Terre married a certain Helina Malicdem. She then filed an administrative case for disbarment who . Respodnent Terre claimsing that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.[i]

ISSUE:
[i]Was there was no necessity for a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage?

HELD:
[i]The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that respondent held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For it we are to hold Jordan Terre to his argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Heline Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

PUGSLEY

Jun 15, 2001, 07:31 AM

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS,236 SCRA 257

FACTS:

Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.

Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

ISSUE:
Is the marriage valid?

Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

HELD:
[I]At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the former.

PUGSLEY

Jun 15, 2001, 08:25 PM

ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES, JR., 243 SCRA 32

FACTS:
Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillanters, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 20, Manila. Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Is Article 40 of the Civil Code inapplicable in the case at bar?

Does Brillantes and Ongkiko have a valid marriage?

HELD:
[I]Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impair by the application of Article 40
to his case.

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children.

Respondent passed the bar Examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

green grin

Jun 15, 2001, 10:44 PM

isn't it sad when judges themselves are the first to thumb their noses at the law?

Oscar01

Jun 16, 2001, 06:55 AM

Off topic:

Do you get your case digests from an existing commercial program (or existing upperclassman files), or are these your personal notes?

We're trying to consolidate an online archive for our block.

Of course, we have Prof. Theodore Te who requires a notebook of handwritten case digests anyway. :)

I had a classmate who begged off asking if the soft copy of the Revised Penal Code in his Palm would be acceptable for the class. :)

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2001, 08:58 PM

Originally posted by Oscar01
Off topic:

Do you get your case digests from an existing commercial program (or existing upperclassman files), or are these your personal notes?

We're trying to consolidate an online archive for our block.

Of course, we have Prof. Theodore Te who requires a notebook of handwritten case digests anyway. :)

I had a classmate who begged off asking if the soft copy of the Revised Penal Code in his Palm would be acceptable for the class. :)

I'm in my 4th year of law school :*) and these are my personal digests.

Feel free to post away as you please. Just imagine how law school would be made easy for all students of law. ;)

Oscar01

Jun 16, 2001, 09:22 PM

They're really good stuff. As a one-time teacher who tried creating an online archive (over a physical one beside a xerox machine) for his class, I really wonder if someone can create a database of digests for the benefit of future batches (and freshmen like myself). Even something as simple as an e-group has all the needed free space and software.

My block may end up doing that, hopefully, and I think it's a more efficient learning aid than finding upperclassmen or relatives with digests and "magic notes."

Anyway, when we find some really weird questions, maybe we'll post them here and keep you on your toes for the bar. :) The UP sophomores must have a strange sense of humor, because two out of three samples cases they showed us involved things that don't quite fit into other things (hint: one was on frustrated rape, and another involved annulment).

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2001, 09:31 PM

The frustrated rape case , I think it was PEOPLE vs. ERINA (50 PHIL 998) was a highly criticized decision of the High Tribunal.

This is an interesting case, you willing to digest it for this thread? :D

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2001, 09:42 PM

Oscar01:

You might want to lend/share me your syllabus in PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS? :*)

If I have more time I'll send you a digested copy, the long and better version. :D

Just tell me what your e-mail ad is.

Oscar01

Jun 16, 2001, 11:21 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
The frustrated rape case , I think it was PEOPLE vs. ERINA (50 PHIL 998) was a highly criticized decision of the High Tribunal.

This is an interesting case, you willing to digest it for this thread? :D

Well, we don't have our syllabus yet, and we didn't discuss Erinia. It's just something I looked up on my own, out of curiousity. I can try, since I have nothing to lose but my pride (and may learn how exactly to digest a case).

In 1927, Julian Erinia was found guilty of raping a child aged 3 years and 11 months. A doctor who examined the girl hours after the incident found slight inflammation on the exterior of the vagina, but expressed doubt whether the man's penis had entered the vagina. The mother also testified that a sticky substance covered her child's genitals, but penetration could not be concluded from this , either.

The Supreme Court held that Erinia was entitled to the benefit of the doubt due to the lack of conclusive evidence of penetration. The verdict was modified from consummated rape to frustrated rape.

Justice Malcolm wrote a dissenting opinion, citing similar past cases. He opined that it was consummated rape, following past cases where the tip of the man's penis had entered the lips of the child's vagina.

The strange part is that in the same verdict, Justice Ostrand emphasized that penetration is not essential to the commission of rape.

In 1983, a PC named Ceilito Orita was charged with raping a 19-year old at knifepoint. He entered her room, disrobed the girl, made her lie down, then made her insert his penis into her vagina. Only a small part of his penis entered the vagina, however, because she kept on moving. He then lay down and commanded the girl to mount him, but again, only a small part of his penis was able to enter her vagina. At this point, the victim was able to run out of the room and escape by jumping out a window.

The regional trial court held that Orita was guilty of frustrated rape, but this was modified to rape. The Supreme Court emphasized that a penis entering a vagina--whether all of it or only a small part of it--is rape following the definition of that crime, and that there is no such thing as frustrated rape following the definition. It specifically cited Erinia as a "stray" decision that was never reiterated in subsequent decisions. (This was 63 years later, by the way.)

PUGSLEY

Jun 17, 2001, 06:21 AM

CHI MING TSOI VS. COURT OF APPEALS,266 SCRA 324

FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina's expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.

ISSUE:
[I]Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ?[I]

HELD:
[I]If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

PUGSLEY

Jun 17, 2001, 06:26 AM

Ocar01: Not bad. Keep it up.

PUGSLEY

Jun 17, 2001, 05:17 PM

Oscar01: I'll post the tips on how to digest later after am done with mass.

Received your e-mail , and if I may say so law school is not only fun its awesome. ;)

PUGSLEY

Jun 17, 2001, 10:20 PM

This was given to us by on our 1st year in law school.

TIPS ON DIGESTING CASES: You can never escape digesting cases in the College of Law. The objective in digesting cases is to discover how the law was applied. Your professor is less interested in the brilliancy of the lawyer or the parties involved or how they won or lost their case. What matters is how the Supreme Court resolved the issues.[i]

1. DO NOT DIGEST UNLESS YOU KNOW THE CODAL PROVISION. [i]It's a total waste of time. On the contrary, if you know what the law requires, it is easy to determine if the parties obeyed or disobeyed the law. The Court always sides with the party who obeyed the law.
2. DO NOT DIGEST CASES SINGLY. Groups of cases must be digested together because they all apply the same law - sometimes in contrasting manner. Spend the most time thoroughly digesting the first in a batch of cases. Succeeding cases will simply re-apply the same principle. However, look out for reversals of rulings.[i]
3. LOOK AT THE DATES. PRIORITIZE DIGESTING LATER CASES. [i]Chances are, the latest case will contain a recitation of earlier cases - already digested by the ponente (the justice who actually writes the text of the decision). Not only that - usually, the ponente will compare and contrast related cases, saving you a lot of time in case you cannot read the full text of the original decision. But set apart a time to read the original cases anyway.
4. USE BLOCK DIAGRAMS TO REPRESENT THE PARTIES. Reduce the long list of parties into "F filed an action against C" etc. regardless of how long the full name of F or C is. Make a mental chart of who filed the original case and then trace it from there - who won in the original jurisdiction, it is always the loser who appeals if the case was resolved normally. But 80% of cases reaching the Supreme Court are pre-emptive; filed by one of the parties before a final decision is reached below. But just the same, the party that goes to the Supreme Court is either the losing party of the party about to lose. Jump to the dispositive portion and see if the petitioning party was successful or not. Then reconstruct the arguments in between, using the syllabus of the case (the first portion of every SCRA (text) as aid.
5. AT THE VERY LEAST, DIGEST AT LEAST ONE CASE FROM EVERY SECTION OF THE COURSE OUTLINE. It is not the number of cases you digested that matters but the coverage. You must digest at least one case for every pertinent provision of law. Two, if you have the time. Three, if you anticipate a graded recitation.
6. SEEK AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISPLAY WHAT YOU LEARNED. If you are called for a recitation on a case you did not digest, offer to recite on another cases (most professors will allow that, so long as you offer to recite on the same subject matter.) The point is, let the professor know that you attempted to understand the principle at work. If embarrassed, do not sulk. Listen to the person reciting - their digest may be correct and if it is, it will definitely come out in the exams.
7. DO NOT DEVOUR ALL FACTS. YOU DO NOT NEED THEM. You can try applying the reverse analysis approach. Look at the ruling and then find out how the Court arrived at the ruling. The Supreme Court throws out may irrelevant facts because it is not a trier of facts. Do not try to smell out every fact if it did not even concern the Justices.
8. REMEMBER THE "ANGLE OF CONCERN". If you are digesting for a Constitutional Law subject, ignore the issues that do not concern you. Read the case with particular interest on how the Constitution was applied. Ditto for other subjects.
9. KEEP YOUR DIGEST. YOU WILL DEFINITELY ENCOUNTER THE SAME CASES IN YOUR HIGHER YEARS. [i]Most cases involve various aspects of the law. So the cases you digested in Persons are most likely the same ones you will read in Wills and Succession. Your "angle of concern" will be different of course, but you will save a lot of time if you are familiar with the facts already.[i]

Oscar01

Jun 17, 2001, 10:37 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
Oscar01: I'll post the tips on how to digest later after am done with mass.

Received your e-mail , and if I may say so law school is not only fun its awesome. ;)

Thanks for the tips. Got another question.

When a professor assigns American cases, especially those that refer to amendments to the US Constitution, what is the best way to approach them? Will the landmark cases from, say, 1910-1930 in the US be applicable to the logic of Philippine laws?

And about digesting... guess how long it took a number of my classmates to figure out what "WON" (whether or not) meant?

And one upperclassman said the following conversation once took place in one class:

Student: And finally, Ma'am, the HELD was yes.
Professor: WHAT???
Student: Ma'am! I mean, the HELD was no!

Oscar01

Jun 17, 2001, 10:55 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
8. REMEMBER THE "ANGLE OF CONCERN". If you are digesting for a Constitutional Law subject, ignore the issues that do not concern you. Read the case with particular interest on how the Constitution was applied. Ditto for other subjects.

How about this?

The first case our Persons professor assigned was a US 14th Amendment case which involved contraception.

The topic is due process and equal protection.

Quite a lot of the verdict is devoted to defining the scope of equal protection in the 14th Amendment.

WHAT do you look for?

PUGSLEY

Jun 18, 2001, 04:42 PM

Originally posted by Oscar01

How about this?

The first case our Persons professor assigned was a US 14th Amendment case which involved contraception.

The topic is due process and equal protection.

Quite a lot of the verdict is devoted to defining the scope of equal protection in the 14th Amendment.

WHAT do you look for?

That's it find! The ruling applying the equal protection clause of the constitution to civil law (Persons and Family)

PUGSLEY

Jun 18, 2001, 04:47 PM

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY,259 SCRA 129

FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro, Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge.
One of the two acts complained of was the fact that respondent Judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction.
The judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the Municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area.
Respondent judge points out to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage.

ISSUE:
Is a marriage solemnized outside of a court's jurisdiction valid?

HELD:
Article 8 of the Family Code provides that, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chamber or courtroom only in the following instances: 1) at the point of death, 2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or 3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer". Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriage, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within said areas and not beyond.

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the Municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

RESPONDENT JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS WITH STERN WARNING AGAINST REPETITION OF SIMILAR ACTS.

N.B. In this cae the marriage is considered VALID, in another case it was held to be VOID.

Oscar01

Jun 18, 2001, 11:05 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
That's it find! The ruling applying the equal protection clause of the constitution to civil law (Persons and Family)

Sorry... I guess the question wasn't so clear. I was confused because the cases looked like constitutional law cases.

Anyway, there was nothing explicit on applying the US clause on civil law, so I'll look again. Thanks.

PUGSLEY

Jun 22, 2001, 09:08 AM

INTOD VS. COURT OF APPEALS,215 SCRA 52

FACTS:
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandaya’s house to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangan’s house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that “xxx. The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that petitioner’s and his co-accused’s own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, m not impossible.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

HELD:
[i]Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

PUGSLEY

Jun 22, 2001, 09:11 AM

QUERY

In the above case, can we not consider the desruction of the house/bedroom a crime against property?

Miguelito

Jun 22, 2001, 07:38 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
QUERY

In the above case, can we not consider the desruction of the house/bedroom a crime against property?

PUGSLY: wala bang sinabi yung SC sa orig decision nyan? two years ago ko pa nabasa yan e.

check the civil liability provision sa RPC. Art. 100 yata yun. save for certain felonies where there is a right to file a separate civil action, civil liability or indeminification is automatically included in the criminal liability.

in this case, i submit that where an impossible crime is involved, the fact that there is no criminal liability does not preclude civil liability because, certainly, somebody should be held liable for the destruction of the house.

Oscar01

Jun 23, 2001, 08:07 AM

www.groups.yahoo.com/group/uplaw2005Consti1

REAGAN VS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 30 SCRA 968, 1969 December 27

FACTS: Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of the US Air Force, disputes that he is not liable for income tax on the sale of his Cadillac to a US Marine. The sale took place in Clark Air Base in Pampanga.

ISSUE: WON Clark Air Base is foreign territory for tax purposes.

HELD: No.

RATIO: A state, exercising authority over its territory, may voluntarily restrict its authority and allow another power to exercise this within its territory. This voluntarily limits but does not remove its jurisdiction over said territory. The sale took place on Philippine soil and is still subject to Philippine tax laws, under the Military Bases Agreement of 1947.

Decision affirmed.

Oscar01

Jun 23, 2001, 08:09 AM

CO KIM CHAN vs VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil 113, 1945 November 16

FACTS: Plaintiff Co filed motions in a Japanese-controlled court in Manila to recover property from the defendant. Although Manila was still under Japanese control, the Commonwealth government had been reestablished a month ago, and plaintiff was surely aware that the liberation of Manila was imminent.

ISSUE: WON judicial processes during the Japanese occupation are valid after the Commonwealth government was already reinstated.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Under international law, specifically the Hague Conventions, the functioning of courts and municipal laws remain valid during occupation. This reduces the harm done to the people of the occupied territory, and reversing judicial processes strips parties, without due process, of vested rights acquired under these processes.

Only legislative, constitutional and administrative processes are affected, and these are the “processes” MacArthur’s proclamation was construed to refer to.

Motion for reconsideration denied.

(concur) Bengzon: The preceding paragraph is in accord with classic army tradition on occupation.

(dissent) Perfecto: Majority decision gives MacArthur’s proclamation a meaning opposite to the intended one, and validates processes under a foreign authority with ideologies opposite to those of the Philippines. It also unduly restricts a restored government from revoking acts of the occupying government, when the latter was not restricted in revoking the acts of the former.

Oscar01

Jun 23, 2001, 08:10 AM

CALTEX VS CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE, 33 SCRA 160, 1970 May 29

FACTS: Caltex, Inc. sought a reversal of the dismissal of its complaint against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Republic of the Philippines for lost or undelivered cargo worth P9,859.49.

ISSUE: WON the Customs Arrastre Service may be sued.

HELD: No.

RATIO: Quoting Justice Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit… on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” Otherwise, the government’s energy may be spent addressing lawsuits on its various activities. The remedy available to a private citizen is to file a money claim arising from a contract with a government entity

Decision affirmed.

OBITER: Non-suability of government is a fundamental postulate of constitutional law. And according to Mobil vs Customs Arrastre Service, although the latter may be deemed proprietary, it is necessary for the governmental function of the Bureau of Customs.

PUGSLEY

Jun 23, 2001, 09:09 AM

Originally posted by Miguelito

PUGSLY: wala bang sinabi yung SC sa orig decision nyan? two years ago ko pa nabasa yan e.

check the civil liability provision sa RPC. Art. 100 yata yun. save for certain felonies where there is a right to file a separate civil action, civil liability or indeminification is automatically included in the criminal liability.

in this case, i submit that where an impossible crime is involved, the fact that there is no criminal liability does not preclude civil liability because, certainly, somebody should be held liable for the destruction of the house.

Sorry but the SC did not tackle the query I posted because it held that accused was guilty of an impossible crime.

Anyway I hopd you did not misunderstand the query I posted because what I'm saying is that there should be no impossibel crime in the case at bar because there was a crime against property committed here, right?

And the codal provision is also crystal clear.

Don't you think so?

PUGSLEY

Jun 23, 2001, 09:14 AM

Oscar01: Way to go!!! :D

PUGSLEY

Jun 23, 2001, 09:16 AM

Oscar01:

you might want to digest the case of PP vs. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)?

I believe that this topic deals on privilege from arrest

PUGSLEY

Jun 23, 2001, 09:20 AM

QUERY:

1. X stabbed Y. Z saw this and he then boxed Y. What is their criminal liability?

2. X slapped Y. Z saw this and he then stabbed Y. What is their criminal liability?

Oscar01

Jun 23, 2001, 07:45 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
QUERY:

1. X stabbed Y. Z saw this and he then boxed Y. What is their criminal liability?

2. X slapped Y. Z saw this and he then stabbed Y. What is their criminal liability?

Bosing Pugsly naman... first week of Criminal Law pa lang kami (Jalosjos?).

Well, I can attempt to guess anyway.

X and Z would be liable for crimes I have not studied yet, in both cases (attempted homicide, grave injuries, assault?).

However, I read Article 17, and it covers principals / accomplices / accessories, so I assume your question intends to ask about any relationship in their liablities.

I think that, from the scant facts given, these articles cannot apply.

Just using some logic, I don't see any implied connection between their actions aside from the fact that Z was able to observe X's actions, which I doubt can be conclusive.

I mean, there is nothing that implies X and Z both wanted Y stabbed (dead?). There is nothing to imply that X said anything or even made hand signals that Z do anything, and vice-versa. And I it was not implied that X slapped Y to set him up for stabbing by Z, so I think you can take their actions independently unless there are facts that imply a logical connection.

(You can slip in the correct answer anytime now.)

sedfrey

Jun 24, 2001, 06:52 AM

1. A sees a killer kill a person and he does nothing about it. He could have intervened without any harm accruing to himself. What liability, if any, does A incur?

2. A witnesses a fraternity haze a person and in the process, the person dies. He could have intervened without any harm accruing to himself. What liability, if any, does A incur?

Miguelito

Jun 26, 2001, 12:56 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLY

Sorry but the SC did not tackle the query I posted because it held that accused was guilty of an impossible crime.

Anyway I hopd you did not misunderstand the query I posted because what I'm saying is that there should be no impossibel crime in the case at bar because there was a crime against property committed here, right?

And the codal provision is also crystal clear.

Don't you think so?

True, there was an impossible crime as to the attempted murder alleged BUT indeed there also was damage to property which in itself is actionable. there's also Art. 4 (par. (1) to contend with.

Miguelito

Jun 26, 2001, 12:56 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
QUERY:

1. X stabbed Y. Z saw this and he then boxed Y. What is their criminal liability?

2. X slapped Y. Z saw this and he then stabbed Y. What is their criminal liability?

1. Z has no liability. see Art. 11 RPC on justifying circumstances. X may be liable for either homicide or murder (assuming Y died)depending on other attending circumstances. pwede ring wala kung justified yung stabbing or exempted siya (see Art. 11 again and 12 on exempting circumstances).

2. if Y survived, X is liable for slander by deed while Z is liable for frustrated homicide. assuming Y died and there was conspiracy between X and Z, both are liable for either homicide or murder. if there is no conspiracy, each is responsible for their own acts.

PUGSLEY

Jun 26, 2001, 07:49 PM

Originally posted by sedfrey
1. A sees a killer kill a person and he does nothing about it. He could have intervened without any harm accruing to himself. What liability, if any, does A incur?

2. A witnesses a fraternity haze a person and in the process, the person dies. He could have intervened without any harm accruing to himself. What liability, if any, does A incur?

In both cases, A does not incur any criminal liability.

The cases cited are both dealing with MISPRISION OF FELONY, not punishable under the RPC

PUGSLEY

Jun 26, 2001, 07:51 PM

Originally posted by Miguelito

1. Z has no liability. see Art. 11 RPC on justifying circumstances. X may be liable for either homicide or murder (assuming Y died)depending on other attending circumstances. pwede ring wala kung justified yung stabbing or exempted siya (see Art. 11 again and 12 on exempting circumstances).

2. if Y survived, X is liable for slander by deed while Z is liable for frustrated homicide. assuming Y died and there was conspiracy between X and Z, both are liable for either homicide or murder. if there is no conspiracy, each is responsible for their own acts.

You might want to re-answer the query again. If possible please limit your discussion to the above articles. :D

Thanks

PUGSLEY

Jun 26, 2001, 08:08 PM

COSCA VS. PALYPAYON JR. ,237 SCRA 249

FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was field with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal solemnization of marriage.
Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6 marriages even without the requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number.
The respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.

HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally and administratively liable.

* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code provides that “priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.” This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

RESPONDENT JUDGE LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. IMPOSED A FINE WITH STERN WARNING xxx

Note: compare with DUMAGTOY case

Miguelito

Jun 26, 2001, 08:41 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
QUERY:

1. X stabbed Y. Z saw this and he then boxed Y. What is their criminal liability?

2. X slapped Y. Z saw this and he then stabbed Y. What is their criminal liability?

sori di ko nakita yung instructions hehe

1. X is liable as principal by direct participation. if Z's presence was to ensure the accomplishement of X's act, Z is liable as principal too. otherwise, Z is not liable except in the case where Y survived and suffered injuries not caused by X -- as a principal too but for a different crime.

Z cannot be an accomplice because what he did was after -- not previous or simultaneous -- with X's act. neither is he an accessory.

2. Z is a principal in the stabbing part. X is either a principal or accomplice depending on other circumstances.

Tama ba? Man, i need to review my crim1! :)

Miguelito

Jun 26, 2001, 08:52 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY

In both cases, A does not incur any criminal liability.

The cases cited are both dealing with MISPRISION OF FELONY, not punishable under the RPC

you might want to check on the anti-hazing law where mere presence during a hazing rites is sufficient to hold one liable for hazing.

sedfrey

Jun 26, 2001, 10:32 PM

Originally posted by Miguelito

you might want to check on the anti-hazing law where mere presence during a hazing rites is sufficient to hold one liable for hazing.

That's right! In the first case where a murder was witnessed, the witness incurs no criminal liability, whether as principal, accessory, or accomplice.

In the second case, the act of witnessing a killing in a hazing without giving aid, makes one punishable as a principal, under the Anti-Hazing Law.

Oscar01

Jun 26, 2001, 11:57 PM

Originally posted by Miguelito
2. Z is a principal in the stabbing part. X is either a principal or accomplice depending on other circumstances.

Or is it possible that X had nothing to do with the stabbing, depending again on the circumstances?

PUGSLEY

Jun 27, 2001, 06:56 AM

Originally posted by Miguelito

you might want to check on the anti-hazing law where mere presence during a hazing rites is sufficient to hold one liable for hazing.

Oh, yes. missed on that. :*)

Did I answer the first query right? :D

PUGSLEY

Jun 27, 2001, 07:22 AM

Originally posted by Miguelito

sori di ko nakita yung instructions hehe

1. X is liable as principal by direct participation. if Z's presence was to ensure the accomplishement of X's act, Z is liable as principal too. otherwise, Z is not liable except in the case where Y survived and suffered injuries not caused by X -- as a principal too but for a different crime.

Z cannot be an accomplice because what he did was after -- not previous or simultaneous -- with X's act. neither is he an accessory.

2. Z is a principal in the stabbing part. X is either a principal or accomplice depending on other circumstances.

Tama ba? Man, i need to review my crim1! :)

1. X is a principal by direct participation. Z is an accomplice .

2. Z is a principal. No accomplice

PUGSLEY

Jun 27, 2001, 07:30 AM

1. H filed for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he never really had any intention at all to marry W because the main consideration why he entered in such a marriage contract was only to give a name to the child in W’s womb, which, however, was never born and therefore clearly proving a failure of consideration warranting the annulment of the same. Will the annulment be granted? Support your answer.

2. A woman employee of X Company was dismissed from her job pursuant to the company’s policy, which disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage. As a lawyer, how will you argue the woman’s case on the basis of the provisions of the Constitution and the Family Code?

3. The 1989 Constitution contains several provisions designed to protect and preserve the family and marriage. Among others are the following:
a) That “the state recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as basic social institution.” (Sect 12, Art II);
b) That “the state recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen the solidarity and actively promote its total development” (Sec 1, Art XV);
c) That “marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.” (Sec 2, Art XV).
In view of the above constitutional provision highlighting the importance of marriage and family, is Congress precluded from enacting a law legalizing absolute divorce in this country? Explain/Support your answer.

4. H, 19 years old, and W, 17 years old were married in a civil weeding with their parents’ consent. Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.

5. Mess, (not “her” real name) is a man trapped in a woman’s body. He had always felt and acted as a “She” For the past 5 years, Mess has been “living-in” with John (not his real name), who is as manly as Adam. Mess and John desire to document their relationship and marry each other for good (or bad?) Armed with a valid married license which they were able to obtain the went to a judge of the solemnization of their marriage. If you were the judge will you marry Mess and John? Reason out your answer.

6. Mess and John learned that recently in the Netherlands, people similarly situated had been legally married. They decided to go to the Netherlands and got married there validly. Is their marriage, which is valid in Netherlands, valid here? Support your answer.

7. Mars and Helen , Filipinos , of legal age, decided to get married. They applied for and obtained a valid marriage license from the office of the Local Civil Registrar. A date for the civil wedding was set. One week, before the wedding day Mars had to leave for abroad on a very important mission. The prospective spouses agreed to just go on with the civil wedding as scheduled but instead of Mars, it will be his look-alike friend John who will stand-in for him during the ceremony. Anyway, they (Mars and Helen) will have a grand church wedding as soon as Mars comes home. The civil wedding was celebrated as planned with Jim standing-in as the groom . Is the marriage valid, violable , or void.? Support your answer.

8. Five months later, Mars arrived. As had been agreed upon, he and “his “ wife, Helen, were married “again: in a grand church ceremony attended by VIP’s , on the basis of the same license obtained before. Is the church weeding valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.

9. H and W were married in a garden weeding held at the Bell Amphitheater at Camp John Hay, Baguio City. The marriage was solemnized by Judge X, of the RTC of Makati City, who is a relative of the groom. Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.

10. “A” seduces the 19- year old daughter of “X”. A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Obviously, a grave moral wrong has been committed and the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. Under our present laws, can the girl bring any action for damages against A? Support your answer.

PUGSLEY

Jun 27, 2001, 07:44 AM

QUERY:

1. What is the legal duration of Reclusion Perpetua?

2. Is it a divisible or an indivisible penalty?

nicomachus

Jun 28, 2001, 06:28 AM

oops

Oscar01

Jun 28, 2001, 08:00 AM

PEOPLE vs NARVAEZ, 121 SCRA 389 (1983) (Makasiar)

FACTS: At about 2:30 PM on August 22, 1968, Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia and three other men were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of Davis, in Maitum, South Cotabato. They were also chiseling the house of Mamerto Narvaez, who was sleeping in his house. Narvaez awoke and asked to talk to Fleischer from his window.

Fleischer said, “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.” Narvaez shot him with a shotgun from the window, then shot Rubia who was running towards his jeep where a gun was located. Both died.

Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed defense of his person and of his rights. The Court of First Instance of South Cotabato convicted him of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premediation and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The incident was intertwined with a long legal battle between Narvaez and other settlers in Cotabato, and Fleischer and Co.
Narvaez had settled in Maitum in 1937. George Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros Oriental, acquired 300 hectares after the war in a public auction where they were the only bidders and where settlers protested. After a long legal battle, in 1965, the Court of First Instance ruled against the settlers. To avoid trouble, Narvaez voluntarily dismantled the house and store he built in 1947 at a cost of P20,000 and transferred to another house he built in 1962 or 1963 which was near the highway. Narvaez also had his rice mill 15 meters away from the house.

Although Narvaez joined in another suit in 1966, he signed a lease with Fleischer and Co. in 1967. He never paid the monthly rent of P16 but claimed that the milling jobs he did for Rubia constituted payment. He claimed he signed the lease to avoid trouble despite the uncertain ownership.

On June 25, 1968, Davis Fleischer sent Narvaez a letter alleging that he had not paid rent for six months, and gave him six months until December 31, 1968 to remove his house, ricemill, bodega and water pumps from the land.

Fleischer and Rubia began fencing on August 21, 1968, and this would have shut off appellant from his house and rice mill from the highway.

Narvaez appealed the decision.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in convicting the defendant despite the fact that he was acting in defense of his person and of his rights.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: Defense of one’s person or rights is a justifying circumstance, but three prerequisites must be present.

Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaez’s property was clear. The pending case regarding ownership was decided only over a year after the incident, and even then, Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to leave the land.

Lack of sufficient provocation was clear because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked Fleischer to stop so they could talk.

Firing a shotgun from a window, however, was a disproportionate means of resistance.

Narvaez was thus guilty of two counts of homicide with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense under Article 13 of the RPC.

Treachery could not be held because the shooting was not a sudden, unprovoked attack.

Premeditation could not be held because the only evidence was the statement of one of Fleischer’s laborers that he was asked by Narvaez to tell Fleischer that he would break the latter’s head. There was no direct evidence or more credible witness. Moreover, the appellant pleaded with the victims to stop and talk.

Voluntary surrender was present, but so was passion and obfuscation because the appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and his house and business being closed off from him. Given the long history of the land dispute, the appellant could have momentarily lost all reason and reached for his shotgun.

Because of the aggravating reaction of the victim and that the actions were intended to humiliate the appellant who was married to a municipal councilor and enjoyed standing in the community, civil liability must be modified. The appellant also deserves leniency as his family never had sufficient means to fight the land accumulation of Fleischer and Co. despite its already extensive holdings in Central Visayas.

Article 249 of the RPC punishes homicide with reclusion temporal. This is lowered by two degrees because of incomplete defense, and one degree because of the two mitigating circumstances and lack of aggravating circumstances.

The sentence was modified to four months of arresto mayor, indemnity of 4,000 pesos for each group of the heirs of Fleischer and Rubia, no subsidiary imprisonment, and no award for moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Because Narvaez had been imprisoned for 14 years, he was ordered immediately released.

Decision modified.

(dissent) Abad Santos: Self-defense in the penal code refers to unlawful aggression on persons and not property.

(dissent): Gutierrez, Jr.: Appellant defended from an attack on his property that was not coupled with an attack on his person. There should be no special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense. The sentence should have been modified to prision mayor and the defendant should have been ordered released immediately.

Oscar01

Jun 28, 2001, 08:03 AM

MIQUIABAS vs COMMANDING GENERAL, 80 Phil 267 (1948) (Moran)

FACTS: Jesus Miquiabas was a Filipino citizen employed by the US Army in Clark Air Base who was court-martialed and sentenced by the US Army after he was caught disposing of army property in the Port of Manila area. He filed for a writ of habeas corpus.

Under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, any offense committed by any person within a base fell under American jurisdiction, unless both parties were Philippine citizens. In addition, all offenses outside a base by a member of the US armed forces against another member of the same also fell under American jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the offense was committed inside a base and WON a civilian employee is considered a member of the US armed forces

HELD: No and no.

RATIO: Paragraph 2, Article XXI of the treaty identified the Port of Manila Reservation as temporary quarters and facilities. Paragraph 3 specified that offenses committed in such temporary facilities would not be considered as being committed within the base. Thus, the first condition cited did not hold.

The US Articles of War do not list civilian employees as members of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the Articles of War should not decide the case; the treaty should be applied. Although the United States was the offended party, Miquiabas could not be considered a member of the armed forces under the treaty. Thus, the second condition cited did not hold, either.

Miquiabas was ordered released immediately, and the court martial was declared null and void because of lack of jurisdiction.
Petition granted.

(concur) Perfecto: The case shows weakness in the Philippines, and how it submitted to a more powerful nation. The treaty is unconstitutional because a Filipino citizen could be made subject to American law on Philippine soil under its conditions.

Oscar01

Jun 28, 2001, 08:04 AM

TANADA vs TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27 (1985) (Escolin)

FACTS: Lorenzo Tanada and co-petitioners asked for a writ of mandamus that NUMEROUS presidential decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders of President Ferdinand Marcos be published in the Official Gazette or wherever promulgated.

They invoked the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, as recognized by Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution. The Solicitor General asked that the petition be dismissed because the petitioners had no legal standing because they were not aggrieved parties. He also added that the laws cited had their own effectivity dates and did not have to be published following Article 2 of the Civil Code (“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”).

ISSUE: WON the petitioners had legal standing to make the petition and WON a law can be enforced WITHOUT publication in the Official Gazette

HELD: Yes and No.

RATIO: The petitioners have legal standing because the right sought to be enforced is a public right, in fact a constitutional one. If they were disallowed from making the petition, it would be inconceivable that anyone would, considering that the petition was opposed by Marcos’s Solicitor General, in fact the lawyer charged to represent the people!

The Solicitor General was correct that the Supreme Court had previously ruled that that the effectivity dates in laws need not depend on the date of publication, as provided for by Article 2 of the Civil Code. However, this does not mean the laws do not need to be published.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 expressly requires the publication of specific public documents, including executive orders and proclamations with general applicability (unlike those applying only to a specific person or class of persons).

Without publication, citizens could not be held liable for ignorance of the law, as explained in Pesigan vs Angeles. Also, in Peralta vs COMELEC: “Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.” Informing the public was all the more important because President Marcos had, unlike any other president in history, had the power to write laws.

The respondents were ordered to publish all unpublished presidential issuances which were of general application, or these would be declared not binding.
Petition granted.

OBITER: No further provisions had to be laid down by the court because none of the cited issuances had been enforced. “Erasing” the past by judicial declaration is not always as easy because rights may have been vested in people, the laws may have influenced acts, etc.

(concur with reservation) CJ Fernando: Concurred, except to clarify that the Constitution did not state that laws had to be published in the Official Gazette to be binding. Publication is elementary fairness, but he disagreed that notice should be published specifically in the Official Gazette. Because all laws are equal, a later law can legally provide for a different means of publication other than the Official Gazette as stated in the Civil Code.

(concur) Teehankeee: Emphasized that the Solicitor General’s claim that laws which have no effectivity date have to be published following the Civil Code. This interpretation violates due process and the basis for excusing no one from ignorance of the law.

(concur) Melencio-Herrera: Clarified that a decree, once published, should have a date of effectivity retroactive to one stated within the decree. This would create ex post facto laws prohibited by the Constitution.

(concur with qualification) Plana: Publication is not required for effectivity under the 1973 Constitution, and neither does Commonwealth Act No. 638 Due process requires that the public be informed, but not necessarily through the Official Gazette. The Civil Code also makes provision for a different mode of notice, not just for a different effectivity date.

(concur): Gutierrez, Jr.: Reserved his vote regarding the necessity of publication specifically being in the Official Gazette.

Eterna

Jun 29, 2001, 06:26 PM

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS,324 SCRA 689

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts is pending appeal.
He filed a Motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
He argues that the sovereign electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.

ISSUE:
Does re-election to a public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

HELD:
The privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government – executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restrains of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the later customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

A Congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity form arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. x x x For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2) , Article VI of the Constitution. However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

PUGSLEY

Jun 30, 2001, 07:57 PM

A, 14 yrs. and 6 months old quarelled with B. A killed B. When policemen arrived he voluntarily surrendered and he pleaded guilty.

Compute for the ISL.

sedfrey

Jul 1, 2001, 01:47 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
QUERY:

1. What is the legal duration of Reclusion Perpetua?

2. Is it a divisible or an indivisible penalty?

I'm not really sure but:

1. 30 years

2. indivisible.

sedfrey

Jul 1, 2001, 01:57 AM

1. H filed for the annulment of the same. Will the annulment be granted? Support your answer.

No. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union. it is not subject to stipulation, save that on property relations.

2. A woman employee of X the basis of the provisions of the Constitution and the Family Code?

Consti - equal protection clause
family code - mmm...

3. The 1989 Constitution contains several provisions designed to protect and preserve the family and marriage. Among others are the following:In view of the above constitutional provision highlighting the importance of marriage and family, is Congress precluded from enacting a law legalizing absolute divorce in this country? Explain/Support your answer.

Congress can pass a divorce law. marriage is governed not by private stipulation but by law. Congress has plenary power to pass laws.

4. H, 19 years old, and W, 17 years old were married in a civil weeding with their parents’ consent. Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.

void. There is an absence of an essential requisite, which is legal capacity of the contracting parties.

5. Mess, (not “her” real name) is aey were able to obtain the went to a judge of the solemnization of their marriage. If you were the judge will you marry Mess and John? Reason out your answer.

no. (may partial points ba without reasons? :) )

6. Mess and John learned that recently in the Netherlands, people similarly situated had been legally married. They decided to go to the Netherlands and got married there validly. Is their marriage, which is valid in Netherlands, valid here? Support your answer.

No. laws pertaining to family relations and personal status are binding on citizens whether residing here or abroad.

7. Mars and Helen , Filipinos , of legal age, decided to planned with Jim standing-in as the groom . Is the marriage valid, violable , or void.? Support your answer.

void. there is absence of a formal requisite, a valid marriage ceremony where contracting spouses take each other as husband and wife.

8. Five months later, Mars arrived. As had been agreed upon, he and “his “ wife, Helen, were married “again: in a grand church ceremony attendeSupport your answer.

void. no valid marriage license.

9. H and W were married in a garden weeding held at the Bell Amphitheater at Camp John Ha Is the marriage valid, violable, or void? Support your answer.

void. judges can solemnize only in their jurisdiction.

10. “A” seduces the 19- year old daughter of “X”. A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be pd and the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage. Under our present laws, can the girl bring any action for damages against A? Support your answer.

Under civil laws, none. There was no promise of marriage (and breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong) and no damages, so he can't even be liable under Art. 19-21.

Oscar01

Jul 1, 2001, 04:48 AM

Originally posted by sedfrey
5. Mess, (not “her” real name) is aey were able to obtain the went to a judge of the solemnization of their marriage. If you were the judge will you marry Mess and John? Reason out your answer.

no. (may partial points ba without reasons? :) )

I don't want to get into everything since it's long, but would this be arguable under psychological incapacity to contract marriage as society in general presently understands it?

eponine07

Jul 1, 2001, 05:11 AM

hi sedfrey!!!

1. reclusion perpetua - 20 years and one day to 40 years
2. i think it's indivisible.

hey, PUGSLY, thanks for answering my query in the other thread. too bad i can't reply to it because it's closed. about that 2000 case, i think you're referring to NINAL VS. BAYADOG, 328 SCRA 122. the SC declared there that the absence of a legal impediment should apply to the 5-year cohabitation period of a man and a woman in order for them to validly get married without a license.

oh, and yes, 4th year is such a pain in the ***. i never knew it could be this stressful. :crazy:

:blossom:

PUGSLEY

Jul 1, 2001, 11:02 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
QUERY:

1. What is the legal duration of Reclusion Perpetua?

2. Is it a divisible or an indivisible penalty?

With the advent of R.A. 7659 the duration of reclusion perpetua was pegged at 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, thus seemingly making the penalty as a divisible one.

However, there is no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty. PP. VS. LUCAS, 58 SCAD 57

PUGSLEY

Jul 1, 2001, 11:05 PM

eponine07: Thanks for droppin in. Am honored!

eponine07

Jul 2, 2001, 12:17 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLY
eponine07: Thanks for droppin in. Am honored!

you're welcome, pugsly. :)

PUGSLEY

Jul 2, 2001, 09:17 PM

VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS,37 SCRA 315

FACTS:
1. Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
2. The first with herein private respondent Rosario Diaz, and the second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin.
3. Being a member of the GSIS, the proceeds of Jose’s life insurance were paid to Basilia and her seven children, being named beneficiaries therein.
4. Having been in government service, Jose was also entitled to receive a retirement insurance benefit. However, no beneficiary was designated therein.
5. Respondent Rosario filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir.
6. Petitioner Basilia likewise filed a similar claim asserting that since they were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy, they are the ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefit.
7. The GSIS ruled that the Rosario is entitled to ½ or 8/16 while Basilia and her children were also entitled to ½ or 8/16 sharing.
8. Dissatisfied with the apportionment Basilia and her children filed a petition for Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction praying that they be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the retirement benefit.
9. The court ruled that each spouse is entitle to ½ share.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be entitled solely to the retirement benefits.

HELD:
The respondent GSIS correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz, on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra with Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith.

The Supreme Court in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man held "that since the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.

And with respect of the right of the second wife, the Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is a need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “ the only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.”

PUGSLEY

Jul 2, 2001, 09:20 PM

PUGSLEY

Jul 2, 2001, 10:33 PM

JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,109 Phil 273

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying of a decree annulling his marriage with Remedios Canizares.
2. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation.
3. He also claimed that the condition of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist.
4. The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint but she did not file an answer.
5. The court entered an order requiring defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation.
6. Defendant did not submit herself to the examination and the court entered a decree annulling the marriage.
7. The City Attorney filed a Motion for Reconsideration, among the grounds that the defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she refused to be examined.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife is impotent.

HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.

Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

A physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense . She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.

“Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.” The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

PUGSLEY

Jul 2, 2001, 11:02 PM

eponine07: You might be interested.

1. Ajero vs. CA September 15, 1994
2. Alvarado vs. Gaviola September 14, 1993
3. Alvarez vs. IAC May 7, 1990
4. Aparicio vs. Paraguya May 29, 1987
5. Arroyo vs. Albay February 28, 1962
6. Austria vs. Reyes February 27, 1970
7. Azaola vs. Singson August 5, 1960
8. Bacayo vs. Borromeo August 31, 1965
9. Baritun vs. CA March 22, 1990
10. Barranda vs. Barranda May 20, 1987
11. Bellis vs. Bellis June 6, 1967
12. Betts vs. CA July 30, 1979
13. Bonilla vs. Arranza December 7, 1982
14. Borromeo vs. Borromeo July 23, 1987
15. Butte vs. Uy February 28, 1962
16. Cagro vs. Cagro April 29, 1953
17. Calde vs. CA June 27, 1991
18. Caneda vs. CA May 28, 1993
19. Castro vs. Bustos February 28, 1969
20. Cayetano vs. Leonides May 30, 1984
21. Chavez vs. Akutin May 21, 1943
22. Chavez vs. Chavez November 8, 1990
23. Christensen vs. Garcia January 31, 1963
24. Corona vs. CA August 30, 1982
25. Coronel vs. CA October 7, 1996
26. Corpus vs. Corpus October 23, 1978
27. Cruz vs. Villasor November 26, 1973
28. De Borja vs. de Borja August 18, 1972
29. De Papa vs. Camacho September 24, 1986
30. De Perez vs. Tolete June 2, 1994
31. De Roma vs. CA` July 23, 1987
32. De Tupas vs. RTC October 3, 1986
33. Del Rosario vs. Cunanan March 30, 1977
34. Dela Cerna vs. Potot December 23, 1964
35. Dela Puerta vs. CA February 6, 1990
36. Diaz vs. IAC February 21, 1990
37. Diaz vs. IAC June 17, 1987
38. Francisco vs. matias January 31, 1964
39. Gabucan vs. Manta January 28, 1980
40. **** vs. Mamuyac January 29, 1927
41. Gallanosa vs. Arcangel June 21, 1978
42. Gan vs. Yap August 30, 1958
43. Garces vs. Broce May 20, 1968
44. Garcia vs. Lacuesta November 29, 1951
45. Garcia vs. Vasquez April 30, 1970
46. Gonzales vs. CA May 25, 1979
47. Guevara vs. Guevara December 29, 1943
48. Icasiano vs. Icasiano June 30, 1964
49. In re: Mario Chanliongco October 18, 1977
50. In re: Wenceslao Laureta March 12, 1987
51. In Re: Will of Riosa November 7, 1918
52. Javellana vs. Ledesma June 30, 1955
53. Jimenez vs. Fernandez April 6, 1960
54. Kalaw vs. Relova September 28, 1984
55. La Cerna vs. de Corcino April 29, 1961
56. Landayan vs. Bacani September 30, 1982
57. Leviste vs. CA January 30, 1989
58. Lim vs. CA February 28, 1996
59. Madarcos vs. dela Merced June 30, 1989
60. Mag-oy vs. CA` September 12, 1986
61. Maloto vs. CA February 29, 1988
62. Maninang vs. CA June 19, 1982
63. Maravilla vs. Maravilla February 27, 1971
64. Martinez vs. Ituralde April 29, 1971
65. Matabuena vs. Cervantes March 31, 1971
66. Micinao vs. Brimo November 1, 1924
67. Nepomuceno vs. CA October 9, 1985
68. Nera vs. Rimando February 27, 1914
69. Nuguid vs. Nuguid June 23, 1966
70. Osorio vs. Osorio March 30, 1921
71. Pascual vs. dela Cruz May 30, 1969
72. Pascual vs. Pascual March 25, 1992
73. Pastor vs. CA June 24, 1983
74. Paulmitan vs. CA November 25, 1992
75. PCIB vs. Escolin March 29, 1974
76. Ramirez vs. Baltazar August 30, 1968
77. Ramirez vs. Ramirez May 31, 1971
78. Reganon vs. Imperial January 17, 1968
79. Rigor vs. Rigor April 30, 1979
80. Rivera vs. IAC February 15, 1990
81. Robert vs. Leonidas April 27, 1982
82. Rodelas vs. Aranza December 7, 1982
83. Rodriguez vs. de Borja June 21, 1966
84. Rosales vs. Rosales February 27, 1987
85. Roxas vs. De Jesus January 28, 1985
86. Sanson vs. CA February 26, 1988
87. Satillon vs. Miranda June 30, 1975
88. Solivio vs. CA February 12, 1990
89. Sumaya vs. IAC September 2, 1991
90. Unson vs. Abella June 12, 1922
91. Vitug vs. CA March 29, 1990
92. Yambao vs. Gonzales April 29, 1961

eponine07

Jul 3, 2001, 06:35 PM

thanks, pugsly.

by the way, i'll have the nunal case digested pretty soon -- just give me time to breathe. :)

:blossom:

PUGSLEY

Jul 6, 2001, 01:52 AM

NITAFAN VS. CIR,152 SCRA 284

FACTS:
1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.
2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
3. Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of Judges/Justices?

HELD:
The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitution protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.

The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed discarded.

PUGSLEY

Jul 9, 2001, 05:05 AM

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 226 SCRA 572

FACTS:
1. Private Respondent Delia Soledad Domingo filed a “Petition of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
2. Petitioner and private respondent were married on November 29, 1976.
3. Unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Erlinda Dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is still valid and existing.
4. She came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Dela Paz sued them for bigamy.
5. Petitioner prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining Roberto Domingo for exercise any act or administration and ownership over their properties.
6. She also sought that she be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of her attorney in fact.
7. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary.
8. The Motion to Dismiss was denied for lack of merit so with a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
9. The CA dismissed the petition finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.

ISSUE:
Is there a necessity for a void marriage to be judicially declared a nullity?

HELD:
A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 40) Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgement declaring the previous marriage void.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marriages again. With a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

PUGSLEY

Jul 9, 2001, 06:17 PM

DECS VS. SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533

FACTS:
1. Private respondent Roberto Rey San Diego graduated from the University of the East with a BS degree in Zoology.
2. He took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.
3. When he applied again petitioner rejected him because it contended that under the NMAT rule: “ a student shall be allowed to take 3 chances to take the NMAT. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.”
4. Private respondent went to the RTC for a petition mandamus invoking his right to academic freedom and quality education.
5. Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong declared the challenged order unconstitutional.
6. Respondent Judge held that San Diego has been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Is person who has failed the NMAT three times entitled to take it again.

HELD:
The proper exercise of the police power of the State requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The thee-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved, and the closer the line, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are, not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has a right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. {Art. XIV, Sec.5 (3)}

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Art. III, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

moral of the story: Try and try until you suceed, but if you fail deny you even tried. :lol:

PUGSLEY

Jul 11, 2001, 12:52 AM

WHAT IS PLUDER?

Any Public Officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P 50,000.00).

WHAT IS THE PENALTY FOR PLUNDER?

The penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH /INTERESTS AND OTHER INCOMES AND ASSETS OF THE PERSON FOUND GUILTY OF PLUNDER?

The same will be forfeited in favor of the State.

WHAT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THE CASE OF PLUNDER?

Prosecution for plunder shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

DOES THE CRIME OF PLUNDER PRESCRIBE?

Yes, the crime prescribes in 20 years.

IF THE CRIME PRESCRIBES, WHAT HAPPENS TO THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
If the crime prescribes, the State still has the right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by the public officer/s and such act shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

eponine07

Jul 11, 2001, 04:58 AM

ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Facts: Pepito Niñal and Teodulfa Bellones were married on September 26, 1974, and out of their marriage was born herein petitioners. Teodulfa died on April 24, 1985, after being shot by Pepito. On December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog were married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempted from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After his death, his heirs (herein petitioners) filed a declaration to declare the nullity of his marriage to Norma, alleging that the said married was void for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed an action to dismiss, stating that petitioners were not among those who could file an action for annulment of marriage under the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC in Toledo dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code was rather silent on resolving the issues in the case.

Issue:
Is the marriage of Pepito to Norma null and void?

Held:
The Supreme Court first decided on the issue of whether there was a valid marriage between Pepito and Norma. The SC reiterated that a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. Such requirement stems from the State's involvement and participation in every marriage, the maintenance of which the public is interested. Such interest proceeds from the "constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic `autonomous social institution'." However, there are instances recognized in the law where a marriage license may be dispensed with. One such instance is found in Article 34 of the Family Code, formerly Art. 76 of the Civil Code, which refers to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least 5 years before the marriage.

It is true that Norma and Pepito were married without a license, working on the assumption that they had been living together for at least five years without benefit of a marriage. However, this 5-year period should be considered as the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity -- meaning that there is no third party involved at any time within the 5 years -- and continuity -- that is unbroken. Otherwise, if such period were computed regardless of whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other or not, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common-law relationships and placing them on the same footing as those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

In this case, it cannot be said that Pepito and Norma had lived together for five years prior to their wedding day. Only 20 months had elapsed between the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved and his marriage to Norma. Even if Pepito and his first wife had been living separately from each other, they were still married, and his cohabitation with Norma was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. it should have been in the nature of a perfect union under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The subsistence of the marriage even when there was actual severance of the filial relationship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

:blossom:

p.s. the digest is a bit incomplete. i only put in the most important issue, but there are a couple of other issues.

eponine07

Jul 16, 2001, 05:40 AM

just pushing this to the top....

hey, pugsly! no time no hear (or post)! the other legal beagles (me included) are wondering where you are. hope you haven't drowned in the cases assigned to you.

keep cool, man. :)

:blossom:

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2001, 12:27 AM

TORRES VS. GONZALES,152 SCRA 272

FACTS:
1. Sometime before 1979, petitioner Wilfredo Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of 2 counts estafa.
2. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
3. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
4. A conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.”
5. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
6. In 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner.
7. Records of the NBI showed a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last 20 years. (20 counts of estafa and sedition)
8. Respondent Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzales wrote the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending the cancellation of the pardon previously granted to petitioner.
9. The conditional pardon was cancelled and petitioner was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
10. Hence, this action impugning the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment claiming that he did not violated his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.

ISSUE:
Is a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.

HELD:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (I) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (I) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (I) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that the SC here deals with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the RPC defines a distinct, substantive felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty in Article 159.

DISSENTING: J. Cruz
There is no question that the petitioner is facing a long list of criminal charges, but that certainly is not the issue. The point is that, as many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final conviction , without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pardon.

Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime; it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by his accuser but by the judge.

sedfrey

Jul 19, 2001, 07:30 AM

hi pugsly,

what's your school? what year are you in?

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2001, 05:56 PM

Originally posted by sedfrey
hi pugsly,

what's your school? what year are you in?

Some school. :lol: I'm in 4th year. :*)

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2001, 11:19 PM

Note: IC is Illegitimate (filiation proved)
LC is Legitimate Child
GM is Grandmother
GF is Grandfather

1. Estate: P 200,000.00
A-LC:
B-LC:
C-LC:
D-LC:
Free Portion:

2. Estate: P 500,000.00
A-LC:
B-LC:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

3. Estate: P 600,000.00
A-GF, Mother Side:
B-GM, Mother Side:
C-GM, Father Side:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

4. Estate: P 800,000.00
(Testator is Illegitimate)
A-GF, Mother Side:
B-GM, Mother Side:
C-GM, Father Side:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

5. Estate: P 1,000,000.00
Father:
Mother:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

6. Estate: P 1,000,000.00
(Testator is Illegitimate)
Father:
Mother:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

7. Estate: P 200,000.00
Father:
Mother:
Surviving Spouse:
A-IC:
B-IC:
Free Portion:

8. Estate: P 100,000.00
Father:
Surviving Spouse:
A-IC:
B-IC:
Free Portion:

9. Estate: P 750,000.00
Surviving Spouse:
A-IC:
B-IC:
C-IC:
Free Portion:

10. Estate: P 800,000.00
(Testator is Illegitimate)
Surviving Spouse:
Father:
Mother:
A-IC:
B-IC:
Free Portion:

11. Estate: P 400,000.00
A-LC:
Surviving Spouse:
Father:
Mother:
Free Portion:

12. Estate: P 800,000.00
A-LC:
Surviving Spouse:
A-IC:
B-IC:
C-IC:
D-IC:
Free Portion:

13. Estate: 1, 600,000.00
A-LC:
B-LC:
C-LC:
Surviving Spouse:
D-IC:
E-IC:
F-IC:
Free Portion:

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2001, 08:18 PM

MARCELINO VS. CRUZ, 121 SCRA 51

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Bernardino Marcelino was charged with the crime of rape before the CFI of Rizal, Br. 12.
2. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded on August 4, 1975.
3. On the same date however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to submit their memoranda.
4. The trial court granted the motion giving the parties 30 days to submit their memoranda.
5. Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time but no memorandum was filed by the People.
6. On November 28, 1975, respondent Judge Fernando Cruz Jr. filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975.
7. On the date for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement , raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision.
8. Respondent Judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976.
9. On the date of promulgation, counsel for petitioner again moved for the resetting of the promulgation of the decision.
10. Respondent Judge granted the motion and reset the promulgation to January 26, 1976.
11. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the 3-month period prescribed by Sec. 11(1) of Art. X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case.

ISSUE:
Did the court has lose jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
Undisputed is the fact that on November 28, 1975, or 85 days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision, respondent Judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in the criminal case. He had thus veritably rendered his decision in said case within the 3-month period prescribed by the Constitution.

The rendition of the judgment in trial courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. There is no doubt that the constitutional provision cited by petitioner refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is this date that should be considered in determining whether or not respondent Judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. Indeed, the date of promulgation of a decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date, considering that notice have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an event which is beyond the control of the judge.

- Failure of judge to decide a case within 90 days does not divest him of his jurisdiction

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2001, 08:21 PM

PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393

FACTS:
1. The CFI of Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven (7) persons believed to be in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola.
2. Seven separate complaints for murder were filed against Sola, four others and fourteen unknown persons with the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.
3. An order of arrest was issued.
4. However without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail.
5. Witnesses informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI of Himamaylan which is but 10 kms. From Kabankalan their safety could be jeopardized.
6. The SC granted a petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the criminal case to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
7. The venue of the trial was then transferred from Himamaylan to Bacolod City.

ISSUE:
Was the transfer of the place of trial proper?

HELD:
The Supreme court could order “a change of venue of place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice.” *** In the particular case before the SC, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which court have been established.”

Thus: “The exercise by this Honorable Court of its constitutional power (Sec.5 (4), Art. X) in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to and form Himamaylan during any of the days of the trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.

eponine07

Jul 22, 2001, 06:46 AM

Note: IC is Illegitimate (filiation proved)
LC is Legitimate Child
GM is Grandmother
GF is Grandfather

1. Estate: P 200,000.00
A-LC: 25,000.00
B-LC: 25,000.00
C-LC: 25,000.00
D-LC: 25,000.00
Free Portion: 100,000.00

2. Estate: P 500,000.00
A-LC: 250,000.00
B-LC: 250,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 250,000.00
Free Portion: 250,000.00

3. Estate: P 600,000.00
A-GF, Mother Side: 100,000.00
B-GM, Mother Side: 100,000.00
C-GM, Father Side: 100,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 150,000.00
Free Portion: 150,000.00

4. Estate: P 800,000.00
(Testator is Illegitimate)
A-GF, Mother Side:
B-GM, Mother Side:
C-GM, Father Side:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

5. Estate: P 1,000,000.00
Father: 250,000.00
Mother: 250,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 250,000.00
Free Portion: 250,000.00

6. Estate: P 1,000,000.00
(Testator is Illegitimate)
Father:
Mother:
Surviving Spouse:
Free Portion:

7. Estate: P 200,000.00
Father: 50,000.00
Mother: 50,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 25,000.00
A-IC: 37,500.00
B-IC: 37,500.00
Free Portion: 0

8. Estate: P 100,000.00
Father: 50,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 12,500.00
A-IC: 12,500.00
B-IC: 12,500.00
Free Portion: 12,500.00

9. Estate: P 750,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 250,000.00
A-IC: 83,333.33
B-IC: 83,333.33
C-IC: 83,333.33
Free Portion: 250,000.00

10. Estate: P 800,000.00
(Testator is Illegitimate)
Surviving Spouse:
Father:
Mother:
A-IC:
B-IC:
Free Portion:

11. Estate: P 400,000.00
A-LC: 200,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 100,000.00
Father:
Mother:
Free Portion: 100,000.00 (parents don't get anything unless the testator provided for them in the will)

12. Estate: P 800,000.00
A-LC: 400,000.00
Surviving Spouse: 200,000.00
A-IC: 50,000.00
B-IC: 50,000.00
C-IC: 50,000.00
D-IC: 50,000.00
Free Portion: 0

13. Estate: 1, 600,000.00
A-LC: 266,666.66
B-LC: 266,666.66
C-LC: 266,666.67
Surviving Spouse: 266,666.66
D-IC: 44,444.33
E-IC: 44,444.33
F-IC: 44,444.33
Free Portion: 400,000.00

N.B. ei pugsly! i'm not sure of these figures. i haven't really gone into the succession part of civil law review. but it's been fun solving for the legitimes. :)

:blossom:

PUGSLEY

Jul 23, 2001, 07:03 AM

PEOPLE VS. AVECILLA
GR No. 117033, February 15, 2001

FACTS:
1. At 11 p.m. on December 24, 1991, accused-appellant Rafael Avecilla arrived at a basketball court in Pandacan Manila and for no apparent reason suddenly fired a gun in the air.
2. Minutes later he proceeded to a closed store about four meters away from the court.
3. He initiated an argument with the group of Macario Afable Jr.
4. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant but the latter placed his left arm around Afable's neck and shot him pointblank in the abdomen.
5. Afable ran toward an alley and accused-appellant ran after him.
6. A witness saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun.
7. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun from accused-appellant, who instantly fled the scene of the incident.
Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital where he eventually expired.
8. Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
9. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Was the conviction proper?

HELD:
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of qualified illegal possession of firearms, defined in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1, PD No. 1866, are present in this case. Specifically, they are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;
3. the accused had no license from the government; and
4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said firearm.

However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by R.A. No. 8924, which took effect on July 6, 1994. Sec. 1 provides “xxx If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”

It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide , as the case maybe. In such case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. 8294 to P.D. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.

In other words, where murder or homicide was committed the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. (PP. VS. MOLINA)

Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the same may be retroactively applied. This new law applied even to violations that occurred prior to its effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Art. 22 of the revised Penal Code.

Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal possession. As stated above, the same may only be done where no other crime is committed.

With more reason, accused-appellant can not be convicted of homicide or murder with “the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating,” inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mention as a result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.

APPEALED DECISION REVERSED. CRIMINAL CASE FOR QUALIFIED ILLEGAL POSSESSION IS DISMISSED.

PUGSLEY

Jul 23, 2001, 03:55 PM

OLAES VS. PEOPLE, 155 SCRA 486

FACTS:
1. Petitioners Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz, charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, challenged in the SC the admission by respondent Judge (Alicia Santos) of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid search warrant and of an extra-judicial confession taken from them without the assistance of counsel.
2. Petitioners likewise claim that the Search Warrant issued by respondent Judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have committed.
3. According to the, there is no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.
4. The caption of the Search Warrant states that is was in connection with “Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.”
5. The petitioners also faulted the admission of the extra-judicial confessions with they had given without the assistance or advice of counsel and cited Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution providing that “any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
6. In the separate sworn statement take from Olaes and Cruz on September 24, 1982, it appears that both petitioners were, before being examined, specifically informed of their right to the assistance of counsel, which would be provided them by the investigating office at their request.
7. Asked if they understood, they said “Opo” and affixed their signatures opposite their answer.
8. A statement entitled “Pagpapatunay” or Verification, in which they stated inter alia that they did not need the assistance of counsel, followed this.

ISSUE:
Was the search warrant validly issued?

Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible in evidence?

HELD:
The SC has examined the Search Warrant issued in the instant case and find it does not come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was a bare reference to the laws in general, without any specification of the particular sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such codifications. There is no similar ambiguity in the instant case.

***Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The Search Warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the descriptions to be made of the “place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

Even so, their investigation did not conform to the requirements laid down in PP.VS. GALIT ,where the SC declared:

“At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the Warrant of Arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent that to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be use against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, or relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone if possible – or by letter or messenger . It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory , in whole or in par, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

PUGSLEY

Jul 26, 2001, 12:24 AM

DE GUZMAN VS. SUBIDO, 120 SCRA 443

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ernesto De Guzman was appointed patrolman in the Quezon City Police department by Mayor Norberto Amoranto.
2. He was civil service eligible having taken and passed the civil service patrolman’s examination.
3. He had also passed the usual character investigation conducted before appointment.
4. Petitioner went through and successfully completed the police training course.
5. Petitioner’s appointment was forwarded to the CSC.
6. After a year after the appointment and with no action on the appointment papers being taken by respondent commissioner (Abelardo Subido), the respondents City Treasurer and City Auditor stopped the payment of the petitioner’s salaries.
7. Respondent Commissioner returned the petitioner’s appointment papers, without action thereon, to the respondent Mayor on the ground that Mr. De Guzman was disqualified for appointment under R.A. No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966.
8. The finding was based solely on petitioners own answer to a question in the information sheet: “Have you been accused, indicted, or tried, for the violation of any law, ordinance, or regulation, before any court or tribunal?”
9. In said question petitioner answered “yes” for jaywalking and violation of another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa.
10. The CFI dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction.
11. According to the court, the requirement of “no criminal record” means without any criminal record and makes no distinction whether an act violates a state law or only a municipal or city ordinance.

ISSUE:
Should petitioner be disqualified from appointment to the Quezon City Police Force?

HELD:
The requirements for applicants to a policeman’s position may be quite stringent but the basic policy of attracting the best qualified is not served by automatically excluding any person who in an absent minded mood or while hurrying to an urgent appointment may unwittingly have crossed a street or stepped down from the curb in violation of a jaywalking ordinance. The same thing is true of a person who may have worked his way through college as a cochero and, who, pitying his horse struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand aft and forward to balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way home, sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined for violating an obscure municipal ordinance.

The phrase “criminal record” governing qualifications for appointment could not have been intended by the Legislature e to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a “crime “ must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the pubic office.

PUGSLEY

Jul 26, 2001, 12:26 AM

eponine07: With all due respect, you might want to recompute the legitimes.

PUGSLEY

Jul 27, 2001, 08:53 PM

GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS,2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
1. Nita Villanueva came to know defendant Dr. Antonio Geluz through her aunt.
2. She became pregnant by her present husband (plaintiff Oscar Lazo) before they were legally married.
3. To conceal her pregnancy from her parents she had it aborted by defendant.
4. After her marriage with plaintiff shed became pregnant.
5. As she was then employed in the Comelec she found her pregnancy as an inconvenience and she had it aborted again by defendant.
6. Less than 2 years, later she again became pregnant.
7. She had the fetus aborted anew; plaintiff did not know of, nor gave his consent to the abortion as he was at that time in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the Provincial Board.
8. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila for damages.
9. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz ordering the latter to pay damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.
10. On appeal , the CA sustained the award of damages (3 vs. 2)

ISSUE:
Was the award for damages is proper?

HELD:
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Art. 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court believes this to be an error, for the said Article, in fixing a minimum award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.

It is unquestionable that the appellant’s act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be to severely condemned; and the consent of the women or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award for damages that under the circumstances on record have no factual or legal basis.

PUGSLEY

Jul 27, 2001, 08:57 PM

BONITE VS. ZOSA, 162 SCRA 173

FACTS:
1. While Florencio Bonite was working as “caminero” of the Bureau of Public Highways a truck driven by private respondent Eligio Abamonga hit him.
2. Bonite died as a result.
3. The surviving heirs of the deceased (petitioners) filed against private respondent a criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence.
4. Petitioners through counsel actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.
5. After trial, decision was rendered acquitting the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages based on Article 29 of the Civil Code.
7. Private respondent claimed that Article 29 is not applicable but Article 33 because Article 29 is not applicable to criminal offenses proceeding from a tortious act.
8. The court dismissed the complaint for damages on the basis that plaintiffs did not reserve the right to file an independent civil action.
9. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
10. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Should an independent civil action for damages be deemd barred by petitioner’s failure in the criminal case to make a reservation to file a separate civil action?

HELD:
When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent) was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case notwithstanding.

Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. It is a wall known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

Article 29 of the Civil Code does not include any such reservation requirement. It allows an action for damages against the accused upon the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case based upon reasonable doubt.

Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and independent actions.

N.B. The Amended Rules on Criminal Procedure reverted to the Old Rule that for independent civil actions there is no more need to make a reservation to file the same.

PUGSLEY

Jul 28, 2001, 03:31 AM

PEOPLE VS. ARIOLA,318 SCRA 206

FACTS:
1. The 6 accused (Leodegario Lagaras, Jovito Bermudes, Elvira Obana, Baby Castillo and Milogene Halina) led by Rosalinda Ariola represented to the 4 complainants that they were connected with a recruitment agency hiring worker for overseas employment.
2. The accused enticed complainants to apply and promised them employment in Papua New Guinea upon payment of the appropriate recruitment fees.
3. Accused collected from them P 5,000.00 each except for one who was required to pay P 13,500.00 out of which he paid an initial down payment of P 3,5000.00.
4. Ariola and cohorts failed to deploy complaining witnesses to Papua New Guinea as promised.
5. Complaining witnesses filed separate affidavit-complaints for illegal recruitment.
6. Ariola and Obana were arrested and tried while the rest of the accused remain at large.
7. The court convicted both accused of illegal recruitment and sentenced each of them to life imprisonment.
8. Obana appealed arguing that the lower court erred in finding that the accused acted pursuant to a conspiracy in committing illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE:
Was the conviction for illegal recruitement on a Large Scale proper?

HELD:
The crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale is committed when 3 elements concur, namely: a) The offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; b) The offended undertakes either any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13, paragraph (b) , of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 34 of the same code; and c) The offender committed the same against 3 or more persons, individually or as a group.

The SC finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the lower court that there was conspiracy among the accused in the commission of the offense. The testimonies of the four complainants indubitably show that there was a delineation of roles among the accused. Ariola represented herself as the recruitment coordinator in charge of giving orientation and receiving payments of applicants. Lagaras and Bermudes acted as field recruiters; and, accused-appellant Obana, Castillo and Halina as assistants during the orientation of applicants. Hence, conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas workers was crystal clear from the acts of all the accused whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly indicated they had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

ibarramedia

Jul 29, 2001, 10:28 AM

First of all I am not an attorney nor am I a law student. But here is a question from a law class I took many years ago.

Ronnie and Nancy maintained a pond on the ranch that was used to water cattle. The pond was on the land when Ronnie and Nancy bopught the land several years earlier. The pond was man-made, having been created by ann earthen dam in a small creek. Through no negligence on the part of Ronnie and Nancy,The earthen dam broke after several weeks of unseasonable rain.

water from the pond produced a flash flood damaging property for several miles downstream before the creek bed emptied into a lrger stream. The damage included the Ferraro boit shop minnow tanks and worm troughs, three autos at Hart's used cars, and some investments belonging to a Rev. Jacks at the church of Freedom,PAC. Wally Mondell, who was camping in the dry creekbed, was swept away by the flood while he slept.

The cattle on Ronnie and Nanc'y's ranch stampeded when the dam broke. They broke through the fence on the ranch and ran onto Jeannie K's truck farm where they trampled several thousandhead of cabbage.
Consider the issues raised in this fact pattern and discuss them in terms of srtrict liability theories of recovery.

Answer

this question deals with two primary issuesinvolving strict liability for damages caused by 1) The breaking of the dam and 2) the stampeding cattle. in each situation the issue is wether liability should attach for certain conduct absent a showing of negligence because of the nature of the intrumentality causing the injury. The concept of strict liability holds liable owners of animals tresspassing and persons who engage in abnormally dangerous activities if their animals or activities cause harm regardless of fault. The rationale behind the strict liability theory is that the defendant is in a better position to bear or insure against the loss than the innocent plaintiff in part because the defendant controls the intrumentality, in part because he benefits from its use. In this question, the application of the general rule is slightly different in each situation.

1) The breaking dam-- the trraditional rule articulated in Rylands v. Fletcher imposes strict liability on the owners of land for the non atural use of the land causing damage to the property of another. Lord Cairns modified Judge Blackburn's rule in the lower court that one ios strictly liable whenever he brings something dangerous on his land, it escapes and causes damage. The cairns view limitied liability to things or activities unduly dangerous and inapproriate to the place maintained in light of the character of that place and its surroundings. Many American courts rejected Rylands by mistakenly using the Blackburn view, althoufgh many of those courts later accepted the doctrine under the rubric of "absolute nuisance." An additional issue is whether the unseasonable rain was an "act of God" cutting off liability if unforeseeable, sudden or destructive, the outside force may act as superceding, intervening cause; Here, it probably does not.

In this fact pattern, Blackburn's view would probably hold Ronnie and Nancy liable to Ferraro's Bait shop, Hart's used cars and Rev. Jacks because water was a dangerous thing brought on the land; it escaped and caused damage. However, under the Cairns view, it is unlikely that a jury would find a cattle pond inappropriate to the place in light of the surroundings, if the ranch is in a rural area where cattle ponds are common. The heirs of Wally Mondell will have greater difficulty because Wally's conduct placed him in the path of the water. Did Wally have full knowledge of the danger? Probably not. Although contributory negligence is not a factor in strict liability, plaintiff's conduct may bar recovery if it is sufficiently reckless. If Ronnie and Nancy are negligent, that is another matter, butabsent showing of innappropriate use strict liability is unlikely to be applied.

2) The stampeding cattle-- at common law, owners of livingstock have been held strictly liable for damages caused by the livestock tresspassing on the land of another. This issue was complicated by the passage of "fencing in." "fencing out," and "free choice statutes. Under "fencing in" statutes the defendant has the burden of fencing his cattle in; under a " fencing out" statute, the plaintiff has the burden of fencing out the cattle of defendant. A "choice" statute would allow the community to choose either option.

The answer to this question depends upon the statute involved. If there is no statute, Ronnie and Nancy are probably liable to Jeannie K.. because under the general rule their cattle escaped and caused the damage. If there is a "fencing in " statute, they are probably liable also because the defendant's duty is to keep the cattle fenced in and and he did not, while the plaintiff has no duty to keep the cattle out. If the cattle escape and do damage, the defendant should be liable. If there is a "fencing out" statute, Ronnie and Nancy may be relieved of liability if Jeannie K. has not fenced her property in order to keep the cattle out. If she has met this burden, however, she may recover for damamges caused by the cattle, although the facts here do not indicate which is the cause.

PUGSLEY

Jul 29, 2001, 06:10 PM

HEIRS OF DIAZ-LEUS VS. MELVIDA,158 SCRA 21

FACTS:
1. Hernani Melvida was the driver of a Plymouth car, travelling North, while Almario Rosas was the driver of a Victory Liner Bus travelling South.
2. The Plymouth car and the Victory Liner figured in an accident along the North Expressway.
3. The car was allegedly driven at a fast speed and in a negligent manner causing it to swerve to the left.
4. The car was then bumped on the rear portion by the Victory Liner bus and dragged about 50 meters off the cemented road.
5. As a result, the passengers of the car namely Dr. Corazon Diaz-Leus and Florencio Carbilledo died while Mrs. Leonisa Gali suffered serious physical injuries.
6. The drivers of both vehicles were then charged of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Double Homicide, Serious and Slight physical Injuries and Damage to Property.
7. Upon arraignment Melvida and Rosas entered a plea of not guilty.
8. The trial court found Accused Hernani Melvida guilty of the offense charged and acquitted Almario Rosas.
9. The heirs of Dr. Diaz-Leus appealed to the Court of Appeals, only with respect to the civil aspect.
10. According to the CA, the vehicular accident cannot be attributed to any negligence on the part of appellee Rosas, that it was a fortuitous event which appellee Rosas could not prevent.
11. The CA also found that “since the appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon appellee Rosas’ negligence which does not exist it follows that his acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of his civil liability and therefore the offended parties may no longer appeal and recover damages from said appellee Rosas.”

ISSUE:
Should the trial court be ordered to determine the civil liability of Rosas and subsidiary civil liability of the owners of the car and the bus in accordance with Article 29 of the Civil Code?

HELD:
The findings of the CA were a complete exoneration of Rosas. Since petitioner’s appeal on the civil aspect is predicated upon Rosas’ alleged negligence which has been found not to exist, the SC likewise upon the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Rosas’ acquittal in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of his civil liability which bars herein petitioner form recovering damages from Rosas.

Since Rosas is absolved from any act of negligence which in effect prevents further recovery of any damages, the same is likewise true with respect to his employer Victory Line, Inc. which at most would have been only subsidiarily liable.

Nor can the spouses Jesus Gali and Leonisa Gali as employers of respondent Hernani Melvida be subsidiarily liable. *** In order that employers may be held liable under Art 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the follwing requisites must exist: 1) That an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; 2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; and 3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry.

The preceding requisites are not present in the case of the Gali spouses. They are not engaged in any kind of industry . *** Thus, the Gali spouses cannot be held subsidiarily liable. “Where the defendant is admittedly a private person who has no business or industry, and uses his automobile for private purposes, he is not also subsidiarily liable to the plaintiff for the damages to the latter’s car caused by the reckless imprudence of his insolvent driver.

PUGSLEY

Jul 29, 2001, 07:08 PM

[B]

PUGSLEY

Jul 29, 2001, 07:10 PM

PP. VS. WALPAN LADJAALAM - September 19, 2000
G.R. No.s 136149-51

KING VS. PP December 2, 1999

Oscar01

Jul 30, 2001, 04:37 AM

ESTRADA vs ARROYO, GR#146710(2001), 2 Mar 2001
Original action; Puno

ISSUE: WON Arroyo was merely an acting president and WON Estrada enjoys presidential immunity

HELD: No and no.

RATIO: Section 8, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that a president ceases to be president only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation. (Agabin: He can only be removed by impeachment, and the people did not remove him by People Power in EDSA II; Arroyo clearly became president under the 1987 Constitution unlike Cory who was installed by a revolution.)

Estrada resigned as president, as can be interpreted from his statement after he left Malacanang and the diary of Executive Secretary Angara, “an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner.” (Agabin: The Court said it used the diary because Angara was the alter-ego of the president, as a cabinet member.) The events as described by Angara showed that, mindset prior to Estrada’s departure and during negotitiations, resignation was implied because the transfer of power was the main problem.

A letter he allegedly sent to the Senate President and Speaker of the House was not mentioned in his press release during his departure, and “resignation from the presidency cannot be subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.” (Agabin: Court said those letters were mere afterthoughts.)

Moreover, Estrada could not say he could not resign because he had pending cases because a public officer may resign despite a pending bribery case—service may not be compelled—but must still face the charges. In addition, cases filed before the Ombudsman were also not acted upon while he was still the president, and were thus not pending. The impeachment trial had also broken down when he stepped down. Thus Estrada had no pending administrative charges at that time.

Now, Section 11, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine whether the president is incapable of performing his functions. After Estrada resigned, both houses filed resolutions expressing support for Arroyo and confirming Guingona as Vice-President. The recognition of Arroyo as president (and not acting president), however, is a political question under the discretion of the legislative branch and cannot be decided by the court without violating the separation of powers. Thus, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, the issue of whether he merely left Malacanang and allowed Arroyo to act as acting president has already been resolved by Congress recognizing Arroyo as de jure president.

Thus, Estrada no longer holds immunity from suit. During the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, Fr. Bernas explained that no explicit provision was included (unlike in the 1973 Constitution) beause “we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure, he is immune from suit.” The theme of the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust would be devalued if Estrada can claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts commited during his term.

Petition dismissed.

Oscar01

Jul 30, 2001, 06:49 AM

MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS, 177 SCRA 668, 27 Oct 1989
Original action; En Banc

ISSUE: WON the Aquino administration has the power to bar the return of the body of Ferdinand Marcos from burial.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: The executive power vested in the president of the Philippines has “unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties.” In Myers v. United States, the US Supreme Court accepted Alexander Hamilton’s proposition that the executive, unlike Congress, could exercise unstated powers as long as these were not forbidden in the constitution. (The powers in the 1987 Constitution are nevertheless different from those in the 1973 Constitution, especially Amendment No. 6 which specifically granted the power to make law to the president.)

Among the duties of the president is to protect the welfare of the people, and the decision to bar the return of the Marcoses under the circumstances in 1989 clearly did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion.

Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merit.

Isagani Cruz: (dissenting) The death of Marcos was met with only indifference from the people; he is no longer a threat but a dead body waiting to be buried. Let the body be brought home and let it be buried to close the issue since it is a “tempest in a teapot.”

Paras: (dissenting) Marcos, though dead, still has rights and so does his family. The threat to national security remains unproven. Reconciliation will proceed if the motion is granted and mercy is shown.

Padilla: (dissenting) Marcos’s human right to travel and to die in his country were banned, and his remaining right to be buried in his homeland should at least be respected. It is the finest Filipino tradition to show respect to the dead. The threat to national security remains unproven.

Sarmiento: (dissenting) Though I have no eulogies to say for Marcos, I must say that if the Constitution intended to grant a power, it would say so. The Bill of Rights is a limitation not only to legislative action but to presidential as well. The threat to national security remains unproven.

Eterna

Aug 27, 2001, 02:17 AM

PEOPLS VS. SALARZA, JR
277 SCRA 578

FACTS:

Zareen went with her boyfriend Enrico together with Silverio, Julio and Tonton to attend a dance. The dance was canceled so they proceeded to a restaurant. They drunk a bottle of rhum. Zareen did not drink. At 11:00 pm they returned to their cottage where Zareen drank one beer. After a while she felt tired and slepy so she excused herself and went to her cottage.

At around 2:00 am of the next day, Zareen woke up when she felt somebody take off her underwear. The room was dark and Zareen did not stop the man because she thought it was Enrico and she was half-asleep.

The man removed his briefs and placed himself on top of her, spread her legs and penetrated her. Later, the man whispered "Zareen, its not Ricky, it's Jun and I love your." When she heard the words Zareen pushed the man aside. She cried and became hysterical. She went to the bathroom and washed herself.

ISSUE:

WON fact that Zareen was half-asleep when the accused had intercourse with her is covered by the phrase "otherwise unconscious" to make the accused liable for rape.

RULING:

Zareen was not deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious when the accused had intercourse with her. Her lame excuse was that she was half-asleep. However, she admitted that in the eraly morning of May 1 1994 she woke up to find someone removign her panty. THuswise, it cannot be said that she was derpived of reason or unconscious. She knew, hence, was concious when her panties were being pulled does she kenw, hence was conscious when her legs were being parted to prepare fro the sexual act; she knew, hence was concious when the man was pulling down his briefs; she kenw, hence was concsious when the madn mounted her and lusted after her virtue. The sexual act was done because of Zareen's passivity if not consent.

JUSTICE REGALADO (dissenting):

From both physiological and neurological considerations, a person who is half-asleep and therfore in a stupor of drowsiness or semi-consciousness, is not capable of giving full, informred, intelligent and voluntary consent.

A woman who is half-asleep being only half-conscious or in a state of drowsiness hence not fully conscious; is not capable of completely giving that consent contemplated as valid in law which would bar a prosecution for rape upon the defense of consensuality in the sexual act.

JUSTICE DAVIDE JR. (dissenting):

The term "unconsciousness" should not be tested by a mere physical standard, i.e., whether one is awakeor asleep, conscious or alert. Rather, inquiry should be made whether the victim could have given a well informed grant of consent.

In Zareen's case, she was "half-asleep" or drowsy when she was penetrated by the accused. SHe was not aware at that time of the totality of circumstances-critically, her partner's identity.

Eterna

Sep 5, 2001, 06:05 PM

SELF-DEFENSE

When the accused invokes the justifying cicumstances of self-defense, he assumes the burden of prving with clear and convincing evidence, the justificaiton of his act. Having admitted the killing, he mus then establishe his claim by clear and convincing proof, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakenss of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted the killing.

The essentail elements of self-defense are:
a) unlawfull aggression;
b) reasonbale necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.; and
c) lack of sufficient provocatiion on the part of the person defending himself.

Eterna

Sep 9, 2001, 04:10 AM

One of the guidelines in the interpretaion and application of Article 36, FC (psyhological incapacity) is that the incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable, as enunciated in the case of REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA.

In the recent case of MARCOS VS. MARCOS the clinical determination of psychologicall incapacity is being done away with, instead relying on "totality of evidence".

N.B. MOLINA case still remains doctrinal considering that the case was merely decided by a division.

eurekaph

Sep 10, 2001, 05:36 AM

are you a lawyer or someone with legal problems? either yes or no CLICK HERE! (http://www.askmiriam.net)

green grin

Sep 10, 2001, 06:10 PM

bumping to the top for krelian.

hey, you guys are doing a good job in this thread! keep it up. ;)

(whenever you have time, i'd appreciate your help at the legal beagles' thread. thanks, panyeros and panyeras!)

Eterna

Sep 12, 2001, 06:35 PM

BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
334 SCRA 106

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised n the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

BODACIOUS

Nov 17, 2001, 07:53 AM

what happened to this thread?

PUGSLEY

Jan 14, 2002, 04:50 AM

I wanted to forego this thread but I can't.....

Just had our first unit exam in COmmercial Law Review on the whole of the Negotiable Instruments Law today. (13:00 to 18:00)

Im posting the exams part by part since it really is long. Thus, the almost 5 hour exam time.....

Hope this could be of help to all law students and reviewees alike.

I. DEFINE THE FOLLOWING :

A. Promissory Note
B. Bill of Exchange
C. Check
D. holder
E. Maker
F. Drawer
G. Payee
H. Indorser
I. Indorsee
J. Negotiation
K. Issue
L. Presentment for Acceptance
M. Presentment for Payment
N. Notice of Dishonor
O. Payment in Due Course
P. Referee in Case of Need
Q. Acceptance
R. Acceptance for Honor
S. Payment for Honor
T. Certification

edwine

Jan 14, 2002, 07:30 AM

Query for Pugsly and all the other students of law:

A, who was in desperate need of money, obtained a loan of P100,000.00 from X, payable within two years.

A and X agreed on an interest rate of 6% per month or 72% per annum.

On the date the loan matured, A had already paid X P160,000.00. But A is now unable AND unwilling to pay X any further amount on the ground that the loan is already fully settled, the interest rate agreed upon being inapplicable as it is excessive and unconscionable (sp?), and that it is the legal rate which should apply.

Is A correct?

Follow-up query:

X brought A before the Lupon Tagapamayapa where they entered into an "Amicable Settlement". In this settlement, A acknowledged an indebtedness of P100,000 (principal amount of the loan) and promised to pay the same. When X sought to enforce the settlement, A demured and instituted a case before the RTC seeking the nullification of the contract of loan on the ground that the interest is excessive and contrary to public morals and public policy.

Will A's case prosper?

franco13

Jan 15, 2002, 03:08 AM

How nice of PUgsly to exert muxh effort in digesting these volumnous cases.

Are you from St. LOuis? Well, I am an alumnus of St. Louis.
I am a 2001 grad. I used to be the Debating team's Head. I'm contemplating on posting the issue "post Bar or Post Law Grad Problems". Kaya lang disappointed ako, kc yung una kong pinost na issue "ANY NEWS ABOUT THE BAR 2001 RESULTS" walang nagpost ng reply.

Im planning to share my own legalesse for the next few days.

NAIMBAG NG ALDAW KADAKAYO APOUW.

It's nice to be connected to some law yuppies. I miss law school a lot. Nakakamiss yung mga inuman sa Luisa's Cafe at Billiard sa 456. At siempre sinung makakalimot sa Star City at Parking LOt - nice ways to get ahead after those though exams.
Sana mapalawak natin to at maengganyo ang ibang alumni at stude nating magpost dito.

PUGSLEY

Jan 16, 2002, 12:12 AM

Originally posted by franco13
How nice of PUgsly to exert muxh effort in digesting these volumnous cases.

Are you from St. LOuis? Well, I am an alumnus of St. Louis.
I am a 2001 grad. I used to be the Debating team's Head. I'm contemplating on posting the issue "post Bar or Post Law Grad Problems". Kaya lang disappointed ako, kc yung una kong pinost na issue "ANY NEWS ABOUT THE BAR 2001 RESULTS" walang nagpost ng reply.

Im planning to share my own legalesse for the next few days.

NAIMBAG NG ALDAW KADAKAYO APOUW.

It's nice to be connected to some law yuppies. I miss law school a lot. Nakakamiss yung mga inuman sa Luisa's Cafe at Billiard sa 456. At siempre sinung makakalimot sa Star City at Parking LOt - nice ways to get ahead after those though exams.
Sana mapalawak natin to at maengganyo ang ibang alumni at stude nating magpost dito.

I graduated from Saint Louis but I'm taking my law in the school termed by media as "the little known school" :D

Don't be disappointed by that thread because really up to now no definite answer would be available for that. You for one should now that results usually come out 6 months after the bar exams.

Did you take the bar already ? Are you Mr. M****?

PUGSLEY

Jan 16, 2002, 05:53 AM

II. Enumeration

A. Requisites of a Negotiable Instrument
B. Effect of forgery in general
C. Requisites in order that a person may be considered as an accomodation party
D. Conditions to constitue a holder in due course
E. Rights of a holder in due course
F. Rights of a holder not in due course
G. Liability of maker
H. Liability of drawer
I. Liability of acceptor
J. Warranties of a person negotiating by delivery
K. Liability of a qualified indorser
L. Warranties of a general indorser
M. When presentment for acceptance must be made

franco13

Jan 16, 2002, 11:08 PM

Originally posted by PUGSLY

I graduated from Saint Louis but I'm taking my law in the school termed by media as "the little known school" :D

Don't be disappointed by that thread because really up to now no definite answer would be available for that. You for one should now that results usually come out 6 months after the bar exams.

Did you take the bar already ? Are you Mr. M****? ;)

Well you got it right. Did you come from the same department I was back in college?
Can you give me a hint then?

Enjoy the rest of the day.

It's good of you to disgest cases. The 2001 examinees were disppointed to find out that no case material type of questions were given. I surmise that this year, case material type of questions will be a good source for questions.

PUGSLEY

Jan 17, 2002, 10:49 PM

III. DETERMINE WON THE FF: INSTRUMENTS ARE NEGOTIABLE. EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

1. I promise to pay to V P 1,000.00
Sgd. Z

2. Pay to the order of bearer X P 1,000.00 upon his death.
Sgd. Y

3. I promise to pay to the order of ___________ P 1,000.00
Sgd. Y

4. Pay to X or his order P 1,000.00 in two (2) equal monthly installments with interest at 12% per annum.
To: Z Sgd. Y

5. I promise to pay to bearer P 1,000.00
Sgd. Y
X is in possession of the note and negotiates it as follows:

Pay to Z
Sgd. X

6. Pay to the order of X P 1,000.00

To: Z
Accepted subject to the condition that X passess the 2000 Bar Exams.
Sgd. Z

7. I promise to pay to X or his order P 1,000.00 upon demand.
Sgd. Y

______________
Pay to Z P 500.00
Sgd. X

8. Pay to X or order P 1,000.00 or deliver to him 5 chickens on April 30, 2000.
Sgd. Y

To: Z

9. I promise to pay to the order of X P 1,000.00
Sgd. Y
_____________
Pay to Z only
Sgd. X

10. The following check has been crossed specially

Matrch 06, 2000

Pay to the order of X ONE THOUSAND PESOS ( P 1,000.00)
Sgd. Y

ABC Bank.

PUGSLEY

Jan 17, 2002, 10:52 PM

IV. State with reason(s) why the following are not considered as negotiable instruments:

a) Postal money order
b) Bill of lading
c. Certificate of Stock
d. Letter of Credit
e) Treasury Warrant

PUGSLEY

Jan 17, 2002, 11:05 PM

V.

X purchased from ABC Bank Cashier's Check No. 12345 fro P 10,00.00. Unknown to X, Y stole the check form his drawer. Upon discovering that the check was no longer in his drawer, X ordered ASBC bank to "STOP PAYMENT." ABC bank subsequently received the check for clearing from LU Bank which it immediately dishonored and sent back to the latter Bank with the words "Payment Stopped ." stamped on it. Later ABC Bank learned that it was Z who depostied the check with LU Bank for clearing and that he came to possess the check because it was paid to him by Y for a certain transaction that he refused to elucidate further

Can Z enfrce paymetn of the chekc against ABC Bank on the following grounds:

a) that Z is a holder in due course; and

b) that a chashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by ABC Bank against itself?

Explain your answer with reason(s).

PUGSLEY

Jan 17, 2002, 11:05 PM

V.

X purchased from ABC Bank Cashier's Check No. 12345 fro P 10,00.00. Unknown to X, Y stole the check form his drawer. Upon discovering that the check was no longer in his drawer, X ordered ASBC bank to "STOP PAYMENT." ABC bank subsequently received the check for clearing from LU Bank which it immediately dishonored and sent back to the latter Bank with the words "Payment Stopped ." stamped on it. Later ABC Bank learned that it was Z who depostied the check with LU Bank for clearing and that he came to possess the check because it was paid to him by Y for a certain transaction that he refused to elucidate further

Can Z enforce payment of the check against ABC Bank on the following grounds:

a) that Z is a holder in due course; and

b) that a cashier's check is a bill of exchange drawn by ABC Bank against itself?

Explain your answer with reason(s).

sedfrey

Jan 18, 2002, 10:06 AM

Midterms namin bukas sa PIL, hindi pa ako tapos!!!!!! Sarap mag LOA!!!!!

PUGSLEY

Jan 20, 2002, 08:32 AM

February 4 pa mid terms namin

PUGSLEY

Jan 23, 2002, 08:55 AM

MARCOS VS. MARCOS
October 19, 2000

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Belinda Marcos and respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice: 1) on September 6, 1982 at the Municipal Court of Pasig; and 2) on May 8, 1983 at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila.
2. Out of their marriage, five children were born.
3. Both petitioner and respondent were in the military service at the time or Marcos’ regime.
4. After the EDSA Revolution, both sought a discharge from the military service.
5. Wilson Marcos left the military service and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper.
6. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence , he would hit and beat her.
7. He would even force him to have sex with him despite her weariness.
8. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them.
9. A petition for annulment of marriage was then filed on the ground of psychological incapacity.
10. The trial court declared the marriage null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
11. The CA reversed holding that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.
12. The CA ratiocinated that “Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouses’ psychological incapacity which should be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
13. Appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.

ISSUE:
Is there a need for Personal Medical Examination of Respondent?

Was the totality of evidence presented in the case – including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker – enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated?

HELD:

* Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

The SC agrees with the petitioner that the personal or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. In REPUBLIC VS. CA AND MOLINA (268 SCRA 198) , the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code were laid down by this Court. ***

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 240 SCRA 20) : “psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

The SC rules in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the martial bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibility of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

malou_Ang

Jan 25, 2002, 06:56 AM

galing mo pugsly sabay pala tayo gragraduate im a graduating 4th year law student from the best law school in the lang SAN BEDA law !!! good luck sa atin kaso justice mendoza daw :( chairman tsk tsk :(

PUGSLEY

Jan 25, 2002, 07:19 PM

Originally posted by malou_Ang
galing mo pugsly sabay pala tayo gragraduate im a graduating 4th year law student from the best law school in the lang SAN BEDA law !!! good luck sa atin kaso justice mendoza daw :( chairman tsk tsk :(

:*) Just returning to the "world" the things I've learned in law school.

Give to the world the best you have and the best will come back to you.

PUGSLEY

Jan 25, 2002, 07:27 PM

Malou_Ang:

Thanks for dropping-by.

If your'e interested I could send you some cases I've digested. Just tell me.

I might be cleaning my computer in a few months time.

I have various cases in CIVIL , CONSTITUIONAL LAW and CRIMINAL LAW.

PUGSLEY

Jan 25, 2002, 07:33 PM

Originally posted by franco13
;)

Well you got it right. Did you come from the same department I was back in college?
Can you give me a hint then?

Enjoy the rest of the day.

It's good of you to disgest cases. The 2001 examinees were disppointed to find out that no case material type of questions were given. I surmise that this year, case material type of questions will be a good source for questions.

How are you? When you pitching in some of the knowledge you've acquired from Saint Louis?

I firmly think/believe that your'e services would not be put to waste. I believe there's 3 PExers taking the bar exams this year.

PUGSLEY

Jan 27, 2002, 07:14 AM

PEOPLE VS. GALIT
135 SCRA 465

FACTS:
1. Francisco Galit was arrested for killing Natividad Fernando on the occasion of a robbery.
2. He was detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days.
3. He consistently maintained his innocence.
4. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
5. The interrogating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically.
6. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl of human waste.
7. The prisoner then admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit.
8. He then signed the confession they prepared.
9. The trial court convicted him of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of Death.
10. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the confession is admissible in evidence.

HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means – by telephone if possible – or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed re-enactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute grave violations of his rights.

The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

PUGSLEY

Jan 29, 2002, 08:27 PM

PEOPLE VS. LOPEZ
74 SCRA 205

FACTS:
1. Salvacion Pablo was seated on a bed alone in her bedroom in her house busy sewing her shorts.
2. She was clad only in her panty and a blouse.
3. Ernesto Lopez, here second cousin, noticed her through a mirror that she was alone.
4. He then entered the room and sat beside her.
5. Salvacion did not ask him to leave and saw nothing unusual in his presence under the circumstances.
6. Almost instantly after, she was flat on the bed and sexual intercourse ensued.
7. A complaint for rape was then filed against Ernesto Lopez.
8. Complainant on her account said that the act of coition was not over and done in a hurry.
9. On cross-examination, in what could have been an unguarded moment, there was an admission by her that the urgencies of the flesh on the part of both of them did find release and satisfaction. :lol:
10. Accused was then convicted of rape.
11. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Was the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
The accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence. That is a mandate of the fundamental law. It may be noted that even when the Previous Organic Act did not so provide, a defendant, according to the early case of US. VS. ASIAO, decided in 1902, with Justice Torres as ponente, “must be presumed to be innocent – until [his] guilt is proven by satisfactory testimony and even in case there is a reasonable doubt as to [his] innocence [he is] entitled to acquittal. The burden of proof is thus on the prosecution to demonstrate guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed.

Where the offense charged is rape thru force, there must be a showing of compulsion being resorted to and coercion being employed. The element of voluntariness must be lacking. If there be an indication of willingness, even if half-hearted, the complaint must be dismissed.

The crime of rape is not presumed, consent and not physical force in the common origin of acts between a man and a woman. Strong evidence and indications of great weight will alone support such a presumption. The most careful scrutiny of the records of this case, to repeat, fails to reveal the existence of that kind of evidence that would suffice to overcome the presumption of innocence.

PUGSLEY

Jan 29, 2002, 08:42 PM

PEOPLE VS. MALBOG
October 12, 200

eponine0907

Jan 31, 2002, 07:08 AM

pugsley:

are you graduating na? good luck with your subjects. :)

i'll try to post some consti law case digests here. there's one case i especially like, which i think is appropriate in these times considering that they're planning to revive the national ID system. the case is Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, july 23, 1998. maybe after the midterms. :)

:blossom:

PUGSLEY

Feb 1, 2002, 01:40 AM

Originally posted by eponine0907
pugsley:

are you graduating na? good luck with your subjects. :)

i'll try to post some consti law case digests here. there's one case i especially like, which i think is appropriate in these times considering that they're planning to revive the national ID system. the case is Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, july 23, 1998. maybe after the midterms. :)

:blossom:

Keeping my fingers crossed. :D

Pls. find time to post whatever knowledge you have. Learning is fun!!!

Thanks for the good luck. Pray for me too!!!

sedfrey

Feb 1, 2002, 09:19 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLEY

How are you? When you pitching in some of the knowledge you've acquired from Saint Louis?

I firmly think/believe that your'e services would not be put to waste. I believe there's 3 PExers taking the bar exams this year.

pugs and eponine,

how come the both of you changed names? is this final? are those really you?

PUGSLEY

Feb 9, 2002, 05:43 AM

Had exams in copyright today.

This was asked.

Distinguish between the "Rule of Reciprocity" to that of "Reverse Reciprocity Rule"

PUGSLEY

Feb 12, 2002, 08:38 PM

PEOPLE VS. AVECILLA
GR No. 117033, February 15, 2001

FACTS:
1. At 11 p.m. on December 24, 1991, accused-appellant Rafael Avecilla arrived at a basketball court in Pandacan Manila and for no apparent reason suddenly fired a gun in the air.
2. Minutes later he proceeded to a closed store about four meters away from the court.
3. He initiated an argument with the group of Macario Afable Jr.
4. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant but the latter placed his left arm around Afable's neck and shot him pointblank in the abdomen.
5. Afable ran toward an alley and accused-appellant ran after him.
6. A witness saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun.
7. The Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun from accused-appellant, who instantly fled the scene of the incident.
8. Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital where he eventually expired.
9. Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
10. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
11. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Was the conviction was proper?

HELD:
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of qualified illegal possession of firearms, defined in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1, PD No. 1866, are present in this case. Specifically, they are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;
3. the accused had no license from the government; and
4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said firearm.

However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by R.A. No. 8924, which took effect on July 6, 1994. Sec. 1 provides “xxx If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”

It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or homicide , as the case maybe. In such case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. 8294 to P.D. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.

Thus, in PEOPLE VS. NEPOMUCENO JR. (309 SCRA 466) the SC stated that: “But pursuant to amendment, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of murder of homicide is treated as an aggravating circumstance. There, the illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearms is no longer separately punished.

With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms under PD No. 1866, it was held in the case of PEOPLE VS. MOLINA (242 SCRA 742) and reiterated in the recent case of PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ (304 SCRA 611) , that in cases where murder of homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced in RA 8294. Thereunder, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed. (Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 8294).

In other words, where murder or homicide was committed the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. (PP. VS. MOLINA)

Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the same may be retroactively applied. This new law applied even to violations that occurred prior to its effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Art. 22 of the revised Penal Code.

Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal possession. As stated above, the same may only be done where no other crime is committed.

With more reason, accused-appellant can not be convicted of homicide or murder with “the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating,” inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mention as a result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.

PUGSLEY

Feb 14, 2002, 12:44 AM

[/b]TE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
346 SCRA 327

FACTS:[/b]
1. Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rights on September 14, 1988.
2. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly.
3. Private gave birth on April 21, 1989 and petitioner stopped visiting her.
4. On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a 2nd marriage with a certain Julieta Santella.
5. Private respondent charged petitioner with Bigamy, which was filed in the RTC of Quezon City.
6. Meanwhile, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her.
7. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential martial obligations.
8. Private respondent also filed with the PRC an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective Engineering licenses.
9. After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court.
10. The trial court in its Order denied petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence stating that the Demurrer could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.
11. Petitioner also filed with the Board of the PRC a Motion to suspend the proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage and the criminal case for bigamy.
12. The Board denied the Motion.
13. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
14. The CA affirmed the RTC’s and the Board’s decision.
15. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the pendency of a civil case give rise to a prejudicial question in a criminal case for bigamy.

Can there be a prejudicial question if one of the cases is administrative in nature?

HELD:
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.. The rationale behind the principle of suspension a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
The CA did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.

The ruling in PEOPLE VS. MENDONZ (95 Phil 843) and PEOPLE VS. ARAGON (100 Phil 1033) cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

In LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731) the SC held that “Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exits.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. The SC previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Spungee

Feb 14, 2002, 03:12 AM

hey pugs =)

great work you have here! you're so chaga! anyways, i hope i could contribute also. want remedial law cases? hopefully i could post the latest cases.

thanks din for sending me case digests. the consti cases came in handy in my poli class.

hmmm...

well... keep up the good work and i'll text you na lang or see ya here when i have time again, k?

ciao!

PUGSLEY

Feb 25, 2002, 07:30 AM

John and Marsha, American citizens of legal age, came to the Philippines and exchanged marriage vows at the Manila Cathedral. They gave at least two (2) reasons why they decided thus. Firstly, they believe that church wedding in the Philippines are “sanctified” and secondly, because absolute divorce, generally is not allowed in the Philippines and therefore there is less opportunity to “put asunder what God had joined together”, which is of course the idea of marriage.

Q1: What can you say about the second reason with respect to their situation? (20 pts.)

Five years later, John and Marsha came to realize that the place of celebration of marriage does not guarantee its success. The spouse of five years obtained a divorce decree in Las Vegas, Nevada where they are residents.

Q2: Will the divorce decree granted in Las Vegas, Nevada be recognized in the Philippines? (20 pts.)

Jane, a beautiful 16 year old Texan, decided to marry Juanito, a computer engineering and native of Baguio. Jane presented to the Local civil Registrar of Baguio City a certificate of legal capacity to marry, attesting among others, that in Texas, USA, a 16 year old can freely marry. A valid marriage license was issued and they were married in a simple civil ceremony solemnized by the City Mayor of Baguio.

Q3: Is the marriage valid, void, voidable? Reason out your answer. (10 pts.)

Suppose the marriage of the above-mentioned parties is held at the US Embassy in Manila, officiated by the US Consular official.

Q4: Will a validly issued marriage license in the Philippines be required? Reason out your answer. (10 pts.)

Suppose their marriage (Jane and Juanito mentioned above) is celebrated in Texas, USA where state law allows 16 year old to marry….

Q5: Will the marriage be considered valid here considering the provisions of “Art. 26, par. 1 FC, which provides,” All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they are solemnized, and valid, there is such, shall also be valid in the country, except those prohibited under Article 35(1)”? Reason our your answer. (20 pts.)

Tony and Maria have been living together as husband and wife. Tony cannot marry Maria because his previous valid marriage was still existing. On the 6th year of their cohabitation, Tony became a widower. A full year later, Tony and Maria were married without bothering to obtain a valid marriage license.

Q6: Is their marriage valid, voidable or void? Reason our your answer. (10 pts.)

Q7: Will your answer be the same if from the beginning of their cohabitation Tony had no legal impediment to marry? Support your answer. (10 pts.)

PUGSLEY

Feb 25, 2002, 07:32 AM

In their marriage settlement the would be spouses agreed on the following:

1. That CPG would govern their property relations whereby all their separate properties, including all the proceeds, fruits and income form them shall remain the separate and exclusive properties of each of them during the marriage;
2. That by reason of their forthcoming marriage the would be husband donates to the would be wife fifty percentum ( 50%) of the value of all his interest, rights and claims over the property that he acquired by succession which is the only property that he owns;
3. That the donation propter nuptias shall come into effect only if they remain childless and that one of the spouse would have to die before the donation would operate;
4. That the said donation propter nuptias shall remain effective even in the event the marriage will not be celebrated; and
5. That in case of judicial separation of property, their residual liability from any and all conjugal obligation shall not be solidary as between them.

Q1 to Q5: Discuss the validity (or invalidity) of the 5 stipulations mentioned above. (5 pts.)

A is validly married to B. While the marriage was still subsisting, A married C. BY reason of the subsequent marriage, C donated in favor of A, a piece of land.

Q6: Upon the finality of the judicial decree of nullity of marriage of A and C, what action can C take respecting the donation propter nuptias? (5 pts.)

Q7: Will your answer be the same if the donee acted in bad faith? (5 pts.)

Q8: Suppose in the above set of facts, the marriage of A and B is in itself void and no declaration of nullity has been obtained prior to the subsequent marriage of A and C and A knows all along that without the said declaration, his subsequent marriage is likewise void, what recourse, if any, is available to C, regarding the donation propter nuptias? (10 pts.)

Q9: What is/are considered sufficient cause/s for judicial separation of property? (5 pts.)

Q10:
a) What are the conditions imposed by law so that payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon either or both spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets? (5 pts.)
b) In a case, the lower court decided that before fines and indemnities imposed upon either of the spouses could be paid out of the conjugal assets, the conjugal partnership must first be terminated. Is the lower court position tenable? (10 pts.)

Q11: What are the effects of the separation in fact of the spouses upon their conjugal partnership? (10 pts.)

In a case, it was proved that the wife while living separately from her husband contracted personal debts without the latter’s knowledge or consent. After trial the court attached several parcels of land purchased by the husband during marriage, with funds borrowed by him from officemates and subsequently titles thereto were issued under his name, as a married person followed by the name of his wife.

Q12: Under the above circumstances, may the conjugal assets be held answerable for the personal debts of the wife? (5 pts.)

Q13: Will the fact that the fund used by the husband in the purchase of lands was borrowed from officemates make the property a separate property of the husband pursuant to Article 109(4)? (5 pts.)

PUGSLEY

Feb 25, 2002, 07:36 AM

This was our midterm exams!!!

1. X, a doctor, rendered medical services to the daughter0in-law of A and B. May A and B be compelled to pay for such medical services? Explain.

2. A borrowed from B P 50,000.00 and agreed that in case of non-payment on the date stipulated, A’s house and lot would be sold to B for the amount of P 50,000.00. A contends that his stipulation is void for being contrary to law. Is A correct?

3. A) A passenger on a bus was hurt, but in a criminal case against the driver, said driver was acquitted. The victim sues the owner of the bus for “culpa contractual”. Will the suit still prosper?

B) A passenger on a bus was hurt because of the negligence of the bus driver as well as the negligence of the driver of another vehicle. Who should be liable?

4. A) X sold a particular sewing machine to Y with the stipulation that the same would be delivered on July 5, 1999. On July 7, 1999, the sewing machine was destroyed by lightning without X’s fault. What are the rights and obligations of the parties?

B) X entered into a contract with Y whereby the latter agreed to sew the wedding dress of X’s fiancée and to deliver the same on or before the wedding day, October 25, 1998. Y fails to deliver the wedding dress on October 25, 1998. When does he incur in delay?

5. X, in a letter addressed to the Board of Director of ABC Colleges, subscribed to 200 shares of stock of P 100.00 per share subject to the condition that she would pay the same after she had harvested fish in her fishpond. X died without paying for the said shares of stock. Is her estate liable for payment of said shares?

6. A borrows P 50,000.00 from B payable in one (1) year. Thereafter, A becomes insolvent. What is the effect of such insolvency?

7. A) A owes B the sum of P 50,000.00 payable on June 15, 1992. B is likewise obligated to pay A the amount of P 10,000.00 payable on July 20, 1992. On July 10, 1992, B assigned his credit against A to C without A’s knowledge. It was only on July 31, 1992, that A knew of the assignment. In an action for the enforcement of the payment by C assign A, may A set up compensation?

B)) A owes B P 10,000.00 due on October 2. B owes A P 2,000.00 due also on October 2. On August 4 (when there was no legal compensation yet), B assigned his P 10,000.00 credit to C with the knowledge but without the consent of A. On October 2, how much can C successfully collect from A?

8. H and W donated a parcel of land to the province of Ilocos Sur on condition that the latter would build upon the land a schoolhouse and a park, the work to begin within 6 months from the date the parties ratify the donation. The province accepted the donation, and the land was registered in the name of the donee. What kind of condition was set froth in the donation?

9. A borrowed money from B on the strength of two (2) sureties C and D who assumed joint and several liability with A. In a suit for sum of money filed by B, the court rendered judgment against all the defendants (A, C, and D) for the total amount sought by B. But the judgment did not state whether the liability of the defendants was joint or solidary. B then asked for execution on the properties of C, one of the sureties, for the whole obligation. C opposes the execution on the ground that his liability is merely join. Is C correct?

10. A owed B debts already due. A paid for one debt without specifying which. After said payment had been credited, A complained stating that he had the right to choose which debt to pay under the application of payments. Is A justified in his complaint? Explain.

11. A sold B a piece of land with the right to repurchase. Within the time given for redemption, A tendered the amount to B to effect the resale. But B refused. A however did not consign the money in court. A then brought an action in court to compel B to accept the repurchase price. B claims that A should have deposited the money in court, but since A did not do so, and since the period of redemption had already lapsed, A cannot now redeem the property. Was consignation needed here?

12. X borrowed from Y the sum of P 30,000.00. After the loan was contracted, X by means of a letter, authorized the ABC Bank to pay his indebtedness to Y out of whatever loan might be granted to him by said bank. The bank agreed. But the bank paid Y only P 20,000.00 on the date of maturity. Y sued X and the bank for the remaining P 10,00.00. Is the bank liable to Y?

13. On January 1, A wrote B a letter offering a lease contract. On January 8, B wrote a letter of complete acceptance, which was received by A on January 15. But on January 12, B had already written a letter revoking his acceptance. Was there a contract between A and B?

14. A) A donated land to B in a private instrument. B accepted the same in private instrument. B then wanted to have the donation registered but registration requires a public instrument, so B requested A to put down the donation in a public instrument but A refused. B then sued for specific performance to compel A to obverse the necessary form. Will the action prosper?

B) A sold to B in a private instrument his land. Later B wanted to have the sale registered, but registration requires a public instrument. May B compel A to execute the needed public instrument?

PUGSLEY

Feb 25, 2002, 07:37 AM

This was our midterm exams!!! (Whole of OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS)

1. X, a doctor, rendered medical services to the daughter0in-law of A and B. May A and B be compelled to pay for such medical services? Explain.

2. A borrowed from B P 50,000.00 and agreed that in case of non-payment on the date stipulated, A’s house and lot would be sold to B for the amount of P 50,000.00. A contends that his stipulation is void for being contrary to law. Is A correct?

3. A) A passenger on a bus was hurt, but in a criminal case against the driver, said driver was acquitted. The victim sues the owner of the bus for “culpa contractual”. Will the suit still prosper?

B) A passenger on a bus was hurt because of the negligence of the bus driver as well as the negligence of the driver of another vehicle. Who should be liable?

4. A) X sold a particular sewing machine to Y with the stipulation that the same would be delivered on July 5, 1999. On July 7, 1999, the sewing machine was destroyed by lightning without X’s fault. What are the rights and obligations of the parties?

B) X entered into a contract with Y whereby the latter agreed to sew the wedding dress of X’s fiancée and to deliver the same on or before the wedding day, October 25, 1998. Y fails to deliver the wedding dress on October 25, 1998. When does he incur in delay?

5. X, in a letter addressed to the Board of Director of ABC Colleges, subscribed to 200 shares of stock of P 100.00 per share subject to the condition that she would pay the same after she had harvested fish in her fishpond. X died without paying for the said shares of stock. Is her estate liable for payment of said shares?

6. A borrows P 50,000.00 from B payable in one (1) year. Thereafter, A becomes insolvent. What is the effect of such insolvency?

7. A) A owes B the sum of P 50,000.00 payable on June 15, 1992. B is likewise obligated to pay A the amount of P 10,000.00 payable on July 20, 1992. On July 10, 1992, B assigned his credit against A to C without A’s knowledge. It was only on July 31, 1992, that A knew of the assignment. In an action for the enforcement of the payment by C assign A, may A set up compensation?

B)) A owes B P 10,000.00 due on October 2. B owes A P 2,000.00 due also on October 2. On August 4 (when there was no legal compensation yet), B assigned his P 10,000.00 credit to C with the knowledge but without the consent of A. On October 2, how much can C successfully collect from A?

8. H and W donated a parcel of land to the province of Ilocos Sur on condition that the latter would build upon the land a schoolhouse and a park, the work to begin within 6 months from the date the parties ratify the donation. The province accepted the donation, and the land was registered in the name of the donee. What kind of condition was set froth in the donation?

9. A borrowed money from B on the strength of two (2) sureties C and D who assumed joint and several liability with A. In a suit for sum of money filed by B, the court rendered judgment against all the defendants (A, C, and D) for the total amount sought by B. But the judgment did not state whether the liability of the defendants was joint or solidary. B then asked for execution on the properties of C, one of the sureties, for the whole obligation. C opposes the execution on the ground that his liability is merely join. Is C correct?

10. A owed B debts already due. A paid for one debt without specifying which. After said payment had been credited, A complained stating that he had the right to choose which debt to pay under the application of payments. Is A justified in his complaint? Explain.

11. A sold B a piece of land with the right to repurchase. Within the time given for redemption, A tendered the amount to B to effect the resale. But B refused. A however did not consign the money in court. A then brought an action in court to compel B to accept the repurchase price. B claims that A should have deposited the money in court, but since A did not do so, and since the period of redemption had already lapsed, A cannot now redeem the property. Was consignation needed here?

12. X borrowed from Y the sum of P 30,000.00. After the loan was contracted, X by means of a letter, authorized the ABC Bank to pay his indebtedness to Y out of whatever loan might be granted to him by said bank. The bank agreed. But the bank paid Y only P 20,000.00 on the date of maturity. Y sued X and the bank for the remaining P 10,00.00. Is the bank liable to Y?

13. On January 1, A wrote B a letter offering a lease contract. On January 8, B wrote a letter of complete acceptance, which was received by A on January 15. But on January 12, B had already written a letter revoking his acceptance. Was there a contract between A and B?

14. A) A donated land to B in a private instrument. B accepted the same in private instrument. B then wanted to have the donation registered but registration requires a public instrument, so B requested A to put down the donation in a public instrument but A refused. B then sued for specific performance to compel A to obverse the necessary form. Will the action prosper?

B) A sold to B in a private instrument his land. Later B wanted to have the sale registered, but registration requires a public instrument. May B compel A to execute the needed public instrument?

PUGSLEY

Feb 25, 2002, 07:52 AM

PUGSLEY

Feb 25, 2002, 07:57 AM

Originally posted by Spungee
hey pugs =)

great work you have here! you're so chaga! anyways, i hope i could contribute also. want remedial law cases? hopefully i could post the latest cases.

thanks din for sending me case digests. the consti cases came in handy in my poli class.

hmmm...

well... keep up the good work and i'll text you na lang or see ya here when i have time again, k?

ciao!

Thanks for dropping by.....I'm greatly honored :*)

Chaga? hmmmmmmm, more of an obssessive complusive type of person. :lol:

Contributions are welcomed so come as you please.......Remedial Law Cases would be great.....I prefer Evidence and Crim Procedure......so that even the non-law students out there could easily understand it.

Good to know that the cases I sent you were of help.....More to come. :D

PUGSLEY

Mar 13, 2002, 07:44 AM

CRUZ VS. ENRILE
160 SCRA 700

FACTS:
1. 217 political detainees were arrested in the 9-year span of official martial rule and were committed to the New Bilibid Prison.
2. All stood trial for common crimes before various courts martial; if any of these offense had any political color, this had never been pleaded nor proved.
3. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians and only 26 conferred as military personnel.
4. Petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the proceedings against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty.
5. Their plea is for a grant of a retrial of their respective cases in the civil court, where their right to due process may be accorded respect.
6. A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed in the SC claiming the pronouncement of the Cot of lack of jurisdiction of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule. (OLAGUER et al vs. MILITARY COMMISSION No. 34, 150 SCRA 144) entitled petitioners to be unconditionally freed from detention.

ISSUE:
Will the 157 petitioner’s be placed twice in jeopardy from a re-trial of their cases?

HELD:
In Olaguer, the Court in no uncertain terms affirmed that – a military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that nay judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned. For the same reason, the Court’s pronouncement in AQUINO JR. vs. MILITARY COMMISSION No. 2 (63 SCRA 546) and all decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned.

Clearly, no right of relief under Olaguer exists in favor of the 26 petitioners who were admittedly in the military service. Over them the courts martial validly exercised jurisdiction. It need only be said that these tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel, and the validity of General Order no. 8 ordaining their creation, although repeatedly challenged on constitutional grounds, has as many times been upheld by the Court, either expressly or impliedly. As to these petitioners, the writ is unavailing.

The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to have been committed, and these are accusations against herein petitioner for those offenses. Olaguer cannot and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of these charges, or establish that the same is baseless, so as to entitle them to immediate release from detention. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the petitioner have as much interest as the Sate has to prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds.

No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioner’s cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution.

PUGSLEY

Mar 13, 2002, 07:46 AM

MERCADO VS. MANZANO
307 SCRA 630

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent EDUardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
2. Private respondent won during said elections.
3. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
4. The 2nd Division of the Comelec granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec. 40 (d) the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
5. On August 31, 1998, the Comelec en banc rendered a reversed the ruling of the 2nd Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor.
6. According to the Comelec: a) Eduardo Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA; b) He acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli; c) He was born also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Constitution; d) That upon attaining the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US Citizenship under American Law; e) Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship .
7. Pursuant to the resolution of the Comelec en banc , the Board of Canvassers, on August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice-mayor of the City of Makati.
8. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is Dual allegiance the same as dual citizenship?

Is private respondent is disqualified from holding office of vice-mayor?

HELD:
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when , as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said sates. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a sate which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli ;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence , the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA No. 7160 , Section 40(d) and in RA No. 7854 , Section 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, by subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as afar as the law of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past election sin this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Karachi

Mar 13, 2002, 08:06 PM

Hello Mr. Pugsley!

I have some questions regarding annulment of civil marriages. I have also read the Family Code coz I'm helping a friend of mine whose boyfriend is separated from his wife for more than a year now. I checked kasi yung grounds for annulment kaya lang parang wala akong makita dun na pwedeng gamitin para ma-annul yung kasal nila.

But this is their status: The guy married the girl even though he doesn't wish to do so anymore. The wedding was preceeded by the girl's uncle (judge). Since they got married last Feb or Mar 2000, they never had sex coz ayaw nga nung guy dun sa girl. They live in the same house but never really spent time together. More or less 9 months after their marriage, parang nagkasarilinan na sila. The guy never talked to the girl and vice versa though they are still pretending that they are married (ie regarding money matters). Until some time in June or July last year when the girl told the guy that "they are over" for real and they should look for somebody else who will make them happy. After that, the guy never heard anything from the girl anymore. Actually, di na daw alam nung guy kung nasan yung wife niya. Ang last na nalaman niya this year eh may bf na yatang iba ang wife niya.

The questions are:

1. if this is the case, what could both parties do to annul their marriage?
2. Who should file the petition?
3. On what possible grounds?
4. And how bout regarding money/conjugal property? Dapat ba talaga nilang paghatian or pwede silang mag-usap na they will keep their own wealth to themselves and not bother na maghabol pa sa wealth ng either parties.

Additional question: What are the grounds to consider the marriage as null ab initio?

I will really appreciate your help. I hope you will reply. Thanks!

Karachi

Mar 15, 2002, 07:13 PM

correction po pala Mr. Pugsley. They had sex pala once in a while nung magkasama pa sila though they never get along that well. So this means, the psychological incapacity is not an option anymore. I hope you can help me to clarify this to my friend. Thanks!

Diego22

Mar 17, 2002, 03:04 AM

Pugsley, Sedfrey et al., what if we go on a regular study group? whatcha think people? say we bring our books and notes to discuss and exchange notes some place nice, clean and quiet?

PUGSLEY

Mar 28, 2002, 06:19 PM

Originally posted by Diego22
Pugsley, Sedfrey et al., what if we go on a regular study group? whatcha think people? say we bring our books and notes to discuss and exchange notes some place nice, clean and quiet?

Good Idea. The only problem is I'm here in Baguio.

eponine0907

Mar 31, 2002, 05:32 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLEY

Still waiting for this promise.... :lol:

oops. sorry. please don't sue me for breach of promise to digest. :D been caught up in a lot of things lately.

:blossom:

eponine0907

Mar 31, 2002, 05:50 AM

OPLE VS. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

FACTS: President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, prescribing a National ID system for all citizens to facilitate business transactions with government agencies engaged in the delivery of basic services. Senator Blas Ople and others questioned the constitutionality of the said order, arguing that such is violative of the peoples right to privacy.

ISSUE: Should A.O. No. 308 be declared unconstitutional?

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the Order is unconstitutional. AO 308 is predicated on two considerations: 1) the need to provide citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with government agencues; and 2) the need to reduce, if not totally eliminate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations. It is debatable whether these considerations are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. But what is not arguable is the broadness, vagueness and overbreadth of AO 308 which, if implemented, will put the people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of AO 308 lies in its Sec. 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics technology"and "computer application designs". But AO 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Furthermore, it does not state whether the encoding of date shall ne limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under AO308 cannot be ignored. The more frequent use of the PRN, the better chance of building a huge and formidable database through the electronic linkage of files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes, but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threated the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The right to privace is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threat comes from various sources, and in the case at bar, it stems from the executive branch of the government, which, by issuing AO 308, pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate the delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that AO 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.

:blossom:

eponine0907

Mar 31, 2002, 05:52 AM

eponine0907

Mar 31, 2002, 06:43 AM

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, G.R. 141284, August 15, 2000

FACTS: President Estrada issued a Letter of Instruction ordering the deployment of members of the Philippine Marines in the metropolis to conduct joint visibility patrols with members of the Philippine National Police in various shopping malls. The IBP questioned the constitutionality of the said LOI.

ISSUES: 1) Does the LOI violate the civilian supremacy clause under Art. II Sec. 3 of the Constitution?
2) Does the order to deploy marines amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Art. XVI Sec. 5(4)?

HELD: No to both questions.
1) The calling of marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscrbied in the LOI, and it provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. The real authority belongs to the PNP, with the local police forces being the ones in charge of the patrols. The police forces are tasked to brief the soldiers on police patrol procedures, and are responsible for the direction and management of the deployment of the Marines. Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persist in Philippine jurisdiction. It is not averse to requesting military assistance in implementing and executing certain traditionally "civil" functions. Among the activities wherein military aid has been rendered are: elections; relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters; anti-drug enforcement activities; and amateur sports promotion and development. What we have here is not the derogation of civilian supremacy but rather mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities.
2) It is not correct to say that Gen. Angelo Reyes, AFP Chief of Staff, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post, in violation of Art. XVI Sec. 5(4). As has been said earlier, the real authority in this instance is the PNP Chief, not the military. It does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the deployment since he does not exercise any control or authority over the same. Since none of the Marines deployed was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

obiter dictum: The Supreme Court held that the IBP is not a proper party to this case, since it has no right that was injured, nor does it have any right that can be injured in the future by the deployment of the Marines. But the Court decided to hear upon the merits of the case, nonetheless.

:blossom:

eponine0907

Mar 31, 2002, 07:03 AM

Originally posted by sedfrey

pugs and eponine,

how come the both of you changed names? is this final? are those really you?

yes, this is really me. i just added an 09 to my name. :)

:blossom:

eponine0907

Mar 31, 2002, 07:06 AM

Originally posted by sedfrey

pugs and eponine,

how come the both of you changed names? is this final? are those really you?

yes, sedfrey. eponine07 and eponine0907 are one and the same banana. :D and yes, this is final. :D

:blossom:

PUGSLEY

Apr 1, 2002, 04:57 AM

PExers in Law School

I'll be deleting files in my computer one of these days, mostly digested cases . If your'e interested , I could send it to you via e-mail.

I have cases in CIVIL, CONSTITUIONAL LAW, CRIMINAL LAW .....

PUGSLEY

Apr 1, 2002, 05:10 AM

PExers in Law School

I'll be deleting files in my computer one of these days, mostly digested cases. If your'e interested , I could send it to you via e-mail.

I have cases in CIVIL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CRIMINAL LAW .....

PUGSLEY

Apr 1, 2002, 05:10 AM

PExers in Law School

I'll be deleting files in my computer one of these days, mostly digested cases. If your'e interested , I could send it to you via e-mail.

I have cases in CIVIL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CRIMINAL LAW .....

PUGSLEY

Apr 9, 2002, 12:10 PM

I. Family Code.

A. Psychological Incapacity
1. Republic v. Dagdag – February 09, 2001
2. Santos v. Court of Appeals – January 04, 1995
3. Republic v. Court of Appeals – February 13, 1997
4. Marcos v. Marcos – October 19, 2000
5. Pesca v. Pesca – April 17, 2001

B. Disposition of Family Dwelling where marriage is declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity
1. Valdes v. RTC – July 31, 1996

C. Effect of Divorce Obtained Abroad by Alien Spouse
1. Llorente v. Court of Appeals – November 23, 2000

D. Proof of Marriage
1. Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals – August 19, 1999
2. Manzano v. Judge Sanchez – March 08, 2001
3. Doecena v. Judge Lapesura – March 28, 2001

PUGSLEY

Apr 9, 2002, 12:12 PM

1. Ligaya and Bayani were very intimate friends. In fact they had indulged in sexual intercourse more than once. Bayani is reviewing for the bar exams. Bayani noticed that Ligaya’s abdomen was bulging and believed that she is pregnant. Bayani afraid of the consequences of such pregnancy, he employed violence upon Ligaya in the hope of causing abortion. Ligaya, however, is not pregnant. From the given facts, what crime is committed by Bayani? (10 pts.)

2. Ferdie inflicted a wound on Ponce in a flight. The wound remained open for 32 days. Ponce only cleaned it with soap and warm water. How would you classify the physical injury inflicted by Ferdie on Ponce? Why? (10 pts.)

3.
a) Gino threatened Mahinhin that he would kill her husband if she would not have sexual intercourse with him. Because of the threat made by Gino, he succeeded in raping Mahinhin. What crime was committed by Gino? Why? (10 pts.)
b) Suppose that in the preceding question, Gino threatened the woman that he would kill her husband if she would not have sexual intercourse with him, and the woman having agreed to the condition imposed by Gino to save her husband, Gino had sexual intercourse with her the following day. What crime is committed by Gino? Explain your answer. (5 pts.)

2. Romeo was informed that his lot was occupied by Juliet who was building a small house there. Romeo immediately went there and by means of violence drove Juliet out of the lot and destroyed whatever was already constructed by Juliet on the lot. What crime was committed by Romeo? Explain your answer. (10 pts.)

3. Paterno and Liberato broke the wooden gate of the stonewall around the premises of Benigno and once inside took from the yard of the latter building materials lying there. What crime is committed by Paterno and Liberato? Explain your answer. ( 10 pts)

4.
a) Distinguish Brigandage from Robbery in Band. (5 pts.)
b) Distinguish crime committed by a band from crime committed with the aid of armed men. (5 pts.)

5. 6 persons, all armed, formed a band of robbers for the purposes of committing robbery in the streets of Baguio. Before they could commit any robbery, they were arrested and when investigated they confessed to the foregoing facts.

a) For the crime/s are the 6 persons liable? Why? (5 pts.)
b) Under what law? (5 pts.)

6.
a) Rene Sagasag hired the truck of Beto, driven by the latter entrusted to him to carry and transport Sagasag'’ merchandize from Baguio to Laguna. Beto did not deliver the merchandise to its destination, but instead took it to Manila and sold it. What crime was committed by Beto? Explain your answer. (5 pts.)

b) Magno, taking advantage of the absence of Ecco and the latter’s family, climbed the only coconut tree in the yard of Ecco and took 6 coconut fruits for the tree. What crime was committed by Magno? Explain your answer. (5 pts.)

7. Colasita, who was buying merchandise in the market for her to resell at her small sari-sari store told Pepay, the owner of the stall in the market, that she was leaving in her stall the bag of merchandise she already bought as she was going to buy rice from the rice section. Pepay agreed to look after the merchandise. When Colasita returned for the bag and asked Pepay for it, the latter denied having received nay merchandise form Colasita.
a) What crime is committed by Pepay? Explain your answer. (15 pts.)
b) Under what contract in the Civil Code governed Colasita and Pepay’s agreement in the given facts of the case? (5 pts.)

8. Ciano purchased from Carlito a piece of land for P 100,000.00 on January 20, 1988 and on the same date issued a check dated March 8, 1988, in payment of the land. Carlito executed an absolute deed of sale upon delivery of the check to him by Ciano. Ciano had sufficient funds in the bank when he issued the check but he intended to withdraw the same on March 2, 1988 to pay a car he bought, the payment of which was due on March 7, 1988. On March 2, 1988, Ciano withdrew all his money from the bank. When Carlito presented the check on March 8, 1988, payment was refused by the bank because there was no fund in the name of Ciano to cover the amount of the check

a) Is Ciano liable for Estafa? If so, what particular paragraph of Art. 315 is violated? Explain your answer. (5 pts.)
b) If not for what crime is he liable? (5 pts.)

PUGSLEY

Apr 11, 2002, 04:16 AM

COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Final Exams

I. A. X subscribed to the shares of stock of Y Corporation , with the agreement with the corporation through its directors that he will pay 80% of the total subscription price which shall then be recorded as full payment thereof. Furthermore, the payment of the discounted subscription price will be taken from future cash dividends to be declared by the corporation, which shall then be owing to him as a stockholder.

QUESTIONS:
1. What rights, if any, did X acquire when he subscribed to the shares of Y Corporation? Why?
2. Is Y Corporation estopped to enforce full payment of the subscription price? Why?
3. Is there a valid consideration of the subscribed shares of stock? Why?
4. Is you were a corporate creditor, how would the terms of the subscription contract affect your interest on the assets of the corporation? Why?

B. In the preceding problem, may the directors be held personally and solidarily liable along with the corporation for having agreed with X on the aforesaid terms and conditions of the subscription contract in favor of corporate creditors and outstanding stockholders? If yes, will it entail the "“piercing the veil of corporate fiction”? Why?

II. A. Enumerate the requisites of a negotiable promissory note.

B. issued a crossed check to Y, payee, drawn against ABC Bank in the amount of P 10,000.00. Z stole the check and after forging the signature of Y and adding one zero to the amount making it appear as P 1000,000.00, he deposited the check in his account with MM Bank . Despite the fact that the insertion of the additional zero was quite suspicious, ABC Bank cleared the same relying on the indorsement of MM Bank. If you were X , against whom will you recover the amount of P 100,000.00? Why?

III. A. Enumerate at least two (2) distinctions between life insurance and property insurance.

B. Exemplify the “incontestability clause”.

IV. A. What is the prescriptive period provided for the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act within which the shipper or consignee may bring an action against the carrier for loss or damage to the cargo? Does “loss” include misdelivery of the cargo? Why?

B. Define pilotage and cite its effects on the liability of the ship owner and ship agent for loss or damage to cargo and/or death or physical injuries to passengers.

V. A. Define E-commerce

B. Give an example of a letter of credit-trust receipt transaction

PUGSLEY

Apr 18, 2002, 12:24 PM

I. Illustrate how the principle of suibrogation can be made applicable in insurance contract.

II. What does a beneficiary acquire a vested right over the proceeds of an insurance? Discuss.

III. a) What are the requisites before a minor can enter into a contract of insurance? Enumerate and discuss.

b) If the contract entered into by the minor fails to meet the requirements provided for by the Insurance Code, is the contract valid, voidable, or void? Explain your answer.

IV. a) On whom does a person have an insurable interest? Enumerate and discuss briefly.

b) Distinguish an insurable inters on life and insurable interest in property for purposes of insurance.

V. a) Distinguish an insurance contract from a wagering contract.

b) What are the essential and distinguishing elements of an insurance contract? Explain briefly.

VI. A person procured insurance on his life through fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. He died after three years after issuance of policy. Can his beneficiaries recover on that policy? Give reasons.

VII. What are the characteristics of an insurance contract? Enumerate and discuss each.

VIII. A took out a P 1 million life insurance policiy naming his firend and creditor B as his beneficiary. When A died, his outstanding loan obligation to B was only P 50 T. A's executor contended that only P 50 T out of the insurance porceeds should be paid to B and the balance of P 950 T should be paid to A's estate. Is the executor's contention correct? Reason.

IX. On July 14, 1993, X a homosexual took an insurance policy on the life of his boyfriend Y. In trhe insurance application, X misrepresented that Y was in perfect good health although he knew all the time that Y was afflicted with AIDS. On October 18, 1997, Y died in a motor accident. Shortly thereaafter, X filed his insurance claim. Should the insuree pay? Reasons.

PUGSLEY

Apr 18, 2002, 12:30 PM

I. Present in outline form how a "wage distortion" issue is adjusted.

II. Distinguish Sec. II of DO 10, DOLE, Series of 1997, what are the rights of a contractual employee?

III. Pedro was engaged to do some painting chores of the building houseing the law office of Atty. Pintor for a fixed amount of P 7,000.00. Pedro was able to finish the painting job within a period of 8 months. During the 8-month period of Pedor's engagement to paint the building, he was requested to clean the office of Atty. Pintor.
a) What is the employement status of Pedro under your labor laws? Explain.

b) What are the 2 types of regular employement?

c) Who is a probationary employee and how long is the probationary period in general? Cite the exceptions, if any.

IV. What must concur in order that contracting and subcontracting be legitimate?

V. When may illegal recruitment in large scale amount to economic sabotage?

VI. Cite at least 3 Constitutional provisions affecting labor and employement.

PUGSLEY

May 7, 2002, 05:41 AM

1. a) Define Conflict of Laws.

b) Distinguish Conflict of Laws (Private International Law) from Public International Law.

2. a) State the sources of Conflict Rules.

b) H and W, husband and wife, Filipinos, reside in Baguio City. H goes to Hong Kong as an OFW and there marries F, a Filipina DH. After a month of marital bliss in the former Crown Colony, H comes back to the Philippines. May H be prosecuted for bigamy in the Philippines at the instance of W? Why? May W sue H for legal separation? Explain.

3. a) What is meant by forum non conveniens? Explain.

b) H, American, marries W, Filipina, in Baguio City. They migrate to Seattle, USA. H leaves W for his American girlfriend. W sues H for divorce before the proper Seattle court, which in due course grants a divorce decree. As a divorcee, W comes back to the Philippines. May she remarry here? Explain.

4. a) In what instances may the local court apply the lex fori in conflicts cases
b) H and W, Americans, get married in Baguio City where they establish their residence. W is the sole breadwinner, and out of her earnings she purchases a house and lot in Baguio City. Does H have a right to the house and lot? Explain.

5. a) H, a Filipino, marries W, a Frenchwoman, in Paris. At the time of the marriage, H was psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage, although the incapacity manifested itself two years after the wedding. Assuming that the marriage is viodable under French law, is it also voidable here? Explain
b) A, an Afghan national, executes a deed of sale in Kabul under which he sells a parcel of land in Irisan, Baguio City (which he had inherited from his Filipina mother) to F, a Filipino. The law of what state shall govern the extrinsic as well as intrinsic validity of the deed of sale? Explain.

PUGSLEY

May 8, 2002, 04:27 AM

CASES IN WILLS AND SUCCESSION:

1. Ajero vs. CA September 15, 1994
2. Alvarado vs. Gaviola September 14, 1993
3. Alvarez vs. IAC May 7, 1990
4. Aparicio vs. Paraguya May 29, 1987
5. Arroyo vs. Albay February 28, 1962
6. Austria vs. Reyes February 27, 1970
7. Azaola vs. Singson August 5, 1960
8. Bacayo vs. Borromeo August 31, 1965
9. Baritun vs. CA March 22, 1990
10. Barranda vs. Barranda May 20, 1987
11. Bellis vs. Bellis June 6, 1967
12. Betts vs. CA July 30, 1979
13. Bonilla vs. Arranza December 7, 1982
14. Borromeo vs. Borromeo July 23, 1987
15. Butte vs. Uy February 28, 1962
16. Cagro vs. Cagro April 29, 1953
17. Calde vs. CA June 27, 1991
18. Caneda vs. CA May 28, 1993
19. Castro vs. Bustos February 28, 1969
20. Cayetano vs. Leonides May 30, 1984
21. Chavez vs. Akutin May 21, 1943
22. Chavez vs. Chavez November 8, 1990
23. Christensen vs. Garcia January 31, 1963
24. Corona vs. CA August 30, 1982
25. Coronel vs. CA October 7, 1996
26. Corpus vs. Corpus October 23, 1978
27. Cruz vs. Villasor November 26, 1973
28. De Borja vs. de Borja August 18, 1972
29. De Papa vs. Camacho September 24, 1986
30. De Perez vs. Tolete June 2, 1994
31. De Roma vs. CA` July 23, 1987
32. De Tupas vs. RTC October 3, 1986
33. Del Rosario vs. Cunanan March 30, 1977
34. Dela Cerna vs. Potot December 23, 1964
35. Dela Puerta vs. CA February 6, 1990
36. Diaz vs. IAC February 21, 1990
37. Diaz vs. IAC June 17, 1987
38. Francisco vs. matias January 31, 1964
39. Gabucan vs. Manta January 28, 1980
40. **** vs. Mamuyac January 29, 1927
41. Gallanosa vs. Arcangel June 21, 1978
42. Gan vs. Yap August 30, 1958
43. Garces vs. Broce May 20, 1968
44. Garcia vs. Lacuesta November 29, 1951
45. Garcia vs. Lacuesta November 29, 1951
46. Garcia vs. Vasquez April 30, 1970
47. Gonzales vs. CA May 25, 1979
48. Gonzales vs. CA May 25, 1979
49. Guevara vs. Guevara December 29, 1943
50. Icasiano vs. Icasiano June 30, 1964
51. In re: Mario Chanliongco October 18, 1977
52. In re: Wenceslao Laureta March 12, 1987
53. In Re: Will of Riosa November 7, 1918
54. Javellana vs. Ledesma June 30, 1955
55. Jimenez vs. Fernandez April 6, 1960
56. Kalaw vs. Relova September 28, 1984
57. La Cerna vs. de Corcino April 29, 1961
58. Landayan vs. Bacani September 30, 1982
59. Leviste vs. CA January 30, 1989
60. Lim vs. CA February 28, 1996
61. Madarcos vs. dela Merced June 30, 1989
62. Mag-oy vs. CA` September 12, 1986
63. Maloto vs. CA February 29, 1988
64. Maninang vs. CA June 19, 1982
65. Maravilla vs. Maravilla February 27, 1971
66. Martinez vs. Ituralde April 29, 1971
67. Matabuena vs. Cervantes March 31, 1971
68. Micinao vs. Brimo November 1, 1924
69. Nepomuceno vs. CA October 9, 1985
70. Nera vs. Rimando February 27, 1914
71. Nuguid vs. Nuguid June 23, 1966
72. Osorio vs. Osorio March 30, 1921
73. Pascual vs. dela Cruz May 30, 1969
74. Pascual vs. dela Cruz May 30, 1969
75. Pascual vs. Pascual March 25, 1992
76. Pastor vs. CA June 24, 1983
77. Paulmitan vs. CA November 25, 1992
78. PCIB vs. Escolin March 29, 1974
79. Ramirez vs. Baltazar August 30, 1968
80. Ramirez vs. Ramirez May 31, 1971
81. Reganon vs. Imperial January 17, 1968
82. Rigor vs. Rigor April 30, 1979
83. Rivera vs. IAC February 15, 1990
84. Robert vs. Leonidas April 27, 1982
85. Rodelas vs. Aranza December 7, 1982
86. Rodriguez vs. de Borja June 21, 1966
87. Rosales vs. Rosales February 27, 1987
88. Roxas vs. De Jesus January 28, 1985
89. Sanson vs. CA February 26, 1988
90. Satillon vs. Miranda June 30, 1975
91. Solivio vs. CA February 12, 1990
92. Sumaya vs. IAC September 2, 1991
93. Unson vs. Abella June 12, 1922
94. Vitug vs. CA March 29, 1990
95. Yambao vs. Gonzales April 29, 1961

PUGSLEY

May 8, 2002, 04:45 AM

A & B, father and daughter. A raped B, 13 years old, five times. A charged with 5 counts of rape.
Information reads: “that on or about December 5, 1997, in the City of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force or intimidation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned, a girl of 13 years of age, against her will.

Court found him guilty and sentenced him to Death for each rape. Was the penalty of death proper?

NO, the relationship of father and daughter must be alleged in the Information. Relationship is a Special Aggravating Qualifying Circumstance.

Under what instances should DEATH be imposed? (QUALIFIED RAPE)
1. When the victim is under 18 years of age and the offended is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of police of military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parents any of the children or other relatives within the 3rd degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with AIDS
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
8. When the offender knows of the pregnancy of the victim at the time of rape.
9. When the offender knows of the mental disability , mental disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of rape.

(PEOPLE VS. LARENA, 309 SCRA 305)
This court has correctly held that these attendant circumstances are in the nature of Special Qualifying Circumstances which unlike generic aggravating circumstances, cannot be considered as such , unless, so alleged in the information, even if proved. In the instant case, the complainants failed to allege the relationship between appellant and the complainant.

While the failure to allege the relationship between accused-appellant and the victim appears to be a mere technically, it nevertheless saves appellant from the supreme penalty of death because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. (PEOPLE vs. ALITAGTAG, 309 SCRA 325; PEOPLE VS. SILVANO, 309 SCRA 362)

PEOPLE VS. RAMOS, 296 SCRA 559: the failure to allege relationship between the accused the offended party in an information for rape is a bar to the imposition of the death penalty. Since relationship is a Qualifying not a mere aggravating circumstance.

Qualifying Aggravating Circumstance – gives the crime its proper name and increases the penalty.
Generic Aggravating Circumstance – merely affects the period of the imposable penalty.

“ Guardian” – the mere fact that Y was merely entrusted to the custody of Carlos, did not constitute the relationship of guardian. At most Carlos was a mere custodian or caretaker of the child over whom he exercised limited authority for a temporary period. PEOPLE VS. GARCIA, 281 SCRA 463, the SC ruled that the term GUARDIAN has a restrictive definition and it refers to a legal or judicial guardian for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. PEOPLE VS. DELA CUESTA, 304 SCRA 83)

blue babe

May 13, 2002, 04:29 PM

hey pugsly!

don't get to log on pex as much, so i just saw your message today. was wondering, do you still have those digests? if you do, please email them to me too at bluebabe82999@yahoo.com. i'm hoping i'll be able to use them for review.

didn't you mention once you were deferring the bar? oh well, i'm so behind in my review, i'm actually tempted. :D

rwchick

May 15, 2002, 05:12 AM

tiyaga naman ng mga gumagawa ng digests! :)

PUGSLEY

May 19, 2002, 03:20 AM

Originally posted by blue babe
hey pugsly!

don't get to log on pex as much, so i just saw your message today. was wondering, do you still have those digests? if you do, please email them to me too at bluebabe82999@yahoo.com. i'm hoping i'll be able to use them for review.

didn't you mention once you were deferring the bar? oh well, i'm so behind in my review, i'm actually tempted. :D

Thanks for your interest.

Sorry for this late reply. Just got back from Puerto Galera.

I only sent you the civil law cases since I've deleted the Consti and Crim cases already.

Are you serious in not taking the bar?

PUGSLEY

May 20, 2002, 02:07 AM

1. A law was passed providing for its immediate effectivity.
a) Does this mean that its immediate effectivity provision would dispense with the publication requirement? (5 points)
b) May the 15-day period of publication be reduced or extended? (5 points)

2. Accused was charged under R.A. 6425 and was sentenced to life imprisonment. While on appeal, RA 7659 reducing the penalty for the offense depending upon the weight was enacted. Can the law be applied to the accused? Why? (5 points)

3. A is the owner of an apartment, which is being leased to B, who has not been paying his rental for the last ten months. A, while B was away, entered into the premises, brought out the things belonging to B and padlocked the premises preventing B from entering into it. B sued for damages. A interposed the defense that he was just exercising his rights as owner of the premised. Decide. (5 points)

4. A and B are married. They have two (2) children, C and D. C is married to X and they have a son E. Y is married to D and they have a daughter F. E and F got married. Is their marriage valid? Why? (5 points)

5. Maria and Luis, both Filipinos, were married by a Catholic priest in Lourdes Church, Quezon City in 1992. Luis was drunk on the day of his wedding. In fact, he slumped at the altar soon after the ceremony. After marriage, Luis never had a steady job because he was drunk most of the time. Finally, he could not get employed at all because of drunkenness. Hence, it was Maria who had to earn a living to support herself and her child begotten by Luis. In 1996, Maria filed a petition for annulment of marriage in the church on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations. Her petition was granted by the church matrimonial court.
a) Can Maria now get married legally to another man under Philippines laws after her marriage to Luis was annulled by the church matrimonial court? Why? (5 points)
b) What must Maria do to enable her to get married lawfully to another man under Philippine laws? (5 points)

6. A and B are married. A has been absent for a period of five (5 ) years without B knowing his whereabouts. B then got married to C, without prior declaration of A’s presumptive death.
a) Is the marriage valid? (5 points)
b) Suppose, in the problem given above, it was A who got married. Is the marriage valid? (5 points)

7. X, and MTC judge of Manila, was invited to attend a marriage celebration in Baguio City. Since Y, the Judge who was suppose to solemnize the marriage was unable to attend , he was asked to solemnize the marriage. Is the marriage valid? Why? (5 points)

8. Suppose A justice of the Court of Appeals who is a resident of Quezon City a marriage in Baguio City while on vacation, is the marriage valid? (5 points)

9. The petitioner while far from home received some information on the acts of infidelity of his wife. So he went home to verify the truthfulness of the alleged infidelity. He sought for his wife and after finding her, convinced her to go with him and live as husband and wife. After two days of living as husband and wife, A, the husband, tried to extract the truth about his wife’s unfaithfulness but B, the wife, instead of answering his query, merely packed up her things and left him. A took that gesture as a confirmation of the imputation.

10. A, a law student courted B, a neighbor. B is married to C, a first-degree cousin. When B informed A of her marriage to C, A told her that nothing would happen to her marriage considering that it is void. A, then persisted in courting B, offering to marry her , until B consented. They got married. After A fathered a child, he left the conjugal dwelling for no reason at all and later on B found that he has gotten married to D. In a disbarment proceeding, he contended that his marriage to B is void, hence, there was no need to have it declared void. Is his contention proper? Why? (10 points)

11. A and B are married. Their marriage was declared void. After the decision became final, A got married to C. is the marriage valid? Why? (10 points)

12. A, an American citizen marriage B, a Filipino, while the former was vacationing in manila. When they went to the US, A was divorced by B due to irreconcilable conflicts. The decree capacitated A to remarry under US laws. Can B get married in the Philippines? Why? (10 points)

13. Is the rule that for as long as there is a valid existing marriage, a person cannot contract a subsequent marriage absolute? Why? (5 points)

bakekang

May 21, 2002, 03:56 AM

I work for a company here in the Philippines that acts as a representative office of a foreign corporation based in another Asian country. We have been granted a "License to Transact Business" by the SEC under the name of our mother company. As such, I believe we are classified as a foreign corporation (please correct me if I am wrong). Given the above, are we (the employees here in the Philippines) covered by the provisions of the Labor Code? In particular:

1. After six months of continuous service, do we automatically become regular employees? None of us signed any employment contract. I'm afraid they can terminate our services whenever they see fit, and worse, do that and not give us any separation pay.

2. Are we entitled to 13th month pay in December? There is an item in our payslip called incentive allowance. We get this every month and they say part of it is our 13th month pay. Indeed, the incentive allowance that we receive can very well cover our 13th month pay, with a little more to spare. Is this valid?

3. Our company does not deduct any withholding tax and SSS/Philhealth contributions. Is this legal?

4. We do not enjoy the same benefits (eg. retirement plan, health insurance) that employees in our mother company enjoy. Is this legal?

Please advise. I'd like to know what our rights are as employees in this particular case. I am specially concerned about security of tenure.

I went through the Labor Code and Corporation Code of the Philippines but couldn't get the specific answers that I need. Are there any other Codes that I should look up for reference?

Thanks in advance.

PUGSLEY

May 28, 2002, 10:37 AM

WILLS AND SUCCESSION
Final Exams

1. The testator T is survived by his widow W, his legitimate children A and B and his illegitimate children C, D, E and F. The net value of his estate is P 40,000.00. What is the legitime of each of the survivors? (5 pts.)

2. A dies intestate, leaving P 60,000.00 worth of properties. His widow B gave birth to a son, C, 6 months after A’s death, C died 48 hours after he was born. The widow died 24 hours after the death of the child. The inheritance left by A is now claimed by the legitimate parents of A and by the legitimate parents of B. There are no other relatives. Who are entitled to the inheritance? Reasons? (10 pts.)

3. The value of the testator’s estate at the time of his death is P 40,000.00. However, the claim against his estate based on obligations incurred by him during his lifetime amounted to P 10,000.00. During his lifetime, he had also made 2 donations – P 15,000.00 to a legitimate child, A and another P 15,000.00 to a friend, F. In his will, he instituted his 2 legitimate children A and B as his heirs. How shall his estate be distributed? (5 pts.)

4. X, prior to his death, executed a will wherein he gives to his legitimate children A and B only their legitime. He bequeath P 5,000.00 to a friend R as remuneration for past services, P 10,000.00 to S for support, P 15,000.00 to E for Education, and P 10,000 to F as ordinary legacy. The net value of his estate is only P 40,000.00. How shall the estate be distributed? (5 pts.)

5. X died intestate survived by A, B, C, D and E his legitimate children; F, G, H and I legitimate children of B; J and K, legitimate children of C; L and M legitimate children of D; and N and O legitimate children of E. B, C, D and E however are incapacitated to inherit form X. If the net value of the hereditary estate is P 4000,000, how shall it be divided? Reasons. (5 pts.)

6. Suppose that in the above problem, B, C, D, and E have the necessary capacity to inherit from X but they repudiated their inheritance, how shall the P 400,00.00 estate be divided? ( 5pts)

7. Suppose that in the above problem, all the children of X are incapacitated to inherit from him how shall the P 400,000.00 estate be divided? (5pts.)

8. Suppose that in the above problem, all of the children of X have the necessary capacity to inherit from him but all of them repudiated their inheritance, how shall the P 400,000.00 estate be divided? (5 pts.)

9. X died intestate in 1986. In his will, he instituted as heirs his 4 legitimate children, A, B, C and D to inherit in equal shares. B and C however died before X. B is survived by 2 legitimate children, E and F, while C is also survived by 2 legitimate children, G and H. D, on the other hands, survived, but repudiated his inheritance. He has 2 legitimate children of his own, I and J. The net value of the estate is P 120,000.00. How shall this estate be distributed? (10 pts.)

10. Suppose that X, in the above problem died intestate, how shall the distribution be made? (10 pts.)

11. X died intestate, survived by the following: his widow Y; his legitimate children A and B’ and his illegitimate child C. The net value of the estate is P 140,000.00. How shall the distribution be made? (5 pts.)

12. A died without a will survived by his widow W; his legitimate brothers B and C and his nephews E and R who are the children of a deceased sister D. The net remained of his estate is P 24,000.00. How shall the estate be distributed? (5 pts.)

13. A has 5 brothers. B a brother of the full blood and C, D, E and F, brothers of the half blood. A died intestate survived by C and E. B, D and F predeceased him, but B is survived by his legitimate children, G and H; D is survived by his legitimate children I and J and F is survived by his legitimate children, K and L. The net value of his estate is P 120,000.00. Divide the estate. (5 pts.)

14. Suppose that in the above problem, not only B, D and F but even C and E predeceased A, and the only survivors are the 6 nephews G, H, I, J, K, and L, how shall the estate be divided? (5 pts.)

15. X died intestate survived by A, B D, and E his legitimate children; F and G , legitimate children of C, a legitimate son of X who predeceased him; H and I legitimate children of D; and J and K legitimate children of E. D, however, is incapacitated to inherit from X because of an act of unworthiness, while E repudiated his inheritance. If the net value of the hereditary estate is P 120,000.00, how shall it be divided? (5 pts.)

16. When A returned from Manila, he caught his wife W committing adultery with his own brother B. The two were convicted as a result of a criminal action brought by A against them for adultery. A few days after, A died without a will, leaving considerable properties. His only surviving relatives are W; B; C and D, first cousins. Who shall inherit from him? (10 pts.)

PUGSLEY

May 29, 2002, 06:29 AM

1. While the Governor of the Province of Palpalaran was on official trip in the United States, the Sangguniang Panalalawigan passed a resolution donating ten parcels of provincial lots. During a meeting of all provincial officials called by the Governor to discuss the matter, the provincial legal officer defended the Sanggunian Resolution. Thereupon, the governor hired a private lawyer to file a case to annul the donation. A compromise agreement was reached. The lawyer filed a notice of attorney’s lien. The province opposed on the ground that the payment of attorney’s fees to respondent is prohibited by law.

a. Rule on the opposition. (5pts.)
b. When may a municipality hire a private lawyer? (5 pts.)

2. The Baguio City Council passed a resolution authorizing the City Mayor to round up all the so-called Magsaysay “express girls,” commercial sex workers plying their trade along Magsaysay Avenue, and relocate them to Smokey Mountain in Irisan. Pro-pro, one of the sex workers wants to go to court to have the ordinance declared null and void.

a. If you were Pro-pro’s counsel, on what ground would you advise your client to challenge the validity of the resolution? (5 pts.)
b. If you were the City Legal Officer, how would you justify the resolution? (5 pts.)
c. If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? (5 pts.)

3. The Congress of the Philippines enacted RA 987654 creating the municipality of Land of Gays. Ten of the proposed component barangays were dismembered from the Municipality of Kalalakihan while the other ten, from the Municipality of Kababaihan. The RA excluded the voters from the other barangays of the municipalities of Kalalakihan and Kababaihan from participating in the plebiscite to ratify RA 987654.

a. Is the law constitutional? (5 pts.)
b. Assuming that a plebiscite was held and officials of the new municipality have already been appointed as provided for by law, may a petition be filed challenging the constitutionality of the law? (5 pts.)

4. The Municipality of Agaw-Lupa filed 2 expropriation cases to acquire two parcels of land for its project on the production of silkworms. The trial court ruled in favor of the Municipality. Anak-Pawis, the private owner of the lot appealed to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to suspend the proceedings until after the municipality shall have obtained approval from the DAR to classify the properties from agricultural to non-agricultural.

a. Comment on the action of the CA. (5 pts.)
b. How does a local government unit exercise it power of expropriation? (5 pts.)

5. Acting on the recommendation of a researcher who found out that 2/3 of texters have become hopelessly poor spellers, the municipal council of Bagyo-Lagi enacted an ordinance prohibiting the sale of text-cable cellphones within its jurisdiction. The ordinance was submitted to the Municipal Mayor for his approval. On the 14th day after his receipt of the ordinance, the Mayor communicated to the council his veto on the ground that the ordinance was ultra-vires.

a. Is the ordinance valid? (5 pts.)
b. Was the veto of the City Mayor effective? (5 pts.)
c. Does the Punong Barangay exercise veto powers? If so, on what grounds? (5 pts.)

6. Without an authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Hikahos, Governor Erap Napakahirap entered into a contract of lease with a corporation over a portion of the provincial road. For five years, the corporation had been religiously paying its rentals to the province of Hikahos. In 1998, Upstart, a neophyte member of the SP filed a resolution urging the Governor to file an action to declare null and void the contract of lease. It was unanimously approved. The province through the governor filed the action. The corporation opposed alleging that since the province had been receiving the rental payments, it is deemed to have ratified the contract.

a. Rule on the opposition. (5 pts.)
b. Would your answer be the same if Gov. Erap entered into a contract of lease for the corporation to operate the public market? (5 pts.)

7. Pursuant to RA 7279 (An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program), the City of Dahil sa Iyo passed an ordinance requiring all of its residents who own lands more than 100 hectares within the municipality to donate 10% thereof to the poor and underprivileged as identified by the LGU. Bwakaw, a landed resident challenged the law. The City Legal Officer defended the ordinance saying it is a legitimate exercise of police power and is sanctioned by the General Welfare Clause of RA 7160. Rule on the claim of the City Legal Officer.

8. The City of Kuko Ng Agila sponsored a Search for Mr. Kuko Ng Agila. One of the candidates was Ruben Padilla who joined the search thinking it could be his ticket to becoming the next “lover boy” of Philippine cinema. The City constructed a float of substandard material to be used by all the 50 candidates during the parade, which was to open the closing activity for the search. As soon as the last candidate stepped on the float’s loading platform, it collapsed. Ruben Padilla was the first to fall. The other candidates fell on him. To make a tragic long story short, he died on his way to his dream. Is the City liable for his death? (5 pts.)

9. Mr. Laging Lasing is the driver of the public market van, which is owned and operated by the municipality of Walang Budget. While driving the van owned by the public market, Mr. Lasing collided with a Philippine Rabbit Bus. It was established that the van was in poor condition.

10. Write a 50-word essay on the topic: Why is Local Autonomy a Boon to Municipal Corporations? (10 pts.)

PUGSLEY

May 30, 2002, 11:34 AM

1. What are the requisites before income received by way of pension may be excluded from the taxable income of a taxpayer? Discuss each requisite briefly.

2. What are the inherent powers of a sovereign authority? How will you compare and distinguish one from the other?

3. What do you understand by the concept of a corporation as provided for under the National Internal Revenue Code? Illustrate.

4. For purposes of determining taxability of income, what is the effect of the discharge or release of an indebtedness? Discuss.

5. Where by reason of an accident, recovery is both for loss of profit and personal injuries will the amounts actually recovered income? Are they taxable?

6. What is meant by double taxation? Is double taxation prohibited? Discuss.

7. What is the legal basis for the delegation by the Legislature of the power of taxation to local government? Explain.

8. What are the distinctions between income and capital? Discuss each distinction briefly.

9. What incomes are taxable under our income tax law?

PUGSLEY

Jun 1, 2002, 08:29 AM

1. Two police officers, while walking along Session Road, Baguio City, heard two gunshots and proceeded to the direction of the gunshots. They saw Benny firing a gun. Upon seeing the police officers, Benny ran to the house of Anton a few meters away. When asked about the whereabouts of Benny, Anton who was then outside his house told the police officers that Benny had escaped through the back door. Upon noticing the bulging waist of Anton, the police officers frisked him and found in his possession an unlicensed firearm. Thereafter, the policemen entered the house of Anton and found in the sala another unlicensed firearm in open view. When prosecuted for illegal possession of the two firearm, Anton challenged the admissibility of the firearms on the ground that they had been illegally seized. Decide. (5 pts.)

2. Two police officers were walking along Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City. They chanced upon two persons (A and B) standing “side by side” with one holding his abdomen. After seeing the police officers coming, the two immediately walked away. The police officers ran after the two and bodily searched them. An unlicensed firearm was found in the possession of B. When prosecuted for illegal possession of firearm, B objected to the admission of the firearm as a fruit of illegal search. Decide (5 pts.)

3. In September 1992, the Philippine National Police Maritime Command of Palawan received reports that a boat and several “craft” were fishing by “muro ami” within the shoreline of Palawan. The police headed by SPO3 Enriquez, immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing in a bid fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson. Hey boarded the boat and with the acquiescence of the boat captain, inspected the boat and found it had no permit to fish within the coastal waters of Palawan without Mayor’s permit. The police officers brought the boat and the crew to the city harbor for further investigation. Upon arrival at the harbor, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish from the boat for laboratory examination and found to have been laced with cyanide. Under PD 704, penalizing illegal fishing, it provides that “mere possession of fish caught by poisonous substance (such as cyanide) is a “presumption “ that the owner, operator, fisherman were fishing with the use of poisonous substance. Consequently, the boat captain and crew were charged for violation of PD 704.

During the trial, the accused objected to the admission of the “fish laced with cyanide” contending that is was a fruit of illegal search. (5 pts.)

Likewise, they also assailed the presumption under PD 704 as a violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence. (5 pts.) Decide

4. The Movie and TV Classification/Review Board is empowered under a law to require television stations to submit to the Board any program or material for review an approval before the same could be aired or viewed on TV. “Simbahan ni Cristo”, a religious denomination, has a TV program and submitted the tape to the Board in compliance with the law. The Board disapproved the tape for viewing on the ground that the contents of the tape contain portions which attack a particular religion. The had of the “Simbahan ni Cristo” challenged the decision of the Board on the following ground:
a. The law empowering the Board to review the tape is a from of censorship constituting prior restrain outlawed under the freedom of religion and expression. (5 pts.)
b. The exposition of religious ideas and doctrines even if derogatory to the belief of another religion is within the ambit of religious freedom. (5 pts.) Discuss the validity of the arguments.

5. In one of the typhoons that hit Central Luzon, the President of the Philippines ordered the evacuation of residents of Barangay Mexico, Bacolor, Pampanga to a temporary resettlement area to protect the residents from the onslaught of lahar. Mr. T. Anga, a law student of SLU, but residing in the area, questioned the evacuation on the ground that it is violative of his constitutional right. What constitutional right is he referring to? Is there a violation of such right? (5 pts.)

6. On March 17, 1997, one typewriter was found missing in the office of Atty. Hernandez, the Baguio City Auditor. An administrative investigation was conducted and A, B and C, the only employees in the office, were invited to shed light on the loss of the typewriter. When his turn came, C refused to talk and claimed that he could not be subjected to inquiry, as it would violate his right against self-incrimination. Is he correct? (5 pts.)

7. Differentiate “use immunity” from “transactional immunity” (5 pts.)

8. Explain the ruling in TAN vs. BARRIOS (October 18, 1990) (5 pts.)

9. Atty. Taulava, a bar topnotcher, and Alvarado, an illiterate, were arrested by police officers on suspicion of being involved in the killing of Atty. Asi committed a week earlier. On the way to the police station, and inside the police car, Atty. Taulava, on questioning of the police admitted owning the ballpen left at the scene of the crime. Alvarado likewise admitted owning the wallet which was also found at the scene of the crime. During the trail, the prosecution presented to the witness stand the police officer to whom Atty. Taulava and Alvarado made the admission. Atty. Taulava, acting as lawyer for himself and Alvarado, objected to the admission of the testimony on the ground that at the time the admission (his and that of Alvarado), they were not accorded their "Miranda" rights.

a) Is he correct? (5 pts.)
b) Is there a difference as the Miranda rights of Atty. Taulava and that of Alvarado? (5 pts.)

10. A was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio for murder for the killing of B. A filed a motion for bail but his motion was denied by the trial court on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong. After arraignment and trial, A was found guilty of homicide. A appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals. And at the same time filed a motion for bail
a) Is A entitled to bail? Reasons. (5 pts.)
b) May A be convicted of murder? Reasons. (3 pts.)
c) If so, is there no double jeopardy considering that when A was convicted of homicide by the trial court, in effect he was acquitted of the murder charge? Reasons. (2 pts.)

11. A criminal information for frustrated murder was filed against A before the RTC of Baguio for the foiled killing of B. After plea of not guilty, the court proceeded to trial. Ten hearing days were allotted to the prosecution to present its evidence. Because of the repeated postponements requested by both the accused and the prosecution, trial did not proceed on those scheduled hearing days. Trial was again set for hearing. On the date set, prosecution could not proceed due to absence of the witness who was sick at that time. A moved for the dismissal of the case against him on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. Over the objection of the prosecution, the court granted the motion. The prosecution elevated the propriety of the dismissal before the appellate court. A moved for the dismissal of the appeal invoking double jeopardy. How would the appellate court rule on the contention of A? (5 pts.)

12. Alex was convicted by the RTC of Baguio for the rape and murder of Alice. The heinous crime law mandates that the imposable penalty is death. The judge in his decision, citing his religious belief that he cannot impose the death penalty, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead. The accused immediately started to serve sentence. The prosecution, on a question of law, elevated the impropriety of sentence imposed by the Judge before the Court of Appeals. The accused opposed the action of the prosecution, claiming that would place him in double jeopardy. Is he correct? Reasons. (5 pts.)

13. After A was arraigned for theft, the hearing was set for January 27 and 28, 1999. On January 27, when accused and counsel did not appear, the prosecution asked that the hearing for 27 and 28 be cancelled and that the case be reset for February 4, 1999. But on January 26, 1999, the case was called for hearing. Only the prosecutor was present and he had no witnesses. The case was dismissed by the Court for failure to prosecute. On February 9, 1999, the Court recalled dismissal order and reset the case for hearing. The defense opposed on the ground that the dismissal of the case on January 28, 1999 was without the consent of the accused and therefore a bar to a subsequent prosecution.

a. Was the dismissal correct? If no, for what legal ground? (5 pts.)
b. Assuming that the dismissal was granted on motion of the accused on the ground of speedy trial, would your answer be the same? (5 pts.)

14. The Supreme Court has evolved and adopted the following tests in the determination as to the validity of any law, ordinance, regulation, and/or governmental action with respect to any from of expression, to wit:

a) Dangerous Tendency Rule
b) Clear and Present Danger Rule
c) Balancing of Interest Rule

Explain the foregoing test. What specific form of expression do they apply? (10 pts.)

sedfrey

Jun 1, 2002, 03:38 PM

Originally posted by bakekang
I work for a company here in the Philippines that acts as a representative office of a foreign corporation based in another Asian country. We have been granted a "License to Transact Business" by the SEC under the name of our mother company. As such, I believe we are classified as a foreign corporation (please correct me if I am wrong). Given the above, are we (the employees here in the Philippines) covered by the provisions of the Labor Code? In particular:

A foreign corporation is either:
a. A corporation incorporated in a foreign country under such laws
b. A corporation which is owned and controlled by foreigners even if it is incorporated under Philippine laws

For our purposes, I think the "place of incorporation test" is relevant. However, the distinction between a Foreign Corporation and a National Corporation is important only for purposes of jurisdiction, in cases wherein which the corporation will be involved. For instance, a foreign corp licensed to operate in RP may sue in RP courts. Without a license to operate, the foreign corp may not sue in RP courts but it may be sued in RP courts.

However, for purposes of coverage under the Labor Code, the distinction is not relevant. Hence, Philippine Labor Laws will apply to you.

1. After six months of continuous service, do we automatically become regular employees? None of us signed any employment contract. I'm afraid they can terminate our services whenever they see fit, and worse, do that and not give us any separation pay.

Yes, you become regular after six months. A contract is the meeting of the minds between the parties on a particular object with a consideration. It is not the piece of paper that you sign to evidence the contract. There is an existing contract of employment even though there is no written contract evidencing it. The indicators of an employer-employee relationship are:

Selection - were you selected by the corp to work?
Wages - are you paid wages?
Dismissal - can the corp dismiss you?
Control - can the company control the manner by which you do your work?

If the answer to all four questions are "yes" then you are an employee, even in the absence of a written contract.

2. Are we entitled to 13th month pay in December? There is an item in our payslip called incentive allowance. We get this every month and they say part of it is our 13th month pay. Indeed, the incentive allowance that we receive can very well cover our 13th month pay, with a little more to spare. Is this valid?

Yes. The only requirement on the 13th month pay is that it should be given before December 24 of a year. So it can probably be given by installment.

3. Our company does not deduct any withholding tax and SSS/Philhealth contributions. Is this legal?

No, the SSS is compulsory upon all employers and their employees.

4. We do not enjoy the same benefits (eg. retirement plan, health insurance) that employees in our mother company enjoy. Is this legal?

Yes. This is because the mother corporation is a different entity from the representative office.

I went through the Labor Code and Corporation Code of the Philippines but couldn't get the specific answers that I need. Are there any other Codes that I should look up for reference?

Everything is in the Labor Code and the Corporation Code. If you need specific citations, you can call up the DOLE and the SEC.

PUGSLEY

Jun 2, 2002, 02:35 AM

sedfrey:

You shouldn't have answered that query....I purposely did not....

How can one read through the Labor Code and the Corporation Code without having the answers to the query posted?

blue babe

Jun 2, 2002, 09:08 PM

pugsley:

no. i wish, but unfortunately, i do not have the luxury of staying unemployed for another year. i've decided that i CANNOT do 5 readings... (the lecturer in ateneo suggests 5 readings) :) which of course, is no shock to anyone, including myself. i've also decided that quality is better than quantity. (just trying to console myself). so i'm pretending that i'm doing okay by really reading the materials well as opposed to reading it over and over again. but seriously, i cannot do more than 200 pages a day. its much much too much work for me.

rwchick: oo noh! sobrang chaga... recruit nyo sha sa barops!!! btw, ano na nangyari sa mga reviewers?? :D

PUGSLEY

Jun 4, 2002, 06:08 AM

Bluebabe: Just do your best!!!

To all law students:

I'm willing to help you digest your cases. Only you have to give the citations to me at least a week before they are due.....I think that's fair enough.

PUGSLEY

Jun 7, 2002, 05:08 AM

PEOPLE VS. TAN
323 SCRA 30

FACTS:
1. Complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a 1987 Mitsubishi Gallant four-door valued at P 420,000.00.
2. Sometime in March 1992, accused Alvin Tan was introduced to Philip and from then on, Philip and Alvin became friends and started to see each other on several occasions.
3. On November 7, 1992, Alvin made it known to Philip that he was intending to buy Philip’s car and that he wanted to test-drive it.
4. On account of their friendship and believing Alvin’s assurance that he would return the car after he shall have test driven it, Philip granted Alvin’s request.
5. On thus getting hold of the car, Alvin sped away and never returned it.
6. In vain, Philip waited for Alvin to show up and return the car; Alvin simply id not show up, much less case the return of the car.
7. Philip started to call up and look for Alvin but the latter avoided him by refusing to answer the telephone calls or pretending he was not around.
8. On June 2, 1993, Philip finally lodged a complaint against Alvin before the Quezon City police station.
9. Alvin Tan was prosecuted and convicted violating R.A No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law)
10. On appeal, the CA affirmed
11. The CA adopted the theory of the Solicitor-General that Philip had entrusted his car to Alvin merely for test driving, and the latter initially received the same for that purpose only; Alvin must perforce be deemed to have unlawfully “taken” the car soon after the test-driving for he failed to show-up and return said vehicle.
12. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is Alvin is guilty of carnapping.

HELD:
There is no arguing that the Anti-Carnapping law is a special law, different from the crimes of Robbery and Theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of Robbery and Theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter’s consent. However, the Anti-Carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence, a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner’s consent, whether the taking was done with or without violence or intimidation of persons or with or without the use of force upon things. Without the Anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute.

The Supreme Court finds that there was no unlawful taking. A felonious taking may de defined as the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of movable property without his privity and consent and without animus revertandi. Thus, an unlawful taking takes place when the owner or juridical possessor does not give his consent to the taking; or if the consent was given, it was vitiated; or where an act by the receiver soon after the actual transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking. In the last scenario, the receiver’s act could be considered as having been executed without the consent of the giver.

Philip’s testimony clearly evidenced his assent to Alvin’s taking of the car not only at the time he yielded the physical possession thereof, for the alleged test-driving but even thereafter, for he neither withheld his consent nor withdrew the same during the seven month period the car was with Alvin. At the very least, Philip tolerated Alvin's possession of the car. A contrary conclusion inspires only disbelief. For if the car was truly carnapped, why did Philip wait for seven months before he reported the same? Further, Alvin’s alleged refusal to meet Philip despite his repeated attempts to do so should have sufficiently alerted him of the former's supposed malevolent intent, yet he still did not report the taking. Even if he failed to report the taking, months after the alleged test driving, he had allegedly seen his car in the initial stages of dismemberment on May 19, 1993 yet, again, he did not report the carnapping on that day nor of the next, but much later on June 7, 1993 or almost a months thereafter.

Philip’s behavior immediately preceding, contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged unlawful taking was definitely not the distraught conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He was even able to register the averred stolen vehicle without sounding the alarm.

Could it be possible that Alvin and Philip were lovers? :lol:

chicker_acu

Jun 7, 2002, 12:56 PM

SAN BEDA LAW!!!!!

PUGSLEY

Jun 10, 2002, 10:57 PM

GARCIA VS. COMELEC
237 SCRA 279

FACTS:
1. In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the Municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
2. Petitioners, headed by Gov. Enrique T. Garcia, filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul the Resolution.
3. The Municipality took no action within 30 days after its submission hence petitioners resolved to the power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991.
4. Unknown to the petitioners, Edilberto de Leon – the Vice-Mayor and Presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong wrote the executive Director of Comelec requesting denial of the petition for local initiative and a referendum because the exercise would just promote division, counter productivity and futility.
5. The Comelec en banc denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject was “merely a resolution and not an ordinance”.
6. A petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed with the SC.
7. The Comelec opposed the petitioner because it contended that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative.
8. The respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong assumes the same stance.

ISSUE:
Is a Pambayanang Kapasyahan a proper subject matter of an initiative.

HELD:
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subject of a local initiative. Sec. 32 of Art. VI provides in luminous language: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act of law or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body….” An act includes a Resolution.

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subject of initiative was implement by congress when it enacted RA 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore.” Thus, its Section 31-A expressly includes resolutions as subject of initiative on local legislation.

It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. “If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the words, or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible to two or more construction, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used.

PUGSLEY

Jun 12, 2002, 03:28 AM

GUILDELINES FOR 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS

III. COVERAGE (This examination covers decisions of the Supreme Court, promulgated up to June 30, 2001; Republic Acts, Presidential Decrees, and Executive Orders, promulgated up to December 31, 2000)

A. Political Law and Public International Law
1. Constitutional Law
2. Political Law
3. Administrative Law (Basic)
EXCLUDE: Implementing Rules and Regulations of Different Agencies
4. Law on Suffrage (Election Laws)
5. Law on Public Officers
a. Party-List Law (RA No. 7941) – decisions of the Supreme Court
b. Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg. 881)
c. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (RA No. 6646)
d. RA No. 1766 – AN Act providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms
6. Public Corporation
INCLUDE: Local Government Code (Basics)
7. Public International law

B. Labor standards/Termination Law and Social Legislation
1. Labor Standards Law
a. Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended), Book I, II, II, VI, and VII
b. Thirteenth (13th) Month Pay Law (PD No. 851 as amended)
2. Labor Relations Law
a. Labor Code of the Philippines, PD no. 442, as amended, Book V and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines
b. Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees, etc. (Executive Order No. 180, June 1, 1987) Two Notice Rule
3. Social Legislation
a. Social Security Act of 1997 (RA No. 8282)
b. Government Service Insurance Act of 1997 (RA No. 8291)
c. Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (RA no. 7877)
EXCLUDE:
a. Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund, Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442 as amended)
b. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA No. 6657) (1988)
c. All other Labor Laws and Social Legislation Acts not included in 1 and 2 above

C. Civil Law
1. Civil Code of the Philippines
INCLUDE: The law on Sales of Subdivision Lots (PD No. 957) and the Condominium Act (RA No. 4726)
EXCLUDE:
a. Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD No. 1083)
b. Water Code (PD No. 1067)
c. The Rental Law (BP Blg. 25 and amendments)
d. Intellectual Property Law

2. The Family Code of the Philippines
EXCLUDE: Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603)
3. Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529)
INCLUDE: (Public Land Law (CA 141)
4. Conflict of Laws (Private International Law)
D. Taxation
a. General Principles of Taxation
b. National Internal Revenue Code
INCLUDE: Comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1997 – Provisions already in effect
EXCLUDE: Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
EXCLUDE: Percentage Taxes, Excise Taxes, and Documentary Stamp Taxes
c. Tariff and Customs Code
EXCLUDE: Arrastre Classification of Commodities
d. Republic Act NO. 1125, Creating the Court of ax Appeals
e. The Local Government Code on Taxation
f. Local Taxation and Real Property Taxation (Basics)

E. Mercantile Law
1. Code of Commerce
a. Merchants and Commercial Transactions ( Arts. 1-63)
b. Letters of Credit under the Code of Commerce (Arts. 567-572)
INCLUDE:
a. Bulk Sales Law (Act No. 3952)
b. The Warehouse Receipt Law (Act No. 2137 in relation to the General Bonded Warehouse Act (Act No. 3893)
c. Presidential Decree 115 on Trust Receipts
2. Negotiable Instruments Law (Act No. 2031)
3. Insurance Code (PD NO. 1460)
INCLUDE: Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (RA No. 3591)
4. Transportation Laws
a. Common Carriers (Civil Code, Arts. 1732-1766)
b. Commercial Contracts for Transportation Overland (Code of Commerce, Arts. 349-37 )
c. Maritime Commerce (code of Commerce, Arts. 673-736; also Arts. 580-584 of Code of Commerce, as superseded by RA no. 6106; Arts. 806-845 of Code of Commerce; Par. 6 of Section 3 of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Com Act 65), Warsaw Convention
d. Public Service Act (Com Act No. 146), as amended
5. Corporation Law
a. The Corporation Code (BP Blg. 68)
b. The Securities Regulation Code (RA No. 8799)
c. Banking Laws
d. The New Central Bank Act (RA No. 7653) (Basics)
e. Law on Secrecy of Bank deposits (RA No. 1405, as amended)
6. Special Laws
a. The Chattel Mortgage Law (Act 1508 in relation to Arts. 1484, 1485, 2140, 2141, of the Civil Code)
b. Real estate Mortgage Law (Act no. 3135, as amended BY RA no. 4118)
c. The Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956)
d. Truth in Lending Act (RA No. 3765)

F. Criminal Law
1. The Revised Penal Code (Books I and II)
EXCLUDE: Penalties for specific felonies
2. Indeterminate Sentence Law
3. Probation Law
4. Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019, as amended)
5. Anti-Fencing Law (PD No. 1612)
6. Bouncing Check Law (BP 22)
7. Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA No. 6425, as amended)
8. Heinous Crimes Act (RA No. 7659)
9. Sandiganbayan Law (RA 6770)

G. Remedial Law
1. 1997 Rules of Court as amended
2. revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000)
3. The 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure
4. Local Government Code on Conciliation Procedure ( Book III, Tile I, Chapter 7)
5. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP Blg 129, as amended by RA no. 7691. And rules issued thereunder, (Emphasis on jurisdiction excluding purely administrative provisions)
6. Judiciary Act no 1948
EXCLUDE:
a. PD No. 946 (Reorganizing CAR)
b. Military Justice
INCLUDE: Appearance of Private Prosecutors in Criminal Case
7. Rules on Evidence
8. Special Proceedings
9. Sandiganbayan Law (RA 6770)

H. Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
1. Code of Judicial Conduct
2. Code of Professional Responsibility
3. Grievance Procedures (Rule 139-b, Rules of Court)
4. Legal Forms

PUGSLEY

Jun 13, 2002, 06:24 AM

LLORENTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
345 SCRA 592

FACTS:
1. Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.
2. Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married on February 22, 1937.
3. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo left for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
4. Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship in November 30, 1943.
5. In 1945 Lorenzo went back to the Philippines to visit his wife.
6. Lorenzo discovered that his wife was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
7. Paula gave birth to a boy with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.
8. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and to live with her.
9. Lorenzo and Paula drew a written agreement, providing among others that they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
10. Lorenzo returned to the US and in November 1951 filed for divorce.
11. The divorce decree became final on December 1952.
12. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958.
13. Alicia had no knowledge of the 1st marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
14. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife from 1958 to 1985.
15. Their 25-year union produced 3 children.
16. In March 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament, which was notarized.
17. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his properties to Alicia and their three children.
18. In December 1983, Lorenzo filed with the RCT a petition for probate and allowance of his will praying that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
19. The trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator was still alive.
20. In January 1984, the court admitted the will to probate finding that the will was duly executed.
21. On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated Lorenzo died.
22. In September 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition for letter of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.
23. Paula contended a) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, b) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, c) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime of one-half share in the conjugal property.
24. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding a petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
25. Without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition.
26. The order was published in the newspaper “Bicol Star.”
27. The RTC held that a) the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the Philippines; b) the marriage he contracted with Alicia is likewise void and is not entitled to receive any share from the testate having gained the statue of a paramour; c) the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo is void; d) Paula being a conjugal partner is entitled to ½ of their conjugal property, as primary compulsory heir, also entitled to 1/3 of the estate; e) 1/3 of the estate should go to the illegitimate children
28. Alicia filed with the trial court a Motion for reconsideration.
29. The trial court denied Alicia’s motion but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.
30. Amending its decision, the trial court declared Beverly as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo entitled to 1/3 of the estate and 1/3 of the free portion of the estate.
31. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision declaring that Alicia is a co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the 25 years of cohabitation.
32. Petition filed with the CA a Motion for Reconsideration.
33. The CA denied the motion.
34. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the 2nd marriage valid?

HELD:
The fact that the late Lorenzo Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from Paula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will; and 4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

In VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO (139 SCRA 139), the SC held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in QUITA vs. CA (309 SCRA 406), that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in VAN DORN would become applicable and petitioner could “very well lose her right to inherit” from him.

In PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA (174 SCRA 653), the SC recognized the divorce obtained by respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, the Court state that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply this doctrines, the decision of the CA is reversed. The SC holds that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters left to the determination of the trial court.

The clear intent of Lorezno to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. The SC does not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “Family rights and duties, statues, condition and legal capacity.”

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2002, 07:48 AM

FRANCISCO JR. VS. BOSA
205 SCRA 722

FACTS:
1. Brothers Juan Jr. and Joram Francisco initiated before the Supreme Court an administrative case for the disbarment of Attys. Antonio Bosa and Jesus Bandong.
2. Atty. Bosa was the counsel for the complainants in a civil case appealed to the Court of Appeals.
3. Atty. Bosa was charged for his failure to notify his clients of the unfavorable decision of said appellate court.
4. Complainants alleged that his negligence resulted in the loss of their right to appeal which eventually led to the loss of 28 hectares of land which should have been adjudicated to them.
5. Joram testified that in a telegram he was requested by his brother Juan to verify the status of their case pending before the Court of Appeals.
6. At the CA, he discovered to his consternation that a decision in their case was promulgated and that a copy thereof was received by their counsel Atty. Bosa.
7. Joram wired Atty. Bosa to appeal the case before the SC.
8. Atty. Bosa wired back suggesting they engage the services of another lawyer. By this time, two months had passed from the time Atty. Bosa received a copy of the decision.
9. Joram again requested Atty. Bosa to file the petition for review before the SC but the request was ignored.
10. Juan thus engaged the service of Atty. Moralde to take care of the case.
11. Petition filed by the second lawyer was however denied due course by the SC for being filed out of time.
12. Juan narrated that when he met Atty. Bosa, respondent told him he sent a telegram through Teodoro Balarete and since he received no reply, he presumed that the Francisco’s were no longer interested in appealing the case.
13. Atty. Jesus Bandong on the other hand is being charged for his failure to forward to the Court of Appeals with his letter of transmittal, the transcript of stenographic notes of the pre-trial proceedings and hearing on July 1, 1977 and June 25, 1981 in the civil Case, which transcripts, according to complainants, were vital to their case.
14. The Francisco brothers testified that Atty. Bandong as Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cataingan, Masbate falsified the minutes of the pre-trail proceedings because the signatures of Attys. Pecson and Almario were forged.
15. For his defense, Atty. Bandong said that since he did not prepare the minutes of the July 1, 1977 pre-trail in the Civil Case, it would be impossible for him to falsify said documents alleging that it is usually the court interpreter who prepares the minutes.
16. Atty. Bandong denied any knowledge of the missing transcript of stenographic notes taken during the June 25, 1981 hearing when he prepared the letter of transmittal to the CA.

ISSUE:
Were the lawyers remiss in their duties.

HELD:
No matter how much Atty. Antonio Bosa tries to disclaim negligence on his part in failing to appeal the case, the evidence indicates otherwise. It is true that the respondent counsel sent to his client by telegram the information on the adverse decision in the case, yet he never checked whether the telegram reached its intended addressee. In this regard, he failed to exercise due diligence required of a counsel. A lawyer handling the case must give his entire devotion to the interest of his client. He must not do acts detrimental to the cause of his client. Neither shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him for his negligence therewith shall render him liable.

Public interest requires that an attorney must exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his clients cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain AND respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

An examination of the records shows that while not listed in the letter of transmittal, transcripts of stenographic notes of July 1, 1977 were actually part of the transcripts transmitted to the appellate court. Thus, complainant’s cause could not have been affected by this slight error. However, the non-inclusion of the transcripts of stenographic notes of June 25, 1891 is an entirely different matter.

Had Atty. JB given the records a thorough examination, he would have come across the order of Judge Alfin S. Vicencio wherein the court-noted testimony of Juan Francisco taken on June 25, 1981. From such fact, he could have noted the absence of and he should have searched for the transcript of June 25, 1981. Not having done this, he failed to exercise the due care required of him.

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2002, 07:51 AM

PEOPLE VS. NARVASA
298 SCRA 637

ISSUES:

What crime/s are committed when a killing is perpetrated with the use of an unlicensed firearm?

In the absence of the firearms themselves, may illegal possession of firearms be proven by parol evidence?

HELD:

In PEOPLE VS. LUALHATI (234 SCRA 325), the SC merely stated that the existence of the firearm must be established ; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be presented as evidence. Thus , in PEOPLE VS. OREHUELA (232 SCRA 82) , the Court held that the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said firearm.

Under RA 8294, if Homicide or Murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In PEOPLE VS. MOLINA (July 22, 1998), the Court en banc explained that RA 8294 considers the use of an unlicensed firearm only an aggravating circumstance in Murder or Homicide.

Under RA 8294, appellants can he held liable only for Homicide and penalized with Reclusion Temporal pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC, RA 8294 should be given retroactive effect.

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2002, 07:52 AM

PEOPLE VS. SANCHEZ
132 SCRA 103

FACTS:
1. Ferdinand Mauri was killed in his hardware.
2. The autopsy disclosed that the victim had two stab wounds in the neck, one of which penetrated the chest and which caused his death.
3. The victim’s houseboy, Armogenes Sanchez (16 years and 5 months old) , who lived with Mauri in the hardware, was arrested.
4. Sanchez admitted the crime and re-enacted it before two police officers and the members of the victim’s family.
5. Sanchez executed an extra-judicial confession recounting the details of the killing and his taking of Mauri’s wallet and P 150.00 in cash which was on the table.
6. In his confession, Sanchez admitted that he admitted the crime to his parents who advised him to surrender.
7. His admission in his confession, that he stabbed the victim twice, jibed with the medical findings.
8. Sanchez was charged with Robbery with Homicide but the court convicted him of Murder because the court held that Robbery was not proven.
9. Sanchez was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.
10. Appellant contends in this appeal that his confession was not voluntary, and that he is entitled to a suspended sentence being 18 years of age.

ISSUES:
Is the extra-judicial confession valid?

Is the conviction for robbery proper?

Should appellant’s sentence be suspended?

HELD:
Sanchez finished the elementary grade . He repudiated his confession. He said that he was maltreated. The trial court found that his claim of maltreatment is “farthest from the truth.” He did not complain of the maltreatment to his sister, Eliza. He did not file any complaint against his alleged tormentors. His confession is filled with details, such as his having a common-law wife, which only an unintimidated person could have given.

He was duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel. If he could not afford a lawyer, the police offered to hire one for him free of charge. The case is not covered by Section 20, Art. IV of the Constitution. Sanchez voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived in writing his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. Such waiver is allowed.

Immediately after his arrest he orally admitted the crime. He re-enacted its commission of his own volition and without pressure on the part of the police officers because he wanted to reveal the truth.

The trial court erred in holding that there was no robbery. The accused admitted taking the victim’s wallet and P 150.00 cash. It constituted the motive for the killing together with the alleged affront made by the victim when he chided Sanchez for his clumsiness in handling the stock of paints.

In Robbery with homicide, an intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life but the fact that the intent of the criminal is tempered with a desire also to revenge grievances against the murdered person does not prevent his punishment for the complex crime.

The provisions on suspended sentence do not apply to cases punishable by Death or Life Imprisonment. Moreover, on March 31, 1981, when the sentence was promulgated, he was already over 18 years. He was not entitled to a suspended sentence.

Eterna

Jun 14, 2002, 12:18 PM

Just taking a peek!!! :D
Its quite informative to lurk here.

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2002, 12:20 PM

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
Midterm Exam

TEST I: Essay

1. Jose signed a promissory note, to wit:

5,000.00 January 22, 2002

I promise to pay to Pablo the sum of Five Thousand Pesos after the unconditional surrender of NPA rebels on December 1, 2002.

Sgd. Jose

2.

a) Discuss whether this instrument is negotiable or not? (5 pts.)

b) Will your answer be the same if the NPA actually will surrender on December 1, 2002? (5 pts.)

c) If on the face of the negotiable instrument the amount payable is P 100,000.00 but there is a defect in the title of one of the prior parties, can the holder in due course recover the ENTIRE AMOUNT? (10 pts.)

3. A bill of exchange states:

P 10,000.00

“Pay to: the order of Tarzan Ten Thousand Pesos.”

Sgd. Maria dela Cruz

TO: Anton delos Reyes

Juan is the holder of the bill. He presented it to Anton for payment. Anton refused to pay contending that it is not negotiable because of two reasons:

a) It is not known when this instrument will be paid and
b) It is not known who Tarzan is

Are the contentions of Anton correct? Explain each. (10 pts.)

4. Miss Paquita Angpuit signed an instrument which states:

P 8,000.00

Pay to the Bearer, Mr. Tom Mckay Eight Thousand Pesos”

Sgd. P. Angpuit
To: RCBC

a) Is the instrument negotiable? (5pts.)

b) Suppose the name “Mr. Tom Mckay” is deleted, will your answer in the preceding question be the same? (5 pts.)

Test II: Enumeration

1. What are the essential elements of a negotiable instrument? (5 pts.)
2. What are the instance when an instrument is payable to Bearer? (5 pts.)

Test III: Define or explain the following:

a) Negotiable Instrument (5 pts.)
b) Indorsement (5 pts.)
c) Bill of Exchange (5pts.)
d) Negotiation (5 pts.)

Test IV. Distinction:

a) Differentiate a check from a bill of Exchange. (5 pts.)

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2002, 12:21 PM

1. The two major powers of an administrative agency are the quasi-legislative power and the quasi-judicial power. Is the exercise by the administrative agency of these powers considered as a violation of the Doctrine of Separations of Powers? Explain briefly.

2. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government, such as the Executive Department, the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, what are essential in order to forestall a possible violation of the principle of Separation of Powers? Explain briefly.

3. Can there be a valid objection to a judicial review for purposes of determining the legality of an act of the President? Explain briefly.

4. As provided under the Civil Service Law, the Civil Service Commission is empowered to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of said law. Can the president exercise the rule-making power conferred by the above-mentioned law upon the civil Service Commission? Explain briefly.

5. A law enacted by Congress punished the act of illegal fishing through the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances or explosives and provides penalty of imprisonment therefor. The Secretary of Natural Resources, who under the law was tasked to issue the necessary rules and regulations to implement the same, then issued a regulation defining Electro-fishing as a crime in violation of the law. Later, fisherman M was arrested and charged by the police for using electricity in fishing and was prosecuted accordingly. May M be validly convicted for illegal fishing under the law as implemented by said regulation? Explain briefly.

PUGSLEY

Jun 14, 2002, 12:26 PM

1. What is the statutory definition of Agency? When is from essential? (10%)

2. A constituted B as agent to sell his house and lot for P 1M on installment basis. B, however, was able to sell it for the same price in cash. Was there a violation of his authority? Why? (10%)

3. A is an agent of B. In transacting business for and in behalf of B, he issued his own personal checks in payment of B’s obligations. Can A be held personally liable? Why? (10%)

4. X is the agent of Y. Y authorized X to sell his Mercedes Benz car on installment basis. A, the buyer paid the downpayment, hence, the car was delivered. A, however, did not pay the balance. In a suit for collection of a sum of money, A interposed the defense that Y has no personality to sue him because X did not disclose Y as his principal. Is the defense valid? Why? (10%)

5. When is a contract of agency not revocable at will? Explain fully. (15%)

6. Mabait appointed Matapang as his agent. Due to altercation with his wife, Matapang was hospitalized with severed internal injuries. Pending his recuperation, he requested Mabait for authority to appoint a substitute. Mabait agreed and Palpak was subsequently appointed by Matapang. Palpak then performed the agency, however he had caused Mabait damages. An irate Mabait sued Matapang for the damages that he sustained. Matapang moved to dismiss on the ground that the action must be prosecuted against Palpak. Resolve the motion to dismiss. (15%)

7. Jose was designated by Mario as his agent for the purpose of selling his Mercedes Benz and BMW to Butch. Upon receiving the vehicles, Jose caused the sale and delivered the Mercedes Benz to Butch and executed an agreement to purchase over the BMW, as Butch did not have sufficient cash to pay for both vehicles. Two days after delivering the vehicle to Jose, Mario executed a deed of absolute sale over the Mercedes Benz in favor of Nico and another deed of absolute salve over the BMW in favor of Robby. Who among the purchasers possess a better right to the Mercedes Benz? (5%) To the BMW? (5%) Did the subsequent act of Mario result in the revocation of the agency? (5%) What is Mario’s liability, if any? (5%)

8. Bonus. (10%)

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2002, 04:23 AM

BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
334 SCRA 106

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
2. After 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
3. Petitioner’s wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
4. She then filed a criminal case for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61.
5. Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
6. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
7. Judge Alden Cervantes was denied the motion , so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
8. Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge Cervantes.
9. The RTC denied the petition also a Motion for Reconsideration.
10. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the declaration of nullity of marriage a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage?

HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two (2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised n the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA 572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable bases for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS. RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS. LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: “xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents an purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case of concubinage.

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2002, 05:42 AM

Originally posted by blue babe
pugsley:

no. i wish, but unfortunately, i do not have the luxury of staying unemployed for another year. i've decided that i CANNOT do 5 readings... (the lecturer in ateneo suggests 5 readings) :) which of course, is no shock to anyone, including myself. i've also decided that quality is better than quantity. (just trying to console myself). so i'm pretending that i'm doing okay by really reading the materials well as opposed to reading it over and over again. but seriously, i cannot do more than 200 pages a day. its much much too much work for me.

rwchick: oo noh! sobrang chaga... recruit nyo sha sa barops!!! btw, ano na nangyari sa mga reviewers?? :D

How's review going? Barely 77 days more, huh?

I saw a friend reviewing in Manila yesterday and told me 6 months is really not enough to prepare for the bar...even if you studied well in law school.

There's just so many laws/cases to be read.

Though I'm not in the same boat as you are I'm still tense considering that I haven't even finish 1/2 the coverage for this years exams (cases included)

***SIGH***

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2002, 11:45 AM

1.
a. Define International Law. (5%)
b. Why is the term “international law” a misnomer? (5%)

2. As regards the relation of International Law to Municipal Law, the Philippines adheres to the doctrine of Incorporation. Explain the doctrine. (10%)

3. There are three (3) theories on what gives binding force to international laws. Give and explain each briefly. (10%)

4.
a. What are the primary and secondary sources of international law? (5%)
b. Distinguish between subject and object of international law. (5%)

5. Unlike municipal law, international law does not generally prescribe specific methods for enforcement. How then does it induce enforcement of its precepts? Explain. (10%)

6. What are the requisites for the exercise of individual or collective self-defense under Art. 51 of the Charter of the UN? Explain each briefly. (10%)

7. Were these requisites satisfied in the “Cuban Missile Crisis” to justify the action taken by the USA and the members of the OAS? Support your answer. (10%)

8.
a. Explain the principle of state continuity. (5%)
b. Napoleon, an Emperor of France , filed in a California court a Civil claim for damages. While the case was pending, Napoleon was deposed. Will the suit prosper? Why or why not? (5%)

9.
a. Explain the Arphipelagic Doctrine. (5%)
b. Explain the Right of Innocent Passage. (5%)

10.
a. The maintenance of diplomatic relations is not a demandable right on the part of either the sending or receiving state. Why? Explain.(5%)
b. Distinguish between the functions of a diplomat and those of a Consul. (5%)

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2002, 11:46 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Final – Quiz 1

1. Spouses jack and Jill bought a parcel of land from Sunshine Farms, Inc. By virtue of the sale, sunshine Farms, Inc.’s title over the lot was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of spouses Jack and Jill. Several years thereafter, President Balasubas issued PD No. 293 invalidating the spouses’ title over their lot and declaring the land open for disposition and sale.
a) Is President Balasubas’s act constitutional? Why?
b) Who has valid title or right over Spouses Jack and Jill’s parcel of land? Why?

2. Judge Pogi was appointed by Mayor Vergara as member or the Baguio City Committee on Justice. Before accepting his appointment, Judge Pogi requested for the issuance by the Supreme Court of a Resolution authorizing Judge Pogi to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to said position. Should Judge Pogi’s request be granted? Why?

3. President Macapagal issues Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “ Adoption of a National Computerized Reference System” purportedly in implementation of the Administrative Code of 10987. Senator Angara files a petition with the Supreme Court assailing AO 308 as unconstitutional.

4. The Senate convened on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the Eleventh Congress. The composition of the Senate was as follows: 10 LAMP, 7 LAKAS, 1 LP, 1 AD 1 PROP, 1 GB and 2 independent. Agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senators Fernan and Tatad were nominated for the position of Senate President by Senators Ople and Santiago, respectively. Senator Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad, then, manifested that with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. Senator Tatad explained that those who voted for Senator Fernan comprised the “majority”, while those who voted for him belonged to the “minority.” However, the 7 LAKAS senators elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. The Senate Rules of Proceedings is silent on who comprises the “minority” and the “majority.” It was Senator Guingona who was formally recognized by Senator President Fernan as minority leader. Thus, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto with the Supreme Court alleging in the main that Senator Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of senate minority leader, a position that, according to them rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

5.
a) Congress enacted republic Act No. 68268 giving the President emergency powers. Congress failed to provide for date of expiry of the emergency powers. When will the President’s emergency powers expire? Why?
b) May Congress extend the emergency powers of the President beyond the life of RA 68268? Why?
c) May Congress revoke the emergency powers of the president any time? Why?

6. The provision of Executive Order No. 626, specifically the portion which provides that “carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Order shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit” was challenged as invalid delegation of legislative power. Decide.

PUGSLEY

Jun 16, 2002, 11:48 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Final – Quiz 2

I

a. Pedro is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. During the Marcos era, he went to the US and was subsequently naturalized as an American citizen. He returned to the Philippines after the end of the past regime and reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Is he eligible to run as Congressman in the next elections? Why or why not?

b. Assuming Pedro legitimately became Congressman. During his term, Congress enacted a law that will increase the salaries of the members of Congress. Can Pedro enjoy the benefits of the law increasing the salaries of the members of Congress during his term? Why?

c. Also during Pedro’s terms as Congressman, Congress enacted a law granting a P 20,000.00 monthly allowance to members of Congress. Can Pedro legally receive his P 20,000.00 monthly allowance during his term? Why?

d. Suppose Pedro after his first term ran and was re-elected. Can Pedro enjoy the benefits of the law increasing the salaries of the members of Congress on his second term? Why?

II

Congressman Pedro was appointed by the President as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform.

a) Can Congressman Pedro legally hold the position of member of House of Representatives and Secretary of Agrarian Reform in concurrent capacity? Why?

b) Can Congressman Pedro legally hold the position of Secretary of Agrarian Reform if he willingly forfeits his seat as member of the House of Representatives? Why?

III

Assuming that Congressman Pedro was appointed by the President as head of a new department created by a law passed in Congress during the term of Congressman Pedro.

a) Can the President validly appoint Congressman Pedro as head of the new department without violating the Constitution? Why?

b) Will your answer be the same if Congressman Pedro willingly forfeits his seat as member of the House of Representatives? Why?

IV

The Commission on Appointments (CA) is composed of twelve senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives, with the Senate President as ex-officio chairman based on proportional party representation. Congressman X was the lone XYZ Party candidate elected as member of the House. He claims that he is entitled to a seat in the CA as nine other congressmen not belonging to his party endorsed and supported him.

a) Is Congressman X entitled to a seat in the Commission of Appointments? Why?

b) Will the failure of either the House or the Senate to nominate the full number of twelve members each mean that the CA cannot legally convene? Why?

c) Can the membership of the CA be changed as a consequence of permanent political realignment? Why?

d) Are judgments of the CA subject to judicial review? Why?

V

a) Can Congress increase the salaries of the President and Vice-President? Why?
b) Can Congress decrease the same? Why?

VI

Congress enacted a budget appropriations law for the Fiscal year 1999 reducing all the appropriations of the various organs of government by 5% from the recommendation of the President following a congressional policy of fiscal restrain and austerity. Is the reduction effected by Congress constitutionally valid? Why?

VII

Juan, incumbent President, died one year and six months after assumption of office. In accordance with the successional rules, Maria, the Vice-President, will become President to serve the unexpired portion. Will Maria be qualified to run for the position of president in the next elections? Why?

VIII

Gloria, President of the Republic, is reputed to be sick of acute high blood and hypertension. Majority of all members of the cabinet transmits to the Senate President and Speaker of the House a written declaration that Gloria is unable to discharge the powers and duties of her office.
a) Will Gloria continue to discharge the powers and duties of her office? If not, who will?
b) What should Gloria do to reassume the powers and duties of her office?
c) What should Gloria’s cabinet do if it is convinced that Gloria’s inability continues?
d) Who finally decides the issue of the President’s inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office? Explain how.

PUGSLEY

Jun 20, 2002, 03:08 AM

MOSSESGELD VS. COURT OF APPEALS
300 SCRA 464

FACTS:
1. On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossessgeld gave birth to a baby boy.
2. The presumed father, one Eleazer Calasan, a lawyer, married, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossessgeld Calasan.
3. Both the presumed father and the mother accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein was true and correct.
4. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
5. The person in charge of the hospital refused to place the presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth.
6. Petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar for registration.
7. The Municipal Treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer-in-charge of the office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4 of the Local Civil Registrar General, providing that Art. 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 199, shall use the surname of their mother.
8. Atty. Calasan filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for Mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname.
9. The lower court denied the petition, ruling that illegitimate children must use the surname of their mothers, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in the record of birth.
10. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
11. On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the judgment appealed from.
12. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the use of the father's surname proper?

Does mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity.

HELD:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.”

This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.

The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Art. 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural children by fiction.

Mandamus does not lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register the Certificate of Live birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.

PUGSLEY

Jun 20, 2002, 03:12 AM

PEREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
255 SCRA 661

FACTS:
1. Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while petitioner Nerissa, his wife is a registered nurse.
2. They were married on December 6, 1986.
3. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray II in NY on July 20, 1992.
4. Petitioner who began work in the US in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modes house in Mandaue City, Cebu.
5. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York.
6. In February 1992, petitioner became a resident alien.
7. Private respondent stayed with her in the US twice and took care of her when she became pregnant.
8. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
9. In January 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu.
10. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US.
11. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms.
12. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager income of P 5,000.00.
13. She longed to be with her only child but her husband was keeping him away from her.
14. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession.
15. Petitioner was forced to move to her parent’s home in Mandaue.
16. Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son to her.
17. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one year old child to his mother, citing paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
18. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to his father. Holding that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.

ISSUE:
As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who bears in his person both their genes?

HELD:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law.

Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean “legal separation” decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such *** petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.

The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors). The provisions of law *** mandate that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction , maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.

It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child.

PUGSLEY

Jun 20, 2002, 12:20 PM

HERNANDEZ COURT OF APPEALS
320 SCRA 76

PONENTE: JUSTICE MENDOZA

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario Hernandez were married in church ceremonies in January 1, 1981.
2. Three children were born to them.
3. In 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter.
4. She alleged that from the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends.
5. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child.
6. She also claimed that due to his promiscuity, private respondent endangered here health be infecting her with a sexually transmitted disease.
7. She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life.
8. Because private respondent failed to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties.
9. The Prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.
10. The trial court dismissed the petition for annulment because the circumstances mentioned by petitioner in support of her claim that private respondent was “psychologically incapacitated” to marry here are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation – not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.
11. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
12. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
13. The CA cited the ruling in SANTOS VS. CA (240 SCRA 20) holding: “It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. Moreso, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se of psychological incapacity.
14. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Should the marriage of petitioner and private respondent be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity?

HELD:
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the CA pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not mere physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent’s parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a great part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.

However, private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent’s youth and self conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

PUGSLEY

Jun 20, 2002, 12:27 PM

REPUBLIC VS. ABADILLA
302 SCRA 358

FACTS:
1. Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
2. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael.
3. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname “Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla.
4. Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
5. An Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of entries was filed by Gerson, Luzviminda and their two minor children, with the RTC of Laoag, seeking corrections made in the Certificates of Birth of Emerson and Rafael.
6. During the hearing of the petition, both Gerson and Luzviminda testified that they are not yet married to each other despite bearing two children.
7. The trial court granted the petition and ordered the corresponding correction.
8. The name of Gerson was corrected and the entry of date of marriage of parents was deleted.
9. The Office of the Solicitor General filed an instant petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the “date and place of marriage of parents” from the birth certificates of minors Emerson and Rafael but failed to order the change of the minor’s surname from “Abadilla” to “Celestino.”

ISSUE:
Should the minor children are allowed to use the surname of their father?

HELD:
There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate children, their parents, spouses Gerson and Luzviminda not being married to each other even up to now.

During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already the governing law.

Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mother’s surname.

PUGSLEY

Jun 21, 2002, 07:47 AM

FERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
230 SCRA 130

FACTS:
1. Petitioners John Paul Fernandez et al., filed a civil case for support against private respondent Carlito Fernandez before the RTC of Quezon City.
2. Complaint was dismissed finding that “there is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel private respondents to recognize or acknowledge petitioners as his children” and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners’ filiation.
3. Despite this, petitioners filed another action for recognition and support against the private respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City.
4. The Evidence shows that Violeta Esguerra, single is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners Claro Antonio and John Paul, both surnamed Fernandez.
5. Violeta and Carlito met sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis court where Carlito was an employee and a tennis enthusiast.
6. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship 6 months after their first meeting.
7. The tryst resulted in the birth of Claro Antonio of March 31, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on February 11, 1985.
8. Violeta further claimed that she did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children.
9. She averred they were married in civil rites on October 1983 but it was in March 1985 were she discovered that the marriage license, which they used, was spurious.
10. To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documents: a) certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father; b) baptismal certificate of Claro which also states that his father is respondent Carlito; c)photo of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and d) pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta.
11. Petitioners likewise presented five witnesses.
12. Three witnesses told the court that Violeta had, at different times, introduced the private respondent to them as her “husband” while the priest Fr. Fernandez testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter’s baptism.
13. In defense, Carlito denied Violeta’s allegation that he sired the two children.
14. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro.
15. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners.
16. On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners’ complaint dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
17. According to the CA, “the proof relied upon by the trial court is inadequate to prove the private respondent’s paternity and filiation of petitioners.”
18. Petitioner Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
19. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Did respondent court err in rejecting as insufficient the documentary evidence offered by petitioners to prove their filiation.

HELD:
Petitioners can not rely on the photos showing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of Claro. These photos are far from proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by one of the witnesses.

The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showing affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.

The baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation.

In MACADANGDANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS (110 SCRA 73), the SC ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.

The certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with the SC’s pronouncement in ROCES VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR (102 PHIL 1050).

The SC reiterated this rules in BERCILES VS. SYSTEMS (128 SCRA 53), when it held that “a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.”

PUGSLEY

Jun 23, 2002, 12:24 AM

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO
312 SCRA 487

.

FACTS:
1. Jose Teober Ricafort and his fiancée Susana Loterte were preparing to take a bath in a nearby well.
2. Jose went ahead as Susana still had to prepare their things.
3. After a short while, Susana followed and when she was barely 20 meters away from the well she saw Jose being surrounded by accused-appellants Hector, Joselito, Juan and Vicente (all surnamed Domingo).
4. After saying “Hayop ka, ikaw an nagsaksak san tugang ko.” (You are an animal, you were the one who stabbed my brother) Hector immediately lunged towards Jose with a fish spear hitting the latter on the chest.
5. The 4 accused then pounced on him hacking and hitting him on different parts of his body.
6. Jose died as a result.
7. Accused-appellants were then charged with Murder.
8. The trial court found the accused guilty of Homicide.
9. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court found that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
10. Although it also appreciated the presence of abuse of superior strength and band, it ruled that these circumstances were absorbed in treachery.
11. Accordingly, it found the four accused-appellants guilty of Murder and not just homicide .
12. The Court sentenced then to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

ISSUE:
Did treachery attend the commission of the crime?

HELD:
The SC disagrees with the appellate court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. “Treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance when the following two conditions are present: a) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defenses or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, and b) the deliberate adoption by the offender of such means, methods or manner of execution. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.” “It is present when the attack comes without warning, is sudden and unexpected and the unsuspecting victim is not in a position to parry the assault. It cannot be presumed,; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.”

The aforesaid elements are unavailing in the instant case. The records show that Susana had no knowledge how the attack started. She did not know the manner by which the assailants made known their presence to Jose. When she arrived at the crime scene, she saw Jose already surrounded by his attackers. They did not attack him instantly although they left no doubt in the mind of their victim of their intent to attack as their bolos were already unsheathed and in full view of their victim when they confronted him.

More importantly, there was a warning from the accused-appellants themselves of the impending attack as when Hector pronounced, “Hayop ka, ikaw an nagsaksak san tugang ko!” In effect they have forewarned their victim of the attack. The attack therefore became expected rather than unexpected. As proof, Jose even tried to parry some of the blows coming from his assailants as shown by the location of the wounds he suffered. When he parried the blow, his left had was hit and was completely severed from his body. At this juncture, it bears repeating that treachery is never to be presumed. Just like the element of a crime, it must be satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, superiority in number does not make the attack treacherous.

Abuse of superior strength could be appreciated; however, not having been alleged in the information, it could only be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. Accused-appellants enjoyed superiority not only in number but also in arms consisting of bolos and spear. They took advantage of their combined strength to perpetuate the crime without no harm forthcoming to themselves.

The felony of homicide carries with it the penalty of Reclusion Temporal. There being one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

yogad

Jun 25, 2002, 02:02 AM

sos, kailangan ko lang sa office! i just wanna ask what particular law defines the age of children . thanks!!!!

PUGSLEY

Jun 25, 2002, 11:41 PM

Originally posted by yogad
sos, kailangan ko lang sa office! i just wanna ask what particular law defines the age of children . thanks!!!!

Can you be more specific about your question?

It isn't clear. :*)

PUGSLEY

Jun 28, 2002, 04:35 PM

DIZON-PAMINTUAN VS. PEOPLE
234 SCRA 63

FACTS:
1. Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways arrived at his residence form the airport and immediately proceeded inside his house.
2. Five unidentified masked-armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot and poked their guns at his driver and two helpers and were dragged inside the house.
3. The robbers ransacked the house and took away pieces of jewelry and other personal properties including case.
4. The matter was reported to the police.
5. The WPD asked Teodoro to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost.
6. He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by an informer.
7. His wife was able to recognize the stolen jewelry displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon-Pamintuan.
8. Norma was arrested, tied and convicted of violating the Anti-Fencing Law.
9. In convicting the petitioner, the trial court ruled that “there is not doubt that the recovered items were found in the possession of the accused and she was not able to rebut the presumption (Sec. 5) though the evidence for the prosecution alleged that the stall is owned by Fredo.
10. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
11. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is accused guilty of the crime charged?

HELD:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of PD 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is the “act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or any thing of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.”

The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2) The accused , who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possess, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

Since Section 5 of PD 1612 expressly provides that “mere possession of any good, article, item or object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing,” it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of Robbery or Theft. The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the crime of Robbery or Theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.

PUGSLEY

Jun 28, 2002, 04:37 PM

DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS
250 SCRA 82

PONENTE: JUSTICE MENDOZA

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon Villar, a businessman.
2. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up.
3. The relationship between Daisie and Ramon developed into an intimate one, as a result Christopher J was born to them followed by two more children, both girls.
4. Private respondent’s wife knew of the relationship when Daisie took Christopher J to Ramon’s house.
5. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Ramon to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
6. In summer 1991, Ramon asked Daisie to allow Christopher J, then 6 years old to go with his family to Boracay.
7. Daisie agreed, but after the trip Ramon refused to give back the child.
8. Daisie filed a petitioner for Habeas Corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
9. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Daisie, granting rightful custody to the natural mother.
10. The CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas Corpus was not proper; the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a Habeas Corpus case contemplates a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated.
11. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the remedy of Habeas Corpus proper?

HELD:
It is indeed true, as the CA observed that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of SALVANA VS. GAELA (55 PHIL 680), it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child’s mother. As such pursuant to Article 176 of the family Code, Christopher J is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, “no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”

That petitioner receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation , compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.

PUGSLEY

Jun 29, 2002, 04:16 AM

PEOPLE VS. PARAZO
310 SCRA 147

FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Marlon Parazo was charged and convicted by the RTC of Cabanatuan City for rape and frustrated homicide.
2. The supreme penalty of death was imposed upon him.
3. On automatic review, the SC affirmed the rape case but modified the sentence as to the frustrated homicide case.
4. Appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to the attention of the court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.
5. Results of the medical examinations conducted on appellant indicate that appellant is really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only 7 years and 9 months, and with a low IQ of 60.

ISSUE:
Was the conviction of accused-appellant proper?

HELD:
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The fact that he was “helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983"” as noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and muttering of appellant.

The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicate the accused’s own version of the circumstance which led to his implication in the crime deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.

The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed to right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.

Movant richly deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.

vertigo

Jun 30, 2002, 02:20 AM

hey pipol,

im really having a hard time studying NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, can you recommend a book or something which will be easy to understand. =)

Thanks.

BTW, k yung mga digests mo PUGSLEY, kaya lang, ang hirap hanapin kung saan part na sya ng thread eh. Pero, otherwise sobrang ok *** =)

ReynangBurgundy

Jun 30, 2002, 08:32 AM

hi people!

tanong lang po... whats the difference between error in personae and mistake of fact? and can there be a situation wherein there is both mistake of fact and error in personae. maraming salamat!

i agree with vertigo...:D your digest are of a great help. kaso nga lang minsan di ko na alam kung saan class ko siya pwedeng gamitin. :hiya:

nga pala why does labor conflicts have to be decided in favor of the laborers? is because of the maxim of "those who have less in life must have more in law" coupled with the Constitution's adovacy for social justice? paki explain please! thanks!

by the way, anybody had d.p. disini for laborI? how is he?mejo na rattle ako sa kanyang questions e. he doesnt tell you whether or not you got it right. :evil_lol: feeling ko naman, he is just trying to see if your convinced of your own answer. :redsmile:

PUGSLEY

Jul 1, 2002, 02:51 AM

Originally posted by vertigo
hey pipol,

im really having a hard time studying NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, can you recommend a book or something which will be easy to understand. =)

Thanks.

BTW, k yung mga digests mo PUGSLEY, kaya lang, ang hirap hanapin kung saan part na sya ng thread eh. Pero, otherwise sobrang ok *** =)

Try using NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW - Agbayani, I believe its more comprehendable.

PUGSLEY

Jul 1, 2002, 02:53 AM

Originally posted by ReynangBurgundy
hi people!

i agree with vertigo...:D your digest are of a great help. kaso nga lang minsan di ko na alam kung saan class ko siya pwedeng gamitin. :hiya:

Most cases I've posted are for the subject PERSONS and FAMILY RELATIONS

The rest are in Criminal Law and Constitutional Law

blue babe

Jul 3, 2002, 04:55 PM

reynang burgundy:

tamang taman... kakabasa ko lang ng first few articles ng crim kanina for review.

mistake of fact is a MISAPPREHENSION of the circumstances of a given situation. it may be an exempting circumstance in some cases. IF a person acts in such a way, that had his PERCEPTION of the FACTS and CIRCUMSTANCES of the situation been correct, his act would have been lawful, then EVEN IF crime was committed, he would not be criminally liable.

example: a person hears something rustling outside his door. he gets a baseball bat, shouts out for the person to identify himself. there is no answer but only more sounds. he hears what seems to him to be the cocking of a handgun. convinced that the rustling sound is from an intruder and that cocking sound meant the intruder was going to shoot him, the person then swings at the "intruder" and mortally wounds the "intruder" who turns out to be his wife. under these circumstances, there was a mistake of fact. the person so acting believed that there was an intruder about to harm him. his act would have been lawful if his wife had really been an intruder, assuming all the elements of self defense were present. but, since there was no intruder, he mortally wounded his wife. in this case, the mistake of fact acts as an exempting circumstance.

HOWEVER if the act was unlawful to begin with, then the mistake of fact will not serve to exempt a person from criminal liability.

a mistake of identity or error in personae would hardly serve to exempt a person from criminal liability, as long as the act consitutes dolo (fault) . as long as there was clear intent to act in an unlawful manner, then regardless of the fact that the victim was different from the one intended by the perpetrator, he shall be liable for the act. example, if a person went to another's house with intent to kill X, and he insteads shoots Y from the back, thinking it was X he killed, then he would still be criminally liable for the killing of Y even if he made a mistake in the identity of his victim.

as for your labor question, just remember that the presumption in favor of labor operates only in cases of DOUBT. if the situation is clear and the applicable law is likewise clear, the courts will rule on the basis of such, even if labor will be at the losing end.

yes, this is because of the constitutional mandate protecting labor and the intent of the legislature to give those who have less in life, more in law. but it was never the intention of the legislature to coddle labor at the expense of capital. the law was not intended to be oppressive to either labor or capital.

hope i helped. ;)

PUGSLEY

Jul 7, 2002, 04:57 PM

mikka:

Sorry for the late reply. I don't check my PM that often.

Anyway, I'm glad of your interest in this thread .

I don't mind you printing the cases. It's for everybody's consumption.

PUGSLEY

Jul 7, 2002, 06:21 PM

CARINO VS. CARINO
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
351 SCRA 127

FACTS:
1. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages.
2. The first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two offsprings; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back 1982.
3. In 1988, Santiago became ill and bed ridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis.
4. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
5. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
6. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P 146, 000 from MBAI, PCCUI, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-Ibig; while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P 21,000.00 from “GSIS life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS.)”
7. Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least ½ of the P 146, 000.00 “death benefits.”
8. Petitioner failed to file her answer prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
9. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
10. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
11. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized with the required marriage license.
12. The court ruled in favor or respondent.
13. On appeal, the decision of the Regional trial court was affirmed in toto.
14. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Who is entitled to half the death benefits?

HELD:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but no limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriage exempt from the license requirement. . A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.

It is beyond cavil, therefor, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriage exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. *** Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”

ALSO SEE:
DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS and NINAL VS. BAYADOG

PUGSLEY

Jul 7, 2002, 06:22 PM

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG
GR No. 109975 February 09, 2001
351 SCRA 425

FACTS:
1. On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
2. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988.
3. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children.
4. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988.
5. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation.
6. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again.
7. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk.
8. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.
9. In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him.
10. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date.
11. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
12. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation.
13. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared.
14. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
15. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
16. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
17. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.
18. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36.
19. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
20. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law.
21. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA.
22. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

PUGSLEY

Jul 10, 2002, 12:15 AM

Originally posted by vertigo

BTW, k yung mga digests mo PUGSLEY, kaya lang, ang hirap hanapin kung saan part na sya ng thread eh. Pero, otherwise sobrang ok *** =)

:*)

Hmmmm. So you won't have a hard time finding this thread, why not contribute also thereby bumping this thread always to the top? :D

Diego22

Jul 11, 2002, 11:19 AM

boos pugsley favor naman po for digested cases in succession. balane is gettin on my nerves, might drop his class.

thanks buddy :D

PUGSLEY

Jul 12, 2002, 07:04 AM

BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 1
Quiz

1. What are the property rights of a partner? (3%)

2.
a) Can a partner give his interest in the partnership to secure his debt to a third person?
b) If the partner fails to pa his indebtedness, can the third person foreclose the security and hold it liable to settle the obligation? Why? (5)

3. Why is a partnership called a “mutual agency?” (3%)

4. A, B, C and D entered into a general partnership. In their articles of partnership, they agreed that D would not be held liable for losses of the partnership. Is this agreement valid? Why? (7%)

5. When is a partnership by estoppel created? When does partnership liability arise? (5%)

6. To obtain better credit facilities XYZ, Pedro, a rich man, represented that he has 30% interest in this XYZ partnership. The partnership subsequently tried to obtain a loan from Philippine National Bank (PNB) by asserting that Pedro is their partner. Then PHN, knowing fully well that Pedro is not really a partner of XYZ partnership, nevertheless granted the partnership a P 1,000,000.00 loan. After a year of operation, XYZ partnership sustained a P 2,000,000.00 loss and could not pay its debt to PNB. Who can PNB collect from? Why? (5%)

7. A, B and C entered into a partnership. They each contributed P 10,000.00. After one year of operation, they sustained debts due Marion in the amount of P 50,000.00. Subsequently, D was taken in as a new partner. D contributed P 10,000.00 to the partnership. Mario now seeks to collect from the partnership his credit amount to P 50,000.00.

a. Should D share in the partnership liability to Mario? Why? (3%)
b. Should the partnership assets be not enough to settle the liability to Mario, from where can Mario seek compensation? Why? (4%)

PUGSLEY

Jul 12, 2002, 07:06 AM

Originally posted by Diego22
boos pugsley favor naman po for digested cases in succession. balane is gettin on my nerves, might drop his class.

thanks buddy :D

Why not give me a list of your cases?

PUGSLEY

Jul 12, 2002, 11:15 PM

Diego22:

Hang on!!!

Don't drop the subject. Can hardly believe that a 3rd year student would give up that easily.

ReynangBurgundy

Jul 17, 2002, 09:36 AM

Hail Pugsley :handsdown:

sobrang life saver tong mga digest mo. Our prof in persons posted our cases friday afternoon and circumstances werent on our side since there was a long weekend due to the storm and the barangay election, eto na lang ang naging pag-asa ko.

God will surely bless you... no kidding! Good luck sa bar!

hmmmmm... a thought struck me, if God permits all of us become lawyers in the near future, why dont we put up a law firm... wouldn't that be nice. *okay* ba?

yogad

Jul 18, 2002, 06:19 AM

PUGSLEY, salamat ng marami!

i really appreciate your effort in starting this thread and posting digested cases. meron bang groupmail where we could share digested cases through email.

GOD bless and goodluck!!!

yogad

Jul 18, 2002, 06:40 AM

PUGSLEY, salamat!

i really appreciate your effort in starting this thread and posting digested cases. meron bang groupmail where we could share digested cases through email.

GOD bless and goodluck!!!

lei_semaj8

Jul 18, 2002, 11:58 PM

ok to pugsley ah!
parang SCRA!

salamat sa mga digested cases pero sana may directory or table of contents para mas madali maghanap!

thanks;)

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2002, 08:48 AM

Originally posted by yogad
PUGSLEY, salamat ng marami!

i really appreciate your effort in starting this thread and posting digested cases. meron bang groupmail where we could share digested cases through email.

GOD bless and goodluck!!!

Your'e very welcome

I'd appreciate it more though if you could also contribute to the betterment of this thread.

Am not aware of any existing groupmail.

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2002, 08:53 AM

Originally posted by lei_semaj8
ok to pugsley ah!
parang SCRA!

salamat sa mga digested cases pero sana may directory or table of contents para mas madali maghanap!

thanks;)

If I had the luxury of time, I would be willing to make a table of contents. Sad to say though, I too am pressed with time.

Unless, of course you could spearhead the work. :D

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2002, 08:55 AM

Originally posted by ReynangBurgundy
Hail Pugsley :handsdown:

sobrang life saver tong mga digest mo. Our prof in persons posted our cases friday afternoon and circumstances werent on our side since there was a long weekend due to the storm and the barangay election, eto na lang ang naging pag-asa ko.

God will surely bless you... no kidding! Good luck sa bar!

hmmmmm... a thought struck me, if God permits all of us become lawyers in the near future, why dont we put up a law firm... wouldn't that be nice. *okay* ba?

It's best that you read the original text though. I might have the wrong appreciation of the case? :lol:

PUGSLEY

Jul 19, 2002, 09:00 AM

EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS

Citizens surety v CA 162 scra 738
Kalalo v luz 34 scra 337
Ponce v ca 90 scra 533
Velasco v meralco 42 scra 556
comm v burgos 96 scra 831
del rosario v shell 164 scra 556
people v franklin 39 scra 363
immaculata v navarro 160 scra 21
Laguna v manabat 58 scra 650
gan tion v ca 28 scra 235
pnb v ong acero 148 scra 166
republic v delos angeles 98 scra 103
solinap v del rosario 123 scra 640
sycip v cs 134 scra 317
cia maritima v c 135 scra 593

Miss O, just got back from Manila. I'll see what I can do about this cases.

Diego22

Jul 19, 2002, 10:21 AM

Originally posted by PUGSLEY
Diego22:

Hang on!!!

Don't drop the subject. Can hardly believe that a 3rd year student would give up that easily.

hey bud, thanks for the support. you may not know it but your giving us big help thru the posted cases here...all because of you tol! animo panyero!

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 09:41 AM

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS. BOBIS
GR. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
336 SCRA 747

FACTS:
1. In October 1985, private respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.
2. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
3. An information for bigamy was filed
4. Sometime, thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
5. Respondent then filed a Motion to Suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
6. The trial court granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.
7. Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
8. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutesa prejudicial question to a criminal case for Bigamy?

HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimate connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the relocation of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.

Its two elements are: a) the civil action involves an issue similarly or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented its case.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.

As ruled in LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731), he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, the SC held the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question (BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE, 334 SCRA 106) . This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 09:53 AM

ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS
59 Phil 643

FACTS:
1. The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate.
2. The testimony of only one to the attesting witnesses was taken.
3. The testimony was:
a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on the margin by the testator and two of the witnesses on January 4, 1931;
b) the remaining three pages were signed by the testator and the three attesting witnesses on January 11, 1931, and that the third attesting witness then signed the first six pages.

ISSUE:
Was the will executed properly?

HELD:
Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute, the execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various participants sign on various days and in various combinations of those present.

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 09:53 AM

BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO
22 Phil 227

FACTS:
1. Pioquinto Paguio died on September 28, 1909.
2. For some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death, he suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech.
3. He retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well.
4. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
5. The testator wrote out on several pieces of paper the disposition of his property.
6. The same was in turn delivered to one Señor Marco who transcribed and put them in form.
7. The pieces of paper were then delivered to a lawyer who read them to the testator asking if they were his dispositions.
8. The testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head.
9. The widow of the decedent Juliana Bagtas then sought the probate of the purported last will and testament of Pioquinto.
10. The CFI of Bataan admitted the same for probate.
11. Isidoro Paguio, a son of the decedent by a former marriage, opposed the probation on the ground that the testator was not n full enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.

ISSUE:
Was the will was validly executed?

HELD:
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well-established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by the court of competent jurisdiction , this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. The opponents failed to do this.

The courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body , induced by age and disease does not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard , few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated insanity or idiocy.

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 09:58 AM

ACOP VS. PIRASO
52 Phil 660

FACTS:
1. The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso because the will sought to be probated was written in English.
2. Evidence showed that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect.
3. Proponent-appellant Sixto Acop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding that the testator did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said dialect.

ISSUE:
Should the will be probated?

HELD:
The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary.

In the instant case, not only is it not proven the English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorotte dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which the will is written.

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 09:59 AM

LEANO VS. LEANO
30 Phil 612

FACTS:
1. Cristina Valdes executed a will.
2. She then placed a cross against her name, attached by some other person, in the presence of the three witnesses whose name are attached to the attesting clause, and that they attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other.
3. Mariano Leaño sought the probate of the will.
4. Arcadio Leaño objected on the ground that the execution of the last will and testament was not in the manner and form prescribed by law.
5. The trial court denied the probate of the will.
6. Hence this appeal

ISSUE:
Was the will was executed in the manner and form prescribed by law?

HELD:
The placing of the cross opposite her name at the conclusion of the instrument was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law, which prescribes that except where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and form therein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator.

It is the right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed anima testandi.

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 10:01 AM

IN RE WILL OF TAN DIUCO
45 Phil 807

FACTS:
1. Mamerta Base instituted an action for the probate of the will of Chinaman Tan Duico.
2. The court denied the probate of the will on the ground that said will was not signed by three instrumental witnesses.
3. The document was signed by Simplicia Sala by order of the testator, whose name is before the said signature, by reason of the latter’s incapacity on account of his weakness and the trembling of his hand.
4. The testator also stated that he directed Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name and in the presence of three witnesses who also signed with him at the bottom of said document, and on the left margin of each of its three pages correlatively numbered in letter by Simplicio Sala in the name of the testator Tan Duico and by the three other witnesses.

ISSUE:
Was the will not signed by three instrumental witnesses?

HELD:
In dealing with attestation, the law does not say that the instrumental witnesses must be different from those who signed the attestation clause, for in the first part of said section, after speaking of the signature of the testator or the person signing in his place, it adds” and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other,” from which it clearly follows that the same witnesses who signed on the left margin of each page of the document presented by the testator to them as his will, must be the ones who should sign the attestation clause, inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will and affirm that it was signed under his express direction in the presence of said witnesses and that all the sheets thereof had also been signed by them in the presence of said testator and of each of them.

PUGSLEY

Jul 20, 2002, 10:09 AM

YAO KEE VS. GONZALES
167 SCRA 736

FACTS:
1. Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City where he was then residing leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.
2. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a petition for the grant of letters or administration alleging that they were the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego.
3. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al.,) alleging that they were the legitimate family.
4. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the legitimate children.
5. The court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego.
6. On appeal, the lower court’s decision was set aside declaring petitioners as the acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion Gillego.
7. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of the deceased since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China.

ISSUE:
Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom?

HELD:
Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.” The law requires that “a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that “ a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely 1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are self serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another. [See Art. 269, Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood.

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego , a Filipina with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father’s acknowledgment, evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance.

PUGSLEY

Jul 23, 2002, 11:37 PM

1. What is a partnership? When must it be constituted in written form? (5%)

2. On January 1, 199, A, B and C executed Articles of Partnership for the purposes of engaging in the business of selling computer software. Their firm agreement contained the following stipulations: a) The firm capital is One Million Pesos (PHP 1,000,000.00), b) The ratio of capital contributions are: A-35%, B-45% and C-20%, c) C would contribute management expertise, d) C and B would act as managing partners, e) shall not be liable for losses.

Of the contribution due form B, he only gave Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PHP 350,000.00) on the date stipulated in the articles of the firm. There being sufficient capital to commence the transaction of business, the firm began operations on January 30, 1999.

On March 30, 1999, B received the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 200,00.00) from Y, a partnership debtor, who is indebted to the firm for Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 300,000.00) and to B for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 100,000.00). Upon receipt of the said amount form Y, B applied One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 100,000.00) to the firm’s credit and the other One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 100,000.00) to his credit, which amount he however delivered to the firm to complete his contribution.

In subsequent transactions with several clients, C discovered that B was receiving personal commissions from them in exchange for additional discounts on prices being quoted by C. C then informed A about his findings, causing the latter to move for the ouster of B as managing partner.

In the meantime, the firm defaulted on a delivery to a major client, Z, who on account of the default terminated all dealings with the firm. Upon inquiries, it was determined that the reason for the defaults was the failure of C to make arrangements to abide with the stipulated delivery date as contained in Z’s letter to the firm that was received by A, who in turn failed to hand it over to C due to his pre-occupation with the actuations of B. Eventually, the firm was sued by Z for damages in the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PHP 750,000.00). At the end of the litigation, the firm was adjudged liable to Z and ordered to pay damages in the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 600,000.00). As the firm’s assets only amounted to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 2000,000.00), the firm had no recourse but to appeal the decision in the meantime. On appeal, the firm contends that since A was not the partner acting on the particular matter, the firm cannot be held liable for its default as the letter should have been delivered to C.

With the adverse decision casting a shadow over the reputation of the firm and causing it to lose clients, C sought to convince D to come in as a partner in view of his untarnished reputation with the clients of the firm. D agrees and will contributed One Million Pesos (PHP 1,000,000.00). Prior to D’s delivery of his contribution, C took out a newspaper advertisement announcing that D had joined the partnership. A month later, D delivered his contribution. Consequently, the firm immediately reaped the benefit of admitting D as a partner as they realized renewed sales that led to profits of Two Million Pesos (PHP 2,000,000.00) at the end of the year.

Discuss the propriety of the application by B of the payment of Y. (5%) Can B be considered as having delivered his contribution in full? (5%) What is the liability of B to the firm on account of his private dealings with several firm clients? (5%) Can A oust B as a managing partner? How? (5%) Assuming that B was ousted from the firm, what effect will his ouster have on any subsequent transaction that may have been entered into by C/ (5%) In the action brought by Z against the firm, is the letter notice received by A considered as notice to the firm? (5%) Prior to the delivery of D’s contribution to the firm, is there a partnership by estoppel? Is it liable for anything? (5%) Assuming that the firm decided to allocate profits because of the substantial profits, how will it be done and how much will each partner receive? (5%) Is D liable for the judgment obligation to Z? (5%) Assuming that D did not come in as a partner and the firm became bankrupt, will C be liable to Z? (5%)

3. What are the property rights of a partner? What are their incidents? Can they be conveyed, assigned or waived? (10%)

4. X, Y, Z and Company is a partnership engaged in the business of supplying heavy equipment to land developers. In the course of its business, partner X executed a deed of sale in his name conveying real estate property registered in the name of the partnership to B, the proceeds of which are to be used to settle its obligations to creditors. Does title pass to B? Explain fully. (5%)

5. Lou, Bong and Dino are the owners of a fishpond that is being managed by their common friend, Sonny. At the end of every year, Lou, Bond, Dino and Sonny sit down together to determine how much money was realized during the entire year form all the harvests. Of the amount so realized, Lou, Bon and Dino each receive twenty five percent, while Sonny is given ten percent, the remaining fifteen percent being reserved for the purchase of fingerlings to stock the fishpond and to maintain the same. Does a partnership exist between them? (5%)

6. A and B are general partners who contributed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 100,000,00.00) each, while C, D and E are limited partners who contributed Twenty Thousand Pesos (PHP 20,000.00) each to the common fund. After operating for a period of three years, the partnership assets stood at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP 300,000.00). The liabilities were as follows: Forty Thousand Pesos (PHP 40,000.00) owed to G, a partnership creditor, Twenty Thousand Pesos (PHP 20,000.00) owed to limited partner C as a loan, Two Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (PHP 220,000.00) owed to H, another partnership creditor, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (PHP 20,000.00) owed to limited partner E by way of a return of his contribution. Is the loan extended by C valid and can it be secured by specific partnership property? (5%) Can D assign his interest in the partnership to G? If he so assigns, his interest, what rights does G have? (5%) Is E entitled to a return of his contribution? (5%)

7. Bonus (10%)

yogad

Jul 24, 2002, 12:57 AM

baka naman may digest ng following cases:
fortune cement vs. nlrc
dy vs. nlrc
espinosa vs. nlrc

salamat!!!

PUGSLEY

Jul 27, 2002, 06:49 AM

Originally posted by yogad
baka naman may digest ng following cases:
fortune cement vs. nlrc
dy vs. nlrc
espinosa vs. nlrc

salamat!!!

I don't have the above-mentioned cases.....

If you need help, Please place the citation.

Thanks!!!

PUGSLEY

Aug 2, 2002, 11:42 PM

1.
a. Explain the effects of the provisions of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea as far as the sovereignty of the Philippines over its internal waters. (5%)

b. Congress enacted a law dividing the Philippines into three regions (Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) each constituting an independent state, but under a central government known as Philippine Federal Government. Discuss the constitutionality of the law. (5%)

2. Barely a year in office, President Estrada was deposed by a mass and broad based peaceful people’s revolution. In the meantime, President Estrada questioned his ouster before the Supreme Court as unconstitutional as he was elected for a six-year term to expire yet in year 2004. Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court justices deliberated on the case. If you were the ponente for the Court, how would you rule on the contention of President Estrada? What principle of government would you apply? (10%)

3. The Philippines is a signatory to the World Trade Organization. The organization requires among others signatories to the agreement to accord other signatories treatment no less favorable than that accorded its own nationals. A group of taxpayers questioned the Philippines entry to such an agreement on the following grounds: a) it impairs our sovereignty as the agreement prevents Congress from enacting laws for the national interest or general welfare. (5%) b) it violates Section 19, Article II which requires the State to develop a self reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos. (5%)

4. Due to urgent need of funds to finance the rehabilitation of areas in the county ravaged by recent typhoons, the President certifies to Congress the passage of a tax measure empowering the President to increase the tax rates on income at his discretion. Accordingly, Congressman Kik Bach filed a bill in the Lower House. Subsequently, Senator Jia Worksi filed a bill at the Senate proposing an improved version of the bill. To reconcile both bills, the bicameral conference committee of both houses hammered a compromise version which was sent to both houses for its passage. The compromise bill was eventually passed by both houses. After the Senate President and Speaker of the House affixed their signatures, the bill was presented to the President who immediately signed it.

One Congressman questions the constitutionality of the law on the following grounds:
a. The Bill that was passed by both houses was not the original one which was filed earlier with the Lower House in violation of Section 24. (5%)
b. The bill did not pass through three (3) readings in separate days and neither were printed copies of the bill furnished to the members of Congress three (3) days before the third reading. (5%)
c. There were provisions in the tax measure which were not part of the versions of both houses and this could be proven by referring to the legislative journal. (5%)
d. There is undue delegation of legislative power. (5%)

How would you traverse the arguments? Explain.

5.
a. Legislative power resides in Congress. How may the President be a part of the legislative process? (5%)

b. Under the Constitution, what is the respective role of the House of Representatives and senate in the conduct of foreign affairs? (5%)

6. President Erap signed into a law the Appropriations Act for 1999 passed by Congress but he vetoed separate items therein, among which is a provision stating that “the President may not increase an item of appropriation by transfer of savings from other items.” The Lower House chooses not to override the veto. The Senate however proceeds to consider two options: 1) to override the veto and 2) to challenge the constitutionality of the veto before the Supreme Court.
a) Is option no. 1 viable? If so, what is the vote required? (5%)

b) Is option No. 2 viable? If not, why not? If viable, how should the Court decide the case? (5%)

7.
a) In October 1998, barely four months after the national elections, members of Congress enacted a law increasing their salaries at a uniform rate of P 1 Million a year and made effective on year 2002. Is the law valid? (5%)

b) Atty. Toling ran for Congress and won. He was proclaimed by the Comelec. His opponent, Atty. *****, wondered how come he lost to his opponent, Atty. Toling, when the latter is a deaf-mute. For purposes of disqualification, before what body should the disqualification case be filed? May the case prosper? In cases of unfavorable verdict, may recourse to a higher body possible? On what grounds? (5%)

8.
a) Part of the fundamental principles in our Constitution is the “Separation of the Church and the State.” Yet, in the same constitution, properties of the church are exempt from taxation. Reconcile the apparent inconsistency. (5%)

b) May Congress pass a law totally exempting Churches, sects and religious denominations exempt from all forms of taxation? (5%)

9. Atty. Romy Caloscos ran and won as a Congressman representing the lone congressional district of Benguet.
a) Upon assumption of office, what must Atty. Romy Caloscos do? (5%)

b) Suppose, he was charged before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio for violation of BP 22. May he enter his appearance to defend himself? (5%)

tortvader

Aug 3, 2002, 04:50 AM

Puglsley, I'd like to post some of the digests of decisions written by Justice V.V. Mendoza. They are for made for the Criminal Law UP Bar Ops.
PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA , 273 SCRA 502 (1997)
Mendoza, J.

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of
RTC-Manila finding Dante Manansala guilty of rape
against his 14-year old daughter, Jennifer Manansala.
On direct examination, she said that she was raped by
her father on 8 occasions from the period Nov 1, 1991
up to Nov 13, 1991 in a taho factory where he was
living.

Held: Reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Ratio:

Incestuous rape is admittedly one of the heinous
crimes. However, the constitutional presumption of
innocence is sedulously observed. For this purpose,
the Court has formulated a set of principles: (1) An
accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to
prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) In view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime, where only 2
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
(3) The evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

The declarations made by the principal witness for the
defense, private complainant Jennifer Manansala, is
contradictory to her mother's testimony(Teresita who
was presented as a witness for the prosecution) in
that the latter said Jennifer was with her father in
Tarlac from Nov 1 to 13. Jennnifer was undulating and
wavering on her statements when upon cross-examination
she said that she was raped in Manila by her father on
Nov 1, but was again raped several times in Tarlac
from Nov 2 to 13. She explained that the reason why
she claimed that she had been raped in Manila was
because she was afraid that her complaints will be
dismissed for improper venue. Later she testified that
she was raped in Nov 1 and 2 in Manila, and then raped
in Tarlac on Nov 3 to 8.

The prosecution's evidence is not only shot through
with inconsistencies and contradictions, it is also
improbable. If complainant had been raped on Nov 1,
1991, why did she go with her father to Tarlac on Nov
2 and stayed there with him until Nov 14? She was
supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience
at the hands of her father but the following day and
for 13 more days after that she stayed with him. It is
true that the medico-legal examination conducted on
Nov 17 showed that shw was no longer a virgin and that
she had recent sexual intercourse. But the fact that
she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac
suggests that the crime was not rape, but quite
possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of
complainant (14 at that time of the crime). This is
expecially true because she said that she had been
given money by her father everytime they had an
intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of
the sexual act shows that it was not an ordeal that
she went through but a consensual act. One subjected
to sexual torture can hardly be expected to see what
was being done to her. What is clear from
complainant's testimony is that although accused had
had sexual intercourse with her, it was not done by
force or intimidation.

tortvader

Aug 3, 2002, 04:51 AM

PEOPLE vs. PANIQUE [G.R. No. 125763. October 13, 1999]
Automatic Review of the Decision of the RTC Br. 59, Parañaque
Ponente: V.V. Mendoza

FACTS: Complainant Geraldine, the eldest child of accused Emmanue
Panique by his wife Susana, was born on May 13, 1981. Her mother went
to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper, leaving her to the care of
accused. Complainant slept in the same bedroom with her sister and
accused, sharing the lower bunk of a double-deck bed with her father
while her sister took the upper bunk. At around 12 midnight of 22 May
1996, while complainant was asleep, accused laid himself on top of
her. When she awoke, she found accused fondling her breasts even as
he inserted his penis into her vagina. All she could do was cry,
because she was afraid of her father whom she knew was hooked on
drugs. She sought help from her uncle, who took her to Pasay to see
her aunt, who sent word to complainant's mother in Hong Kong. When
her mother arrived on 25 May 1996, they went to Camp Crame where she
was examined. An information for rape was filed against accused
alleging -
That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1996, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Geraldine
Panique against her will and consent. XXX
During arraignment, accused entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, complainant testified that this was not the first
occasion that he had raped her, having been sexually abused since
March 1993, when she was only 12 years old. On cross-examination,
complainant stated that her sister did not notice anything during the
incident; The medico-legal report shows that complainant is a "non-
virgin"; that there are no external signs of any form of violence;
and that complainant's vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative
of spermatozoa. Also offered in evidence for the prosecution are the
marriage certificate and complainant's birth certificate. When
accused testified, he admitted that complainant is his daughter and
that he had sexual intercourse with her. The RTC found him guilty of
rape and sentenced him to DEATH and ordered him to pay indemnity
(P50K), moral damages (P50K) and exemplary damages (P50K).
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape
HELD: YES!!!
REASONING: The evidence clearly show that resistance was not present
when accused was on top of her and inserting his penis. She did not
do anything but yielded to the accused. As a matter of fact, after
the sexual intercourse, accused lay beside her and place his legs on
top of her thighs and was touching her breast. Because a woman's most
precious asset is the purity of her womanhood, she will resist to the
last ounce of her strength any attempt to defile it. It is unnatural
and unbelievable that a woman whose honor had just been outraged
would do nothing. In a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or
influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority.
Abuse of reverence and respect by a father can subjugate his
daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants.
Accused's moral ascendancy over complainant was reinforced by the
fact that since his wife had gone to Hong Kong to work there, accused
alone exercised parental authority over his children. The
overpowering moral influence of accused-appellant as a father took
the place of violence and made his carnal knowledge of his daughter
rape.
The fact that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime and that accused is her ascendant would
have called for the imposition of the death penalty on accused.
However, complainant's minority and relationship to the offender were
NOT alleged in the information. (Incompetent piece of ****!) The
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender
constitute a special qualifying circumstance which should be alleged
in the information and proved to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty. Hence, the death penalty imposed on him should be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
RTC correctly awarded an indemnity of P50K in favor of complainant in
line with existing jurisprudence. In addition, complainant should be
paid P50K as moral damages, but the award of exemplary damages is
deleted for lack of basis.

DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that SENTENCE REDUCED to
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

tortvader

Aug 3, 2002, 04:53 AM

VASQUEZ vs. CA
September 15, 1999

MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
1. Vazquez, a Tondo resident, and some 37 families fromhis area, went to see National Housing Authority chair Lito Atienza regarding their complaints against their Barangay Chairman Olmedo.
2. After their meeting, they were interviewed by nes reporters re their meeting with Atienza.
3. The next day, a news story came out saying Olmedo in cahoots with NHA officials deprived Vasquez and his group of land. There were also imputations regarding the chairman’s involvement in theft of fighting ***** and his involvement in a murder case.
4. Olmeda files complaint for libel based on newspaper story.
5. RTC found petitioner guilty and fined him P1,000.00 on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the truth of the charges and that he was "motivated by vengeance in uttering the defamatory statement." CA affirms in toto. Vasquez goes to SC on petition for review.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of libel

SC: No!
To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 RPC, the following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

In accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. The issue here is not whether the Brgy chairman actually committed the imputed crimes but WON he was actually charged with the crimes.

In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent.

Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

PUGSLEY

Aug 4, 2002, 02:52 AM

tortvader:

Great Job!!!

PUGSLEY

Aug 5, 2002, 06:06 AM

1. Being a lawyer and/or a member of the bar is an exceptional privilege worth aspiring for although it entails a lot of responsibilities and obligations a) the court; b) to fellow lawyers; c) to the clients; and lastly d) to the public in general.
Briefly discuss these obligations and responsibilities (20%)

2. Write a short paragraph on the statement that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. (10%)

3. Are citizens of the United States practicing law in the Philippines before July 4, 1946 allowed to continue to practice their profession after this date without taking an examination? Explain. (10%)

4. A group of businessmen organized a corporation, the Reliable Law Co., intended to furnish its stockholders with legal advice and services. It proposed to hire licensed lawyers to do the legal work. On presentation of the incorporation papers, the same was denied by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Was the Securities and Exchange Commission justified in refusing registration? Why? (10%)

5. Aromin and Bugtong, both lawyers, and Mabalo, a Certified Public Accountant, in order to enhance their respective practice, decided to pull their resources together and establish a partnership for the combined purposes of law and accounting under the firm name Aromin, Bugtong, Mabalo and Associates. Is the proposed partnership allowed? (10%)

6. State the reasons why every applicant for admission to the Bar must be 1) a citizen of the Philippines, 2) of age, 3) a resident of the Philippines, 4) possessed of good moral character. (10%)

7. What is the first and most important duty of an attorney? Why? (5%)
How should a lawyer view representation of the poor, the marginalized, and the oppressed before our Courts of Justice? Explain. (5%)
Why is legal aid to those unable to pay for legal services a matter of public duty and not a matter of charity? (5%)

8. What are the duties of a lawyer to the courts? (5%)

9. In a newspaper there has appeared from time to time the entire text of pleadings, memoranda etc. in important cases involving public interest. In several instance, the published papers, pleadings, etc. indicate that a well-known member of the judiciary has signed such papers thus:
X, Y and Associates – Counsels for Respondents
By: Justice X

Does the foregoing constitute a breach of legal or professional ethics on the part of the law firm and the signing partner? Answer with reasons. (10%)